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We take notice that since early in the 19th Century there have 
been marked differences between the United States Congress 
and other parliamentary bodies.  One is the greater 
development of the committee system here . . . .  Committee 
chairmen and members naturally develop interest and 
expertise in the subjects entrusted to their continuing 
surveillance.  Officials in the executive branch have to take 
these committees into account and keep them informed, 
respond to their inquiries, and it may be, flatter and please 
them when necessary.  Committees do not need even the type of 
“report and wait” provision we have here to develop 
enormous influence over executive branch doings.  There is 
nothing unconstitutional about this: indeed, our separation of 
powers makes such informal cooperation much more necessary 
than it would be in a pure system of parliamentary 
government.1
Although more than a century has passed since the birth of the 
administrative state in the United States, a great deal of uncertainty 
remains concerning the actual and appropriate distribution of power 
within the government.  There is a continuing struggle between the 
President and Congress over control of the administration.  Legal 
conflicts have resulted from innovations of more or less recent vintage, 
including legislative and line-item vetoes,2 congressional appointment of 
members of independent agencies,3 assignment of administrative tasks to 
 1. City of Alexandria v. United States, 737 F.2d 1022, 1025-26 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 2. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (striking down line-item veto); 
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down legislative veto). 
 3. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding, inter alia, appointment of 
members of Federal Election Commission by the Speaker of the House and the President 
pro tempore of the Senate improper). 
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officials under the control of Congress,4 and the creation of a mechanism 
for the appointment (by an Article III court) of a prosecutor outside the 
control of the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute executive 
branch misconduct.5  Another set of skirmishes has involved assignment 
of power to adjudicate disputes among private parties to non-Article III 
tribunals such as agencies6 and arbitrators.7
Disputes concerning the proper distribution of power over the 
administration of the laws have also arisen in somewhat more rarified 
constitutional contexts.8  There have been two attempts in recent decades 
to revive the nondelegation doctrine, which in some circumstances limits 
the power Congress may grant to the President and administrative 
agencies.9  Legislation passed relating to an administrative matter during 
the pendency of judicial review litigation has also been attacked as 
usurping the judicial role.10  And Congress has been twice rebuffed 
 4. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that the Comptroller 
General, an official subject to removal by joint resolution of Congress, may not exercise 
authority to enforce budget controls). 
 5. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding provisions of the 
Ethics in Government Act concerning the appointment and removal of independent 
counsel with authority to investigate and prosecute executive branch officials). 
 6. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) 
(upholding assignment to Commodity Futures Trading Commission to adjudicate state 
law counterclaims in dispute between commodities broker and customer). 
 7. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) 
(upholding mandatory binding arbitration, with limited judicial review, of compensation 
claim by pesticide registrant against private party wishing to make use of trade secrets 
contained in registration materials). 
 8. For an overview of separation of powers disputes between Congress and the 
President, see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE 
PRESIDENT (1985). 
 9. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (rejecting novel 
holding of D.C. Circuit that the Clean Air Act violated the nondelegation doctrine 
because the EPA failed to articulate standards under which it would exercise regulatory 
discretion); Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the OSH Act violated nondelegation doctrine); 
Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) 
(plurality opinion) (noting that if the OSH Act lacked threshold requirement before 
agency may regulate workplace, it might be unconstitutional under the nondelegation 
doctrine); id. at 671-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the 
OSH Act violated the nondelegation doctrine). 
 10. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) 
(upholding legislation passed during the pendency of judicial review that, in effect, 
legislatively approved the administrative action under review). 




when it attempted to retain control over the administration of the airports 
in the Washington, D.C. area.11
There have also been numerous nonconstitutional administrative law 
controversies that implicate the allocation of power to control the 
administration of the laws.  Many of these controversies center on 
appropriate standards of judicial review: May courts impose procedural 
requirements on agencies when, in the courts’ judgment, APA 
procedures are insufficient?12  How much and when should courts defer 
to agency policy decisions13 or agency interpretations of statutes?14  
When is an agency decision beyond the reach of judicial review?15  May 
the President or members of Congress communicate with administrative 
officials about matters pending before the agency16 or force the agency 
to submit some or all administrative decisions to review by agents of the 
President?17  These issues, while not explicitly constitutional, have 
implications for the distribution of power among the President, 
Congress, agencies and the courts. 
Underlying many of these controversies is a fact that is insufficiently 
noted in legal scholarship—that Congress is deeply involved in the day 
to day administration of the law.18  In recent years, at least since 
 11. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (holding members of Congress may not serve on Board of 
Review with power to overrule decisions of Airport Authority); Hechinger v. Metro. 
Wash. Airports Auth., 36 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that Congress may not 
require appointments to Board of Directors of Airport Authority be made from lists 
supplied by the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate). 
 12. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519 (1978) (stating that courts lack power, absent unconstitutionality, to impose 
procedures in addition to those statutorily required). 
 13. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 14. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 15. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991); Webster v. Doe, 
486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
 16. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 17. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981); Exec. Order 
No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (2005). 
 18. There has been some very good legal scholarship on this point, including 
Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative 
Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992); Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of 
Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059 (2001); and 
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 1511, 1525 (1992).  However, the political science literature on congressional 
oversight of the administration of the law is much more developed.  See, e.g., Arthur 
Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (1994); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. 
Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 243 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, 
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the 
Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); Mathew D. McCubbins, The 
Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 721 (1985); Seymour 
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President Reagan’s precedent-setting Executive Order 12,291, which 
subjected administrative rules to centralized review by the Office of 
Management and Budget, there has been a resurgence of direct 
Presidential supervision of the administrative state, and this phenomenon 
has received significant attention in legal academia.19  Congress’s 
involvement has been much less thoroughly examined, and, although 
most people are familiar with congressional hearings and oversight, the 
dominant image as a legal matter is that once Congress legislates, it 
loses control over how its laws are administered.  Under this dominant 
image, the only mechanisms that prevent the administration from 
ignoring Congress’s goals altogether are judicial review and the 
possibility of further legislation.20  This article is an attempt to initiate a 
Scher, Congressional Committee Members as Independent Agency Overseers: A Case 
Study, 54 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 911 (1960); B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The 
Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801 (1991).  
Further, administrative law has not been sufficiently influenced by the realities of 
congressional oversight. 
 19. The classic recent work is Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).  It is clear, as Dean Kagan describes, that the President has 
become much more directly involved in agency action in recent decades.  See also 
Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996) (discussing 
the dominance of executive power); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of 
Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994); Terry M. Moe, Regulatory 
Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197 (1982); Daniel B. 
Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership in the 
Modern Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180 (1994); Thomas O. Sargentich, The 
Contemporary Assault on Checks and Balances, 7 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 231, 241, 247-55 
(1998); Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency 
Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1994); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role 
of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986). 
 20. In the early days of review of regulations under President Reagan’s Executive 
Order 12,291, there was a great deal of commentary on whether centralized review was 
proper in light of Congress’s usual practice of delegating regulatory authority directly to 
a particular agency.  See Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test 
Case in Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL. 483 (1988); Colin S. 
Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 519 (1987); Thomas O. McGarity, 
Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443 
(1987); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way 
to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986); Morton Rosenberg, Presidential 
Control of Agency Rulemaking: An Analysis of Constitutional Issues that May Be Raised 
by Executive Order 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1199 (1981).  Now that review under the 
successors to 12,291 is an entrenched and accepted element of the administrative 
process, scholarship has focused on its justifications, its effects, and its limits.  See 
William D. Araiza, Judicial and Legislative Checks on Ex Parte OMB Influence Over 
Rulemaking, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 611 (2002); Steven Croley, White House Review of 
Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003); John O. 
McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901 (2001) 




greater appreciation of Congress’s role in the administration of the laws 
and to infuse that understanding into certain key features of 
administrative law. 
In the political science and public policy literature, the understanding 
of Congress’s role in monitoring agencies has evolved from despair that 
Congress is not sufficiently engaged21 to a recognition that Congress 
gets involved when it is worth it in terms of gaining political support 
from oversight activities.22  In a seminal paper reconstructing our 
understanding of Congress’s supervisory role, McCubbins and Schwartz 
compared Congress’s oversight of agencies to police patrols and fire 
alarms.  Police patrols involve constant supervision under which the 
“police” are ever searching for problems.  Under fire alarm supervision, 
the department sits back and waits for someone to pull the alarm 
indicating that there is a problem.  This theory holds that while it may 
not be worth it very often for Congress to devote “police patrol” 
resources to oversight, members gain a great deal of political credit for 
“putting out fires” called in by constituents.23  Thus, the appearance of 
lack of oversight may in actuality reflect a rational decision that in most 
cases it is more cost-effective to sit back and wait for an alarm.  The 
proliferation of congressional casework is also a reflection of this reality. 
On the other hand, the high volume of reports that agencies are 
required to file with Congress and the constant monitoring of agencies 
that Congress performs indicates that some more generalized, police 
patrol type oversight is worthwhile.  Police departments find it 
(arguing that presidential review helps restore control over excessive delegation to 
agencies); Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability, supra note 18, at 1068-75. 
 21. THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE 
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979). 
 22. Mathew D. McCubbins, Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the 
Bureaucracy, and the Delegation Dilemma, REGULATION, Summer 1999, at 30; Mathew 
D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).  I do not mean to argue that 
there is general agreement that Congress is more powerful than the President or vice 
versa.  Political scientist Robert Spitzer recognizes that Congress has the tools to exert 
control over the execution of the law, but argues that a careful examination of 
institutional realities reveals that the President exercises “hegemony” over the U.S. 
government despite the availability of tools with which Congress could resist 
presidential domination.  See ROBERT J. SPITZER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: EXECUTIVE 
HEGEMONY AT THE CROSSROADS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1993); see also Lucy 
Drotning & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Predicting Bureaucratic Control: Evidence from 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 21 LAW & POL’Y 1 (1999) (noting disparate views 
on degree of congressional control and constructing an empirical test to determine the 
conditions under which oversight is likely). 
 23. McCubbins, Abdication or Delegation, supra note 22, at 33 (“Political leaders 
are therefore likely to prefer the low-risk, high-reward strategy of fire-alarm 
oversight . . . .”); see also Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN 
THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989). 
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worthwhile to send officers out in automobiles, airplanes, helicopters 
and boats looking for problems, and even fire departments do some 
inspections without waiting for an alarm.  Similarly, Congress requires 
thousands of periodic reports from agencies, holds numerous hearings 
and sends the Government Accountability Office (GAO)24 out looking 
for problems even in the absence of a pulled alarm.  While the 
McCubbins and Schwartz model is obviously a very powerful conceptual 
tool for understanding the incentives underlying oversight, the high 
volume of oversight that is not responsive to particular alarms 
contradicts the prediction that there will be little in the way of police 
patrol type oversight.25  To the contrary, oversight, like police patrols, 
seems to be everywhere, whether alarms are being sounded or not.26
Congress’s oversight of and involvement in the administration of the 
laws is a result of the unique structure of the U.S. government.  
Ironically, as the above quoted passage from an opinion of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit recognizes, the brand of separation of 
powers practiced in the United States is a significant cause of Congress’s 
ongoing intervention into executive branch activity.  In most countries 
with parliamentary systems, principal executive officers are drawn from 
the legislature, and they are a natural conduit for legislative input into 
the execution of the law.  In the United States, with the constitutional 
prohibition of contemporaneous service in both Congress and the 
executive branch, other channels are necessary, and sometimes it 
 24. The role of the GAO in congressional oversight of agencies is discussed infra 
at notes 314-322 and accompanying text. 
 25. It is somewhat difficult in some situations to distinguish between police patrol 
and fire alarm oversight.  Many, if not most, legislative and regulatory initiatives are in 
response to an alarm sounded by a group of constituents demanding resolution of a 
problem or favorable governmental treatment, just as the level of police patrols in a 
community is likely to be very responsive to the articulated demands of the citizenry.  
Once a regulatory program is in place, the constant monitoring of agency performance 
that Congress tends to do may be thought of as responsive to the initial “alarm” that 
resulted in the regulatory program, or it may be viewed as police patrol oversight if no 
new alarm precipitated the particular instance of oversight. 
 26. An additional difficulty is that there is no clear normative baseline for judging 
whether the amount of congressional oversight of the executive branch is proper.  This 
makes it very hard to come to a conclusion on whether Congress is fulfilling its role as 
legislator or whether it has abdicated that role to executive decisionmaking.  Basic 
economic modeling, as exemplified by the McCubbins and Schwartz thesis, would 
predict that Congress will retain or delegate power based on the political costs and 
benefits.  JOHN A. ROHR, CIVIL SERVANTS AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONS 84-86 (2002). 




appears that only the creativity of Congress limits the form of oversight 
and control. 
 Congress’s involvement in the administration of the law takes place 
both formally and informally.27  Formally, Congress attempts to control 
the administration of the law legislatively, through devices as general as 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and as specific as legislation 
enumerating with particularity the purposes for which appropriated 
funds may or may not be spent and legislation approving particular 
agency action during the pendency of judicial review litigation.  
Informally, Congress uses the threat of legislative action, especially 
relating to its power over the budget, to control or at least influence the 
administration of the law in myriad ways, from insisting that the 
President appoint particular candidates for executive positions to 
pushing administrative action in the substantive direction favored by 
members of Congress without the need to resort to the full legislative 
process.  Through its oversight and supervision of the administration of 
the laws, Congress is involved in a great deal of the output of the 
administrative state. 
The consistent and constant involvement of Congress in the 
administration of the laws has interesting ramifications for key features 
of administrative law such as the nondelegation doctrine, which 
regulates the amount of discretion Congress may delegate to an agency, 
the Chevron doctrine, which specifies the standard for judicial review of 
agency statutory interpretation, and the Vermont Yankee doctrine, which 
prohibits courts from imposing procedural requirements on agencies in 
addition to those that are required by either the Constitution or 
applicable statutes and rules.  The lenient nondelegation doctrine, which 
allows for the delegation of a great deal of discretion to agencies, is 
consistent with a full appreciation of Congress’s role.  As far as 
deference to agency statutory interpretation is concerned, congressional 
administration counsels in favor of a deferential version of Chevron in 
those instances in which congressional involvement in agency 
interpretation is likely.  Finally, a broad application of the Vermont Yankee 
doctrine to prohibit courts from imposing their own ideas of proper 
 27. For a collection of citations to the literature on congressional influence over 
the administration of the law, most of which come from nonlegal publications, see 
Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 755 n.135 (2005).  For 
a useful collection of essays on the relative roles of Congress and the President in 
matters of public policy, see DIVIDED DEMOCRACY: COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS (James A. Thurber ed., 1991).  See also Walter 
Dellinger, The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and 
Congress, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 513 app. at 562-66 (2000) (discussing oversight). 
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procedures on agencies is consistent with Congress’s involvement in the 
execution of the laws. 
 This Article is structured as follows.  The first part of the Article is a 
catalog of the ways that Congress is involved in the administration of the 
law, formal and informal.28  Included in this part is some analysis of 
whether Congress’s involvement is appropriate as a constitutional and 
legal matter.  The second part of the Article analyzes important doctrines 
of administrative law in light of Congress’s involvement and asks 
whether and to what extent any of these doctrines should be modified or 
at least reconceptualized in that light.  In particular, three pillars of 
administrative law are examined—the nondelegation doctrine, the 
Vermont Yankee doctrine and the Chevron doctrine. 
I.  CONGRESS’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAWS 
The form of Congress’s involvement in the administration of the laws 
ranges across a wide spectrum of formal and informal methods.29  On the 
formal side, Congress employs its legislative power to map out its 
preferred course of administrative action, and then it continually 
supervises the executive branch through legislation and other formal 
action.30  Some legislation is directed at particular agencies, and ranges 
from directive provisions in enabling legislation to very specific 
appropriations riders that prohibit or direct particular agency actions.  
Other legislation, such as the APA and the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA), is more general and is designed to shape the 
 28. I have purposely omitted discussion of the war power.  It is worth noting that 
Louis Fisher believes that Congress has, in recent times, abdicated its historical position 
of primacy in the decision whether to commit the armed forces of the United States to 
foreign conflict.  See LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND 
SPENDING (2000); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2d ed. rev. 2004).  For an 
analysis of Congress’s role in authorizing the war on terrorism, see Curtis A. Bradley & 
Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 2047 (2005). 
 29. For a comprehensive look at the relationship between Congress and the 
President, see LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE 
EXECUTIVE (4th ed. 1998).  See also THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY: CONGRESSIONAL 
RESTRAINTS ON EXECUTIVE POWER (Thomas M. Franck ed., 1981). 
 30. Of course, the President supervises Congress’s legislative actions through the 
veto power, Article I, Section 7, and the Recommendations Clause, Article II, Section 3.  
For an interesting discussion of the President’s involvement in the legislative process, 
including an argument that Congress is constitutionally required to consider the President’s 
recommendations, see Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-In-Chief, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2002). 




conduct and policies of many agencies.  In many cases, Congress enlists 
the aid of the courts by prescribing judicial review under specified 
standards.  Although most formal congressional action is in the form of 
legislation, the Senate’s power to reject executive appointments and the 
impeachment and removal power of the House and Senate, respectively, 
are additional formal tools that Congress employs to supervise the 
executive branch. 
In addition to formal supervision, Congress, or at least small groups 
and individual members of Congress, supervise agencies informally.  
Informal supervision also takes a variety of forms, including cajoling, 
adverse publicity, audits, investigations, committee hearings, factfinding 
missions, informal contacts with agency members and staff, and pressure 
on the President to appoint persons chosen by members of Congress to 
agency positions.  All of the informal congressional action directed at 
agencies takes place in the context of (often unspoken) threats that 
Congress (or a particularly powerful member or committee) will not 
cooperate with the executive branch in the future.  Congress’s power 
over all legislation including the annual budget, the power of 
congressional committees to bottle up legislation, and the Senate’s 
advice and consent power over appointments all create a strong incentive 
for the President and the rest of the executive branch to keep Congress 
happy.  Thus, informal tools of supervision are often as powerful as 
formal tools.31
Sometimes, it seems that members of Congress do not care much 
about how the laws they have passed are executed, or at least they do not 
care enough to react formally or informally to administrative action.32  
Other times, Congress seems incredibly concerned, even obsessed, with 
how its laws are administered.  Perhaps Congress should care more 
often, and it may be a major defect in our political system that Congress 
can take credit with constituents for passing legislation and then sit by 
idly while the executive branch fails to carry out its terms.  Even worse, 
Congress can interfere with the execution of the law to please a different 
group of constituents.  Overall, however, the level of oversight is high 
enough that it is incorrect to assert that Congress abdicates its 
responsibility when it delegates discretion to those administering the 
law. 
 31. See generally Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or 
Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 
J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983). 
 32. Over the years, there have been many attacks on delegation based upon the 
political distortions that occur when Congress does not make the hard choices itself.  A 
good example is DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW 
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993). 
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The remainder of this section describes and analyzes the principal 
tools, both formal and informal, that Congress uses to supervise the 
execution of the laws.  These mechanisms are far from perfect if the 
standard of perfection is ensuring implementation of programs in accord 
with the intent of the legislative coalitions that enacted the programs.  
Numerous principal-agent problems prevent Congress from ensuring 
that agencies implement programs in accordance with congressional 
desires.  Further, once post-hoc supervision comes into play, the 
difficulties may be magnified, with a new coalition or group within 
Congress acting in accordance with aims that may be different from 
those of the coalition that originally enacted the law being administered.33  
Nonetheless, even though perfection may be unattainable, oversight of 
agencies is important to Congress and constitutes a substantial part of 
Congress’s work. 
A.  Formal Congressional Involvement in the Execution of the Laws 
1.  The Legislative Power 
Congress’s most important formal method of influencing the 
administration of the law is legislation, that is, by passing a bill through 
both Houses of Congress and presenting it to the President for signature or 
veto.  Aside from a few constitutionally prescribed exceptions discussed 
below, formal action by Congress has been limited by a number of 
Supreme Court decisions in the past few decades to the legislative process, 
including the invalidation of the legislative veto,34 the insistence that 
officials under Congress’s formal supervision may not take part in the 
execution of the laws35 and the invalidation of any attempt by members of 
Congress to appoint the members of administrative agencies36 or to serve 
on such agencies themselves.37
Put quite simply, Congress provides the laws to administer, and the 
President’s primary power and duty is to faithfully execute those laws.  
When Congress legislates with precision, the President and other 
administrative officials may have little discretion in the execution of the 
 33. See generally McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, supra note 18. 
 34. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 35. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 36. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 37. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991). 




law, especially if there are effective tools for enforcing Congress’s 
expressed intent.  Congress can also attempt, in the legislation creating 
an agency or granting it the power to act, to “hard wire” the agency 
through procedural and structural devices to make the agency more 
likely to act in line with congressional preferences.38  If Congress is less 
than precise, or if enforcement is not very strong, Congress may be 
unable to exert much direct control over the administration of the law. 
The legislative power gives Congress an enormous ability to control 
the execution of the laws.39  The President’s power to execute the laws is 
completely dependent on Congress passing laws to execute.  There are, 
no doubt, some areas in which the President has unreviewable authority, 
such as decisions concerning the recognition of foreign governments.40  
In most areas, however, the President and the entire executive branch are 
highly dependent on legislation enabling them to carry out their 
constitutionally assigned functions.  As Judge Michael McConnell stated 
recently in an opinion upholding very specific legislation aimed at 
controlling the execution of the law: 
 38. See Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The 
Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 673 (1992).  This illustrates 
a conceptual distinction in understanding congressional control of administrative action, 
the distinction between ex ante and ex post controls.  Ex ante controls, such as precise 
statutory language and agency structure, attempt to control agency action in advance.  Ex 
post controls, such as statutory amendments and appropriations riders, attempt to control 
agency action after the fact, when Congress notices that the agency has done something 
it does not like.  Hard wiring the agency, as Macey describes, is an example of an ex ante 
control device. 
       39. Unlike other legislatures that are constitutionally barred from legislating 
in certain areas of executive prerogative, or whose decisions may be 
overridden by an executive veto or popular vote, Congress has a jurisdiction 
that is virtually coterminous with that of the national government.  Congress, 
rather than the president or the voters, has the final say on public policy 
questions.
Michael L. Mezey, Congress Within the U.S. Presidential System, in DIVIDED 
DEMOCRACY: COOPERATION AND CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 9, 
23 (James A. Thurber ed., 1991). 
 40. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); see also 
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).  However, Congress has been active in the 
general field of foreign affairs.  Thomas Franck interestingly ascribes congressional 
activism in the international human rights field to the failure of the executive branch to 
enforce the law.  See Thomas M. Franck, Human Rights and Constitutional Wrongs: A 
Case Study of the Origins of Congressional Imperialism, in THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY, 
supra note 29, at 160-62.  In another essay in the same collection, a foreign diplomat 
complains that legislative oversight of the conduct of foreign affairs causes problems 
because congressional meddling reduces the reliability of the executive branch.  See Ivor 
Richard, Foreign Perspective: With Whom Do You Deal? Whom Can You Trust?, in THE 
TETHERED PRESIDENCY, supra note 29, at 21.  The problem appears to arise from the lack 
of a connection between the Cabinet and Congress. 
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[W]hen Congress is exercising its own powers with respect to matters of public 
right, the executive role of “tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” 
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, is entirely derivative of the laws passed by Congress, 
and Congress may be as specific in its instructions to the Executive as it 
wishes.41
The language of the Constitution underscores the extent of congressional 
superiority: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House 
of Representatives.”42  The Constitution amplifies the legislative power 
in incredibly broad terms.  Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants 
Congress the power “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”43  The analysis of this 
clause has by and large focused on the meaning of “necessary and 
proper,” with most scholars (and courts) adopting a very broad reading.44  
I want to focus on the last part of the clause which grants Congress the 
power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying out “all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  This language means 
that in addition to legislation to carry out Congress’s enumerated 
powers, Congress has the power to legislate on all matters properly 
within the purview of the federal government, whether or not they are 
listed as within the legislative power.45
 41. Biodiversity Assoc. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004) (alteration 
in original). 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 44. My colleague Gary Lawson is among the exceptions.  He has consistently 
argued for a narrow interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  See Gary 
Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional 
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993).  I do not mean to enter 
into the debate over the proper meaning of the clause, except to note that the courts have 
by and large allowed Congress very wide latitude in the laws it enacts, perhaps with a bit 
of tightening up in the last decade or so.  One way in which the Supreme Court has 
narrowed Congress’s power is by using the procedural device of requiring that Congress 
make findings to justify its legislation.  See Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an 
Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731 
(1996).  In my view, this proceduralization of the analysis is not really genuine, but 
rather designed to meet the criticism that the Court should not aggressively review the 
substantive bases for congressional action. 
 45. See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the 
Judicial Branch, 1 BYU L. REV. 75 (1999). 




Just what does Congress’s ability to make law relating to powers 
vested in other departments or officers entail?  May Congress restrict the 
exercise of powers vested in other officials, or does “carrying out” mean 
that Congress may only enable other officials to carry out their 
constitutionally assigned functions?  For example, the prevailing 
understanding is that Congress may not restrict the President’s 
recognition of foreign governments because the power to receive 
“Ambassadors and other public Ministers” is explicitly granted to the 
President and is part of the President’s authority in foreign affairs, where 
it is most important for the nation to speak with one voice.  Congress 
legislates in this area by providing funds for the conduct of foreign 
affairs and by passing laws regarding the immunities and privileges of 
foreign diplomats.  Does Congress also have the power to limit the 
President’s exercise of his constitutional powers on the theory that the 
clause grants Congress the power to legislate even on matters vested by 
the Constitution in other officers?  Consider also legislation relating to 
the judiciary.  There has long been controversy over whether Congress 
has the power to restrict the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.  The 
most common argument in favor of Congress’s power is that the power 
to restrict the courts’ jurisdiction is implicit in Congress’s complete 
discretion over whether to create any lower federal courts at all.  The 
second half of the Necessary and Proper Clause adds another, perhaps 
even stronger, argument that restricting the lower courts’ jurisdiction is 
within Congress’s power to make laws relating to the powers vested by 
the Constitution in the federal courts. 
There are conflicting views regarding the scope of Congress’s power 
over the other branches, particularly the executive branch, under the 
second half of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  William Van Alstyne 
has taken a broad view of Congress’s power, concluding that except in 
areas of constitutional necessity, the President and the federal courts are 
highly dependent on Congress for their powers, even in sensitive areas 
such as “confidentiality, removal, [and] remedy.”46  According to Van 
Alstyne’s reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause, “the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress may defeat an assertion of ancillary 
executive or judicial powers that cannot be defended as having been 
expressly provided in articles II and III or as necessarily implied by the 
nature of the expressed duties of those branches.”47
 46. William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental 
Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect 
of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 118 (1976). 
 47. Id. 
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David Engdahl has argued for a more restrictive view of Congress’s 
power, concluding that the language of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
grants Congress power only to enable, but not to restrict, other branches 
in the exercise of their constitutional powers: 
With reference to the powers of another branch, however, whatever discretion 
inheres in them belongs not to Congress but to that other branch, and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause only empowers Congress to help effectuate the 
discretion confided to that other branch. Although the decision whether and how 
to render assistance is committed to Congress’ discretion, it is only assistance 
that is authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause. The words of this clause 
are so perfectly adapted as to seem specifically tailored to exclude laws that 
restrict or inhibit the constitutionally contemplated power (hence discretion) of 
another branch.48
I do not find the language of the Necessary and Proper Clause as clear as 
Engdahl does.  Although Van Alstyne observes that a construction 
allowing Congress only to enable the other branches is compatible with 
the language of the clause, he does not reach a firm conclusion on 
whether Congress has the additional power to restrict the other 
branches.49  But Engdahl has gone much further, concluding that the 
enabling only construction is almost compelled by the language.  To the 
contrary, when the Constitution grants Congress the power to make all 
laws necessary and proper for carrying out “all other Powers vested by 
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof,” it is not linguistic nonsense to interpret 
this language as granting Congress the power to decide what is 
“necessary and proper” and what is not.  A law may be necessary and 
proper for carrying into the execution of a power granted to another 
branch if it confines the other branch to exercising the power in a 
manner consistent with legislatively expressed standards or procedures.50  
Almost any legislation Congress might pass with regard to another 
 48. Engdahl, supra note 45, at 102 (second emphasis added). 
 49. See Van Alstyne, supra note 46, at 133 n.100.  In my view, Van Alstyne’s 
analysis and the sources he cites point toward the power to restrict.  However, his main 
focus is on the other branches’ need for enabling legislation from Congress, while 
Engdahl focuses a bit more on the possibility of restrictive legislation. 
 50. This would be nonsense to Gary Lawson, who argues that the word “proper” in 
the Necessary and Proper Clause requires Congress to respect background norms of 
federalism and separation of powers.  Among separation of powers norms at the 
founding, according to Lawson, is a ban on congressional interference with the 
performance by the other branches of their constitutionally assigned functions.  See Gary 
Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 
18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 195-200 (2001). 




branch may include some restrictions or limitations, such as a 
requirement that a particular agency employ a rulemaking or 
adjudicatory procedure before issuing a rule or order or even that a 
particular agency may issue only rules or only orders.  Engdahl cites for 
support of his conclusion the following language from an opinion of 
Chief Justice John Marshall: “As Chief Justice Marshall said, Congress 
may ‘exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures to carry into 
execution the constitutional powers of the government.’”51  This 
language does not answer whether the Court would strike down 
Congress’s judgment if it embodied restrictions that are not contained in 
the Constitution itself, for example by selecting some measures while 
disallowing others or requiring that particular actions be done according 
to prescribed procedures. 
It is thus not a simple question whether Congress has the power to 
place limitations on other branches in the exercise of their constitutional 
powers.  Consider the following example.  The Constitution grants the 
President the power to issue pardons.  Assume that Congress authorizes 
the position of “pardon attorney” in the Department of Justice and also 
appropriates funds for the pardon process.  So far so good, but suppose 
also that the legislation requires the President to consult the pardon 
attorney, and give her thirty days to render advice, before issuing a 
pardon and that pardons issued in contravention of these requirements 
are invalid.  Then, on his last day in office, the outgoing President issues 
several pardons that were never submitted to the pardon attorney.  Are 
these pardons valid?52  Most people’s reaction to this example is likely 
to be in favor of the President’s power to disregard the restrictions 
because the President is exercising a constitutional power, not a power 
granted under a statute passed by Congress.  That seems to be the best 
reading of Supreme Court case law, but there are good arguments that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause’s reference to other powers granted in 
the Constitution gives Congress the power to place restrictions on the 
exercise of the pardon power.53
 51. Engdahl, supra note 45, at 102 n.103 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420 (1819)). 
 52. See HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 194-96 (2005) (discussing 
congressional interference in the President’s pardon power). 
 53. The Supreme Court’s only decision directly on point struck down an effort by 
Congress to interfere with the pardon power by converting a pardon from evidence of 
loyalty during the Civil War to evidence of disloyalty.  See United States v. Klein, 80 
U.S. 128 (1871).  The Court has also expressed its views on the pardon power in dicta, 
usually recognizing expansive presidential power free from congressional interference.  
See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).  For a comprehensive study of 
Congress’s role in the pardon power, see Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power 
over Pardon & Amnesty: Legislative Authority in the Shadow of Presidential 
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Even if the Necessary and Proper Clause is read to grant Congress the 
power to enable, but not restrict, other officers in the exercise of their 
constitutional powers, Congress is likely to maintain some discretion 
regarding how much to enable the other branches.  For example, 
Congress, perhaps out of dissatisfaction with the President’s conduct in 
foreign affairs, may fail to afford foreign diplomats customary protections 
or it may appropriate insufficient funds for the President to conduct the 
diplomacy the President would prefer.  Congress may similarly fail to 
provide the federal courts with adequate resources and may refuse to 
increase the number of judges when the workload indicates the need.  
Insufficient enabling is unlikely to be viewed as unconstitutional, and 
Congress’s legislative power, even if it is restricted by doctrines 
prohibiting direct interference in the other branches’ activities, provides 
Congress with significant supervisory authority.  Neither the Constitution 
nor Marshall’s language clearly states that Congress must enable the 
other branches to exercise their powers to the fullest possible extent. 
There is no question that in the foreign affairs area, Congress can have 
a great deal of effect on the President’s conduct.  Most directly, the 
Senate can reject treaties agreed to by the President.  Even if a treaty is 
ratified, the Senate may attach conditions to the ratification to force 
interpretation or application of the treaty in a particular direction.54  
Further, a subsequent Congress can pass legislation that is inconsistent 
with the treaty or that, in effect, prevents the President from carrying out 
the treaty.  While this legislation does not void the treaty, it can force the 
United States into default on the treaty because the President is bound by 
legislation that is inconsistent with treaty obligations.55
A key formal method Congress employs to control executive 
discretion is to nip discretion in the bud by legislating with precision.  
Under current law, Congress has a great deal of freedom over the degree 
Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1225 (2003).  Peterson concludes that Congress 
may not restrict the pardon power and probably cannot exercise the pardon power on its 
own.  In Peterson’s view, Congress has the power both to create the position of pardon 
attorney and to regulate the conduct of the pardon attorney, but Congress may not 
condition the President’s exercise of the pardon power on the observance of pardon 
attorney procedures or any other statutory requirements, procedural or substantive. 
 54. See John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1228 
n.191 (2004).   
 55. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
209-10 (2d ed. 1996); see also Jamil Jaffer, Comment, Congressional Control over 
Treaty Interpretation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1093 (2003) (describing efforts in Congress to 
legislate the proper interpretation of a treaty). 




of precision in laws granting power to agencies, with somewhat less 
freedom over the design of mechanisms it creates to control executive 
discretion.56  There are few, if any, situations in which Congress’s 
choice to be very precise concerning the substance of a regulatory 
program would be subject to challenge on constitutional or other 
grounds.57  On the other hand, lack of precision is often attacked as 
violating the separation of powers by delegating legislative power to the 
executive branch.  Under the current, very lenient application of the 
nondelegation doctrine, Congress must establish only an “intelligible 
principle” to guide the exercise of executive discretion.58  Under the 
intelligible principle standard, Congress can legislate its goals and the 
broad contours of a regulatory program and leave it to the executive 
branch to carry out the program.  To some, this is unfortunate because it 
allows Congress to evade its responsibility for the laws it passes and 
allows Congress to be all things to all people, legislating in favor of one 
interest while ensuring lax enforcement of another.  To others, the 
delegation of discretion to agencies is an inevitable and even desirable 
response to the complexities and numbers of problems with which 
government is confronted. 
The lenient nondelegation doctrine, coupled with no significant 
limitations on the degree of precision with which Congress legislates, 
means that the output of Congress may sometimes be indistinguishable 
from the output of an agency.  For example, Congress may legislate 
precise limits on the emission of pollutants from automobiles, or it may 
set a goal of cleaner air and rely on an agency to establish the precise 
limits.  When a bill specifying the precise limits makes its way through 
both Houses of Congress and is presented to the President, it is a proper 
exercise of the legislative power.  When the exact same text is published 
 56. Congress’s freedom over the degree of precision in the laws it passes derives 
from the leniency of the nondelegation doctrine, which requires only that Congress 
legislate an intelligible principle under which the administering agency must act.  See 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) and infra text accompanying 
note 58.  The Court has strictly enforced structural provisions of the Constitution against 
innovations such as the legislative veto and congressional attempts to vest execution of 
the law in officials under congressional supervision.  See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
(1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).  On the appointment and removal front, 
the Court has been strict about not allowing Congress to be involved in the process, but 
has allowed Congress to reduce the President’s authority by restricting removal and 
placing appointive authority in hands other than the President’s.  See Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654 (1988) (approving independent counsel appointed by a federal court and 
subject to removal only by the Attorney General and only for good cause). 
 57. There are constraints where independent presidential powers are concerned such 
as the President’s powers over foreign affairs, the pardon power, and the appointments 
power.  There may also be substantive constraints when Congress legislates to resolve an 
issue that is the subject of litigation.  This is discussed in detail below. 
 58. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. at 472-74. 
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in the Federal Register as a final rule after notice and comment, it is an 
agency rule and a proper element of the execution of the law.  To 
advocates of a stricter nondelegation doctrine, this reveals the illogic of 
the lenient nondelegation doctrine’s denial that Congress delegates 
legislative power in these imprecise statutes.  However, unless the 
Supreme Court changes course, which it has declined to do in the face of 
sustained attack for more than twenty years, the choice of the degree of 
precision in regulatory statutes is largely for Congress to make. 
There are general substantive doctrines that apply to all legislation that 
may require some precision in regulatory statutes.  Excessive vagueness 
may violate due process by failing to give fair notice of legal 
requirements or potential penalties when property or liberty interests are 
threatened.59  However, there is no general constitutional requirement of 
clarity in regulatory legislation that has any significant bite.  In fact, the 
D.C. Circuit’s recent unsuccessful attempted revival of the nondelegation 
doctrine is best understood as an attempt to find a constitutional home 
for a clarity requirement in administrative law which would require 
agency decisions to be deduced from preexisting rules. 
In its decision in the American Trucking case, the court of appeals 
held that the nondelegation doctrine was violated, not by any lack of 
clarity in the statute under which Congress granted the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) its authority to regulate air pollution, but 
rather because the EPA could not explain its regulatory choice based on 
a preexisting standard of its own.  That is, the nondelegation doctrine 
was violated due to a lack of clarity in underlying regulatory standards.60  
This, to the court, meant that the agency’s discretion was unconstrained, 
and constituted a violation of the nondelegation doctrine.61  The 
Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals’s attempt to import into the 
nondelegation doctrine the requirement that agencies derive their rules 
from preexisting standards on the simple basis that the nondelegation 
doctrine regulates the clarity of Congress’s instructions to agencies and 
not the clarity of the agency’s own standards from which it derives its 
rules.62  The Court resoundingly reaffirmed that constitutional clarity 
 59. See, e.g., Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969) (“misconduct” 
standard for disciplining university students too vague to satisfy due process). 
 60. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir 1999). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. at 472. 




concerns are met by statutes that contain an “intelligible principle” to 
guide agency discretion and facilitate judicial review of agency action.63
When acting to enforce the law, the President’s authority to issue 
orders directed to executive branch officials is often dependent, at least 
partly, on legislative authority granted by Congress.  Although they 
often significantly affect the interests of nongovernmental parties, 
Executive orders typically are directed at officials within the executive 
branch while “proclamation” is the term used for presidential orders 
directed at private parties.64  As a formal matter, the President has the 
constitutional authority to issue such orders.65  However, the substance 
of an Executive order must have a legal basis in one of the President’s 
constitutionally based powers or from statutory authorization,66 and the 
President may not contravene the law when issuing one. 
In the most well-known Supreme Court decision involving an 
Executive Order, the Supreme Court held that President Truman’s order 
directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize the nation’s steel mills 
during a wartime labor dispute had no legal basis and was thus invalid.67  
 63. Id.  There was an interesting point of disagreement among the Justices in the 
Whitman case.  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion presented the issue as whether Congress 
had delegated legislative power to the EPA.  Id. at 462.  Justice Stevens, in a separate 
opinion, argued that the Court should acknowledge that agency rulemaking authority is 
delegated legislative power.  Id. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  The basis behind Justice Stevens’s argument is that “[t]he proper 
characterization of governmental power should generally depend on the nature of the 
power, not on the identity of the person exercising it.”  Id.  Justice Stevens is wrong for two 
reasons.  First, his implicit premise that Congress and the EPA would be performing the 
same function if each wrote the same rule is incorrect.  Agency rulemaking and legislation 
are not the same function.  When an agency makes rules, its power is limited by the terms 
of a preexisting statute.  Congress, by contrast, is not constrained by preexisting standards 
except the limits established by the Constitution.  Second, and more fundamentally, there 
are many situations in which the characterization of a governmental power depends entirely 
on the identity of the entity exercising the power.  For example, when an agency grants an 
alien the right to remain in the United States despite a finding for deportability, that is an 
exercise of executive power that may be carried out only within the strictures put in place 
by the law as enacted by Congress.  However, when Congress passes a private bill to the 
exact same effect, it exercises legislative power and therefore must follow the procedure for 
passing a bill—bicameralism and presentment to the President—but Congress is not bound 
by the terms of any preexisting statute.  See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952-54 & n.16 
(1983).   
 64.  See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of 
Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 155 (1999):  
[The] term [Executive order] is often reserved for orders directed at 
subordinates within the executive branch []since the latter are the ones who 
actually carry out government policy . . . .  Presidents have also acted, however, 
through proclamations, a term that has traditionally (but not always) been used 
when the order is aimed at citizens rather than government employees. 
 65. See Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 551 (2005) 
 66. See id. at 550. 
 67. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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In this case, Justice Jackson wrote his famous concurring opinion in 
which he divided presidential actions into three categories: those in 
which the President acts with congressional authorization, those in 
which the President acts in the face of a congressional prohibition and 
those in which the President acts without authorization but not against a 
prohibition.68  Justice Jackson argued that there is room for the President 
to act without authorization, but his analysis was not very specific or 
satisfying.  Here is what Justice Jackson wrote: 
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of 
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone 
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in 
which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference 
or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, 
measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test 
of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary 
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.69
The emphasized part of Justice Jackson’s opinion implies that when 
there is an absence of statutory law governing the President’s conduct, 
practicalities rather than law should determine the legality of the 
President’s conduct.  The majority was more focused on law, looking for 
congressional authorization for the President’s action in seizing the steel 
mills.  The majority found that the President had essentially usurped the 
legislative function by taking significant action without congressional 
authorization.  To the majority, the lack of authorization rendered the 
President’s actions illegal.  Justice Jackson placed much less stress on 
the lack of authorization from Congress than the majority did, at least in 
the particular context of the case.  To Justice Jackson, “imperatives of 
events and contemporary imponderables” might justify presidential 
action in the absence of authorization.  Jackson found, however, that the 
President’s action of seizing the steel mills was in his third category, 
prohibited by congressional action.  While the President was not 
statutorily prohibited from seizing the steel mills in so many words, 
Justice Jackson inferred the prohibition by negative implication from the 
existence of congressional authorization to seize private businesses in 
other circumstances and with other procedures.  Placing the seizure in 
the category of actions prohibited by Congress, he found lacking any 
 68. Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 69. Id. at 637 (emphasis added). 




independent presidential authority to act, and thus agreed with the Court 
that the President’s order was unlawful.70
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated 
an Executive order that it found contrary to law.71  President Clinton’s 
Executive Order 12,594, purportedly issued under federal procurement 
legislation, prohibited the federal government from purchasing goods 
and services from companies that had hired permanent replacements for 
their striking workers.72  The court held the President’s order unlawful 
because it was contrary to a provision of federal labor law that 
guarantees employers the right to permanently replace their striking 
employees.73  The court brushed aside challenges to its authority to hear 
the case, holding that Executive orders are subject to “nonstatutory” 
judicial review under the pre-APA doctrine of judicial declaration of 
executive actions as “ultra-vires,” even if the APA does not subject 
Executive orders to judicial review.74  Thus, Executive orders are subject 
to review for compliance with statutory provisions.75
In addition to the possibility of judicial review for compliance with 
preexisting statutes, Congress often legislates specifically to direct, 
override or prevent particular administrative action.  As long as required 
legislative procedures are employed, specific substantive restrictions on 
executive action do not transgress separation of powers or other 
constitutional limits on legislative action and in fact are desirable 
because they maximize democratic input into important policy decisions.  
While Congress does not legislatively override particular agency action 
very often, especially when compared to the volume of administrative 
 70. Id. at 640-56 (majority opinion). 
 71. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 72. Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (1995). 
 73. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1336-38. 
 74. Id. at 1326-28.  The President is not an “agency” under the APA and thus 
presidential actions are not subject to APA judicial review.  See Franklin v. 
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992). 
 75. If the President is careful in drafting Executive orders, the possibility of 
illegality can be avoided.  President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13,202 
instructed federal agencies not to require or prohibit a certain kind of labor contract in 
federally funded projects under their jurisdiction.  Exec. Order No. 13,202, 3 C.F.R. 759 
(2002), reprinted in U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. II 2002).  In Building and Construction Trades 
Dept., AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002), the order was challenged on 
the ground that some statutes required or permitted the particular form of labor 
agreement in federal projects.  Because the order required action only “to the extent 
permitted by law,” the court held that the order was not contrary to law.  Id. at 29.  Under 
this language, if the order was contrary to the particular statute administered by an 
official, the official was instructed by the order itself to follow the statute.  Similarly, 
President Reagan’s landmark Executive Order 12,291 required agencies to engage in 
cost-benefit analysis only to the extent permitted by law.  Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 
C.F.R. 127 (1982). 
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action that receives no apparent attention from Congress, when it does 
happen, it places Congress in a strong supervisory role over the 
administration of the law. 
Congress has the power to legislatively reject particular administrative 
action without changing the underlying substantive law.76  Before 1983, 
Congress overrode particular agency decisions pursuant to legislative 
veto provisions.  After the legislative veto was declared unconstitutional, 
Congress eventually established a formal legislative method of reviewing 
major administrative rules.77  Under this statute, the Congressional 
Review Act (CRA),78 before any administrative rule can go into effect, 
the promulgating agency must submit a report containing the text of the 
rule and the rule’s concise general statement of basis and purpose to 
each House of Congress and the Comptroller General.  The report must 
also include any cost-benefit analysis prepared regarding the rule and 
various other compliance documents required by other statutes.  With 
regard to major rules, the effective date of the rule must be at least sixty 
days after Congress receives the report.  Under this process, Congress 
may legislatively reject rules within a specified period of time.79  While 
the constitutional requirements for legislating are not affected by this 
procedure, the statute eases Congress’s own rules (although the statute 
recognizes the right of each House to apply different rules80), making it 
 76. There may be some limits to Congress’s power to overrule agency actions in 
adjudication based on due process and related concerns.  However, Congress’s power is 
not limited to general rules.  Courts have approved legislation regarding agency action 
with significant effects on particular parties even while judicial review is pending.  See 
infra notes 142-153 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (Supp. III 1994). 
 78. See id. 
 79. Under current law, if Congress does not act, the administrative rules go into 
effect after a specified period of time.  5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3).  Conceivably, Congress 
could statutorily provide that rules do not go into effect unless Congress passes 
legislation approving them.  5 U.S.C. § 801.  While this would maintain an even greater 
degree of control in Congress, Congress is unlikely to adopt such a procedure because of 
the volume of rules it would be forced to act upon and because then Congress would be 
politically responsible for all rules adopted through the procedure. 
 80. See 5 U.S.C. § 802 (Supp. III 1994).  This means that the statute is “essentially 
hortatory or directory” because each House is free not to employ the expedited procedure.  
See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 361, 428 (2004).  Vermeule opines that although it may be unconstitutional, Congress 
should have the power to establish binding rules of congressional procedure.  Id. at 430; see 
also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, 
Separation of Powers, and the Rules of the Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345 
(2003) (arguing that binding statutory rules of congressional procedure are 
constitutionally suspect); Virginia A. Seitz & Joseph R. Guerra, A Constitutional 




easier for the rejection legislation to make it to the floor of each House 
of Congress for votes.  Substantively, the CRA is unnecessary because 
Congress always had the power to legislatively override agency rules.  
The main innovations of the CRA are procedural, primarily consisting of 
the advance notice to Congress of proposed rules and the expedited 
procedure for a resolution disapproving an agency rule to reach the floor 
of each House of Congress for a vote.  This procedure has been used 
only once,81 but the threat of such action may influence the content of 
administrative rules.  By enacting this statute, Congress has taken 
responsibility for supervising agency rulemaking and, in a sense, is 
lending its authority to those rules that it does not overrule under the 
procedure. 
2.  The Power of the Purse, Appropriations Riders, and Earmarking 
The fact that the nondelegation doctrine does not require Congress to 
be very specific when it empowers agencies does not mean that 
Congress is forbidden or should even be discouraged from being very 
specific when it wants to be.  One way in which Congress has supervised 
agencies with great particularity, both formally and informally,82 is 
through the appropriations process.83  The power of the purse is among 
Congress’s most potent weapons in its effort to control the execution of 
the laws.84  The other branches of government are completely dependent 
on Congress for funding.85  The Appropriations Clause provides: “No 
Defense of “Entrenched” Senate Rules Governing Debate, 20 J.L. & POL. 1 (2004) 
(agreeing that entrenched laws are unconstitutional but defending entrenched Senate 
rules for ending debate). 
 81. See Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001) (joint resolution disapproving 
Department of Labor’s Ergonomics Rule). 
 82. Informal supervision through the appropriations process is discussed infra at p. 
62. 
 83. See generally HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 77-83 (2005) 
(discussing strength of and limits on Congress’s power over appropriations). 
 84. For an argument that Congress has not adequately supervised the budget 
process, see FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING, supra note 
28.  For a reply, denying that Congress has abdicated its responsibility for the budget, see 
Neal Devins, Abdication by Another Name: An Ode to Lou Fisher, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. 
L. REV. 65 (2000).  See also D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE 
LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 
167-85 (1991) (concluding that Congress, through parties and committees, supervises the 
appropriations process more than the critics contend).  For an interesting general look at 
how the congressional budget procedures affect the balance of power in the 
appropriations process, see Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: 
Strengthening the Party-in-Government, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (2000). 
 85. See Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the 
Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833 (1994).  The Constitution might require 
Congress to fund the core functions of the other branches such as providing enough 
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money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law.”86  “Appropriations made by law” means 
appropriations made through the legislative process—bills that pass both 
Houses of Congress and are presented to the President.87
As a political matter, Congress’s power over the budget has been 
somewhat diminished since the passage of the Budget and Accounting 
Act of 1921.88  That statute enhanced the President’s power within the 
budget process by unifying the process of preparing the annual budget 
and professionalizing the President’s budget staff.89  However, as a 
formal matter, Congress retains the power of the purse, and it has used 
that power to influence if not control the administration of the law.  As a 
practical matter, in a disagreement between Congress and the President 
over the priorities or the value of a particular program, Congress will 
win if it uses its power over the allocation of funds. 
In addition to simply appropriating more money for favored programs 
and less (or no) funds for disfavored programs, Congress has used what 
are known as appropriations riders to supervise the execution of the laws 
in a very direct and particularized way.  Appropriations riders are used by 
Congress across a broad spectrum of substantive areas to supervise the 
activities of federal agencies.  Appropriations riders typically single out 
a specific regulatory activity and prohibit the expenditure of funds for 
carrying out that regulatory activity or plan.  For example, early on in his 
presidency, President Bill Clinton made ergonomics regulation a priority 
for his administration.  For several years, however, Congress prevented 
the OSHA from issuing regulations with provisions in appropriations 
bills like the following: 
funding for the Supreme Court to function and for the President to review legislation and 
to exercise his powers such as the pardon power and the power over foreign affairs. 
 86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 87. Congress has statutorily prohibited agencies from getting around limits on their 
appropriations by raising and spending their own funds.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (2000).  
Agencies are also statutorily prohibited from spending more than what has been 
appropriated.  See 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). 
 88. Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (1921) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.). 
 89. See KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 84, at 166 (quoting JAMES PFIFFNER, 
THE PRESIDENT, THE BUDGET, AND CONGRESS: IMPOUNDMENT AND THE 1974 BUDGET ACT 
15 (1979) (“[T]he creation of the Budget Bureau marks the ‘beginning of the domination 
of the budgetary process by the institutionalized presidency.’”)); Alan L. Feld, 
Separation of Political Powers: Boundaries or Balance?, 21 GA. L. REV. 171, 188 
(1986). 




None of the funds made available in this Act may be used by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration directly or through section 23(g) of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act to promulgate or issue any proposed or 
final standard or guideline regarding ergonomic protection. Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to limit the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration from conducting any peer reviewed risk assessment activity 
regarding ergonomics, including conducting peer reviews of the scientific basis 
for establishing any standard or guideline, direct or contracted research, or other 
activity necessary to fully establish the scientific basis for promulgating any 
standard or guideline on ergonomic protection.90
There are many more examples of appropriations riders.  For example, 
in the 1980s, when the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
was considering abandoning its longstanding broadcast licensing 
preferences for women and minorities, Congress added riders to the 
FCC’s appropriations bills prohibiting the expenditure of FCC funds to 
reexamine or reverse these preferences.91
Another striking example of the use of the rider to influence the 
execution of the law is a series of riders in the 1980s barring the 
executive branch from taking any action to change the per se rule in 
antitrust law that prohibits resale price maintenance agreements.92  As J. 
Gregory Sidak reports, this rider prevented the Department of Justice 
from presenting an oral argument in support of a legal position it had 
taken in an amicus curiae brief it had filed in a pending case.93  Sidak 
calls riders like this one “muzzling” riders because they prevent the 
President and the executive branch as a whole from advocating for 
changes in law or policy, and he argues that they may violate the 
Recommendations Clause of the Constitution which requires the 
President to “give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, 
and recommend . . . such Measures as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient.”94  Whether constitutional or not, this use of the rider 
dramatically illustrates how the power of the purse allows Congress to 
 90. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-34, § 102, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). 
 91. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? 
Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. 
L. REV. 685, 715 n.164 (1991) (citing Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-1, 1329-31 
(1987)). 
 92. See Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-166, 97 Stat. 1071, 1102 (1983), 
cited in J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2080 n.6 
(1989); see also Act of Sept. 30, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 605, 101 Stat. 1329-1, 
1329-38, discussed in Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, 
Total Welfare, and the Challenge of IntraMarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 849, 915 n.176 (2000); Act of Oct. 18, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 605, 100 Stat. 
1783, 1783-73; § 510, 97 Stat. at 1102-03. 
 93. See Sidak, supra note 92, at 2080. 
 94. U.S. CONST, art. II, § 3. 
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control important aspects of the execution of the law in ways that appear 
to impinge on the discretion of executive branch officials. 
Riders often function as temporary, narrowly focused amendments to 
the underlying statute.  For example, Congress has used appropriations 
riders to hinder the listing of a species as endangered even if all of the 
statutory requirements for listing are met.95  The effect of such a rider is 
to exempt the particular species from coverage for the duration of the 
rider.  The rider legally supersedes the provisions of the general statutes 
referred to in the rider.  A rider is more effective than the simple failure 
to appropriate funds for a particular action or program because agencies 
are often able to reallocate appropriated funds among various 
programs.96
The legal effect of an appropriations rider is illustrated very clearly by 
a dispute over a government program that made its way to the Supreme 
Court a few years ago.  Under federal law,97 convicted felons are prohibited 
from owning or possessing firearms.  A felony conviction in Mexico (for 
illegally, although possibly accidentally, importing ammunition into Mexico) 
made it impossible for Thomas Bean to continue in his profession as a 
firearms dealer.98  A provision of the federal law at issue, however, 
allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to restore a convicted felon’s right 
to own or possess firearms if the Secretary found that “the applicant will 
not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the 
granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.”99  
Bean applied for this relief, but the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms (ATF), to which the Secretary had delegated his authority to 
act, returned the application without acting on it because Congress had, 
since 1992, attached riders to the Treasury Department’s appropriations 
bills prohibiting the Department from using any of its funds to act on 
 95. See Jason M. Patlis, Riders on the Storm, or Navigating the Crosswinds of 
Appropriations and Administration of the Endangered Species Act: A Play in Five Acts, 
16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 257 (2003).   
 96. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (agency decision to reallocate sums 
included in a lump sum appropriation is exempt from judicial review).  Reallocation in the 
face of objections from members of Congress may be difficult due to informal supervision 
from the appropriations committees.  See infra text accompanying notes 369370. 
 97. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)(2000).  The description of the statutory scheme and 
the case decided under it are from United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002). 
 98. Bean, 537 U.S. at 72-73. 
 99. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000).  The current version of the statute provides that the 
Attorney General, rather than the Secretary of the Treasury, may grant relief.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 925(c) (Supp. II 2003). 




applications for relief from federal firearms restrictions.  Bean then 
sought judicial review, characterizing the ATF’s refusal to act on and the 
return of his application as a denial of the application subject to judicial 
review.100  The Supreme Court rejected Bean’s argument, holding that 
judicial review is available only after the ATF has actually made a 
decision on the merits of an application for relief.101  Because the 
appropriations rider prevented the ATF from acting on the merits of any 
applications, Bean could not get judicial review of what, in effect, was a 
denial of his application.  The appropriations rider prevented the 
Treasury Department from executing the substantive provisions of the 
statute, demonstrating Congress’s ability legislatively to control the 
execution of the law. 
The use of appropriations riders is controversial for a number of 
reasons.  Steve Calabresi characterizes appropriations riders as Congress 
using its “power of the purse to affect directly the President’s exercise of 
what would otherwise appear to be his core executive powers.”102  For 
one, the placement of a rider in an appropriations bill makes it difficult 
for the President to veto it because he would have to veto an entire 
appropriations bill.103  Another criticism of the use of riders is that they 
often fly below the political radar, placed in the bill by a few connected 
members of Congress and voted on by members who may not even be 
aware of their presence in the bill.  Even if they are aware of the riders, 
members face a great deal of pressure to vote in favor of the bill and 
may be unable to get serious consideration of an amendment to remove 
the rider.104  Riders are thus viewed in some circles as a method for 
 100. On the merits, Bean had a decent case for relief since he might have been able 
to prove that the violation was accidental and that he had an otherwise unblemished 
record. 
 101. Bean, 537 U.S. at 75-76. 
 102. Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 
ARK. L. REV. 23, 53 (1995). 
 103. This is Farber and Frickey’s explanation for why Congress used appropriations 
riders rather than passing substantive legislation to prevent the FCC from revising its 
affirmative action policies.  See Farber & Frickey, supra note 91, at 714-15. 
 104. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY 52-57 (1993).  
Schoenbrod illustrates the problems with riders with the example of administrative and 
legislative activity designed to keep the price of oranges high.  According to Schoenbrod, 
when the Department of Agriculture threatened to take steps that would reduce the 
largest grower’s grip on the market, Congress used a combination of appropriations 
riders and other pressure to prevent changes to the status quo.  One interesting rider 
prohibited the Department from using its funds to provide the public with information 
about growers.  The Department interpreted this rider to forbid it from complying with 
requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act even if the requester was 
willing to bear all the costs of obtaining the information.  A court rejected this 
interpretation.  See Cal-Almond, Inc. v. USDA, 960 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1992), cited in 
SCHOENBROD, supra note 32, at 218 n.54; see also City of Chicago v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 384 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2004) (rider prohibiting the expenditure of funds to 
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Congress to dodge responsibility for its legislative actions.105  
Nonetheless, despite these criticisms, the rider is an effective method for 
supervision by Congress of the execution of the laws.106
Congress also earmarks funds in a manner that may be considered the 
converse of riders, appropriating funds for very particular purposes or 
programs and sidestepping agency discretion.  Earmarked spending is a 
type of congressional administration because it often runs parallel to an 
agency program.  In the area of endangered species, for example, 
Congress has mandated that funds be spent to take steps to protect 
species that the administering agency would not have taken under its 
usual standards.107  At the same time that Congress funds large granting 
agencies like the National Science Foundation to enable the agency to 
distribute federal funds for scientific research under statutory and 
administrative standards, Congress appropriates funds for particular 
research projects that may or may not meet the usual, scientifically 
release certain firearms data does not prohibit Treasury Department from releasing 
firearms data in response to FOIA request).  However, when the rider was augmented 
with language stating that the information in question is “immune from legal process and 
shall not be subject to subpoena or other discovery in any civil action in a State or 
Federal court,” see Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, 2859-60 (2004), (to be codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 923), the Seventh Circuit reversed itself and held, en banc, that the 
Treasury Department may not release the data pursuant to a FOIA request.  See City of 
Chicago v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 423 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2005).   
 105. See Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st 
Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 995-96 
(2000) (suggesting that if the nondelegation doctrine were strengthened, Congress would 
use appropriations riders as one method of avoiding accountability); Neal E. Devins, 
Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456; see 
also Neal E. Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the Fiscal Year 1988 
Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE L.J. 389 (criticizing secretive nondeliberative process 
for passing continuing resolutions).  For these reasons, there is a mythic rule that 
appropriations provisions are not supposed to change substantive law.  The rule is a myth 
because, as we have seen, riders are used all the time to change the law. 
 106. The Supreme Court has treated appropriations riders with the same respect it 
affords to legislation in other forms.  For example, congressional approval in the form of 
appropriations riders prohibiting the FCC from changing its affirmative action policies 
was one factor the Court relied upon when it upheld those policies against constitutional 
challenges.  See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 572 (1990). 
 107. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control 
Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1477 & n.124 (2003) (describing how practice 
of earmarking funds for the protection of particular species avoids the usual discretion of 
the Fish and Wildlife Service to decide how best to allocate resources for species 
protection). 




accepted, standards.108  Often, earmarked appropriations are a type of pork 
barrel legislation in which powerful legislators procure funds for 
research or projects that benefit businesses or educational institutions in 
their districts.109  Earmarked appropriations are problematic when they 
fund unnecessary programs or are inconsistent with rational priorities for 
spending limited funds.  They are also a good example of the lack of 
fiscal discipline in Congress.  However, they are well within Congress’s 
constitutional power. 
 108. See Donald N. Langenberg, Earmarked Appropriations: The Debate Over the 
Method of Federal Funding, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1029 (1987).  A good example of 
this is research into the usefulness for military purposes of chewing gum with nicotine 
made by a company located in the district of the Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert.  
See Ceci Connolly & Juliet Eilperin, Hastert Steps Up to Leading Role, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 5, 1999, at A1. 
 109. An infamous recent example is the $450 million earmarked to build two 
bridges in Alaska that went nowhere.  See Matt Volz, Alaska Wants to Fix Image; 
Governor Fears State Is Perceived as a Greedy Place, COLUMBIAN (Wash.), Feb. 14, 
2006, at D9, available at 2006 WLNR 2810225 (discussing two “bridges to nowhere”).  
The use, and expense, of earmarks has grown dramatically in the past ten years.  See 
Susan Milligan, Congressional Pet Projects Boom in Secret: Lobbyist with Hill Ties Key 
to Record Funding, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 29, 2006, at A1.  Because of the effect they 
have on the federal budget deficit, earmarks have become a hot issue and various 
reforms have been proposed to make it more difficult to insert earmarks into legislation.  
See Peter Cohn, Panel Closing Ranks on Earmarks Plan, CONGRESS DAILY, Feb. 10, 
2006, 2006 WLNR 2376809.  Some members of Congress defend earmarking as 
something they do only because their constituents would suffer if they stopped doing it 
when everyone else does, or as necessary to help constituents ignored by federal 
agencies.  See Milligan, supra (quoting Representative John Tierney); FDCH Capital 
Transcripts, Jan. 18, 2006, 2006 WLNR 975075 (quoting Senator Trent Lott at a news 
conference):   
I’ve been involved in earmarking for my state.  My state has been one of the 
poorest states in the nation . . . .  We don’t have adequate roads, we don’t have 
adequate schools, we don’t have adequate housing. 
. . . . 
I’ve been trying to get the Department of Housing and Urban Development to 
help the poor little town of Tchula, Mississippi for four years. 
. . . .    
Everything that they’ve gotten Senator Cochran and I did with line items. 
Id.; see John Terrence A. Rosenthal & Robert T. Alter, Clear and Convincing to Whom? 
The False Claims Act and Its Burden of Proof Standard: Why the Government Needs a 
Big Stick, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1405, 1451-60 (2000) (describing earmarked 
appropriations for military projects that were not requested by the Department of 
Defense, and were militarily unnecessary, but would benefit a large contractor 
headquartered in the district of former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich). 
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3.  Private Bills 
Private bills are another way that Congress remains involved in what 
appears to be the execution of the law.110  A private bill is a legislative 
measure, usually to grant a benefit to a single party, that is published in 
the Statutes at Large but not as a public law.111  The process for passing 
a private bill is the same as the procedure used for public laws, including 
passage through both Houses of Congress and presentment to the 
President.  Congress has used private bills in a variety of contexts, some 
of which resemble the activity of administrative agencies, including 
awarding pensions to war veterans112 and granting particular aliens 
permanent residency despite legal deportability.113  Any attempt to use a 
private bill to punish a particular person would raise constitutional 
concerns under the Due Process and Bill of Attainder clauses, and some 
of the historical uses of private bills, such as private bills waiving res 
judicata in private litigation, raise constitutional issues today that may 
not have been recognized earlier.114
 110. Thanks to my colleague Wendy Gordon for drawing my attention to the 
relevance of private bills to this project. 
 111. For a general discussion of private bills, see Note, Private Bills in Congress, 
79 HARV. L. REV. 1684 (1966). 
 112. The history of awarding war pensions through private bills dates all the way 
back to pensions for veterans of the Revolutionary War.  Recall the famous Hayburn’s 
Case from 1792 in which federal judges (including Supreme Court Justices) addressed 
whether it was consistent with their status as federal judges to hear petitions for war 
pensions when their decision resulted not in a final judgment but rather in a 
recommendation to the Secretary of War and ultimately to Congress.  Hayburn’s Case, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).  Interestingly, the judges who expressed their views on the 
matter in Hayburn’s Case did not identify any constitutional problem with Congress 
deciding individual pensions legislatively.  Rather, the constitutional issue identified was 
that issuing nonfinal judgments was beyond the judicial power and thus the judges could 
not act on the petitions, at least not in their judicial capacity.  Some of the judges agreed 
to hear the petitions as extrajudicial commissioners. 
 113. There is a long history of Congress reserving to itself the decision whether a 
particular deportable alien should be allowed to stay in the United States.  As the history 
recounted in the Chadha opinion illustrates, even though Congress was apparently 
suffering under a heavy load of private immigration bills, the legislative veto was 
included in the immigration provision at issue in Chadha because Congress was 
unwilling to surrender the power to suspend deportation to the Department of Justice.  
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 114. Under current law, a private bill reopening litigation might violate the 
defendant’s due process property rights, especially if the case had already been litigated 
to judgment.  However, in a very early case, the Supreme Court found no constitutional 
problem when a state legislature ordered a new trial in a pending civil action.  See Calder 
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 




In the immigration context, the private bill process illustrates 
cooperation between the executive branch and Congress in the execution of 
the law.  Congress and the agency administering the deportation process 
apparently have agreed to delay deportation while Congress considers a 
private bill.115  The rules of the House Judiciary Committee on private 
immigration bills, administered by a subcommittee, explain the process: 
5. The Subcommittee may, at a formal meeting, entertain a motion to request 
that the Immigration and Naturalization Service provide the Subcommittee with 
a departmental report on a beneficiary of a private bill.  In the past, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service has honored requests for departmental 
reports by staying deportation until final action is taken on the private bill.  
Only those cases designed to prevent extreme hardship to the beneficiary or a 
U.S. citizen spouse, parent, or child will merit a request for a report.116
Thus, the actions of a single subcommittee result in a stay of deportation, 
albeit via an informal agreement between Congress and the agency. 
When Congress decides that a particular alien should be allowed to 
remain in the United States or that a particular war veteran should 
receive compensation or a pension,117 this action, though legislative in 
form, resembles the administration of the law.  It is certainly action that 
could have been taken by an agency under standards prescribed by 
Congress.  In fact, in some cases, private bills directly overturn the 
results of administrative processes, although this is a use of the private 
bill that apparently invites a presidential veto.118  While there is no 
constitutional impediment to Congress legislating in this manner, 
problems with the private bill process have been recognized.  For 
example, although private bills almost by definition raise no important 
social or legal issue, presidents have vetoed private bills on at least two 
interesting grounds—first, that they are discriminatory when they single 
out particular parties for a benefit not available to others and, second, 
 115. H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, Rules of 
Procedure and Statement of Policy for Private Immigration Bills, H. 522-3 § 5, 107th 
Cong. (2002) microformed on No. 02-H522-3 (Cong. Info. Serv.), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/privimmpro.pdf. 
 116.   Id.  The rules of the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and 
Citizenship similarly state: “1. The introduction of a private bill does not act as a stay of 
deportation until the committee requests a departmental report.”  S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs, Rules of Procedure (Private 
Legislation), S. 522-1, 100th Cong. § 1 (1987) microformed on CIS No. 87-S522-1 
(Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 117. Carmel Sileo, Gulf War POWs Can’t Get Satisfaction, TRIAL, Feb. 2004, at 74-75 
(“A similar suit filed by former civilian hostages−the infamous ‘human shields’ who were 
also held during the Gulf War−was settled two years ago, and that judgment was paid out of 
the same now-disputed Iraqi funds, through private bills passed in Congress. (Hill v. Republic 
of Iraq, 175 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2001)).”). 
 118. See Note, supra note 111, at 1702. 
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that they can be inconsistent with a general legislative plan when they 
grant relief from the provisions of a public law.119
4.  Legislation During the Pendency of Judicial Review 
Another method of supervising agencies, analogous to the 
appropriations rider because of its specificity, is legislation during the 
pendency of judicial review.  In an apparent effort to influence the 
outcome of the judicial review proceeding or perhaps even to short 
circuit it altogether, Congress sometimes legislates with great 
particularity regarding administrative action even while judicial review 
is pending.  This practice raises separation of powers concerns, not only 
with regard to the power of the executive branch but also with regard to 
the judicial branch.  On the one hand, Congress may not directly interfere 
with ongoing litigation by ordering a court of law to take a particular 
action in a pending case.  On the other hand, Congress may change the 
law while litigation is pending, and courts will generally follow the law 
as amended. 
The distinction between congressional interference with ongoing 
litigation and legislation that changes underlying law is not terribly 
clear.  The best relatively recent illustration of this difficulty is a case 
arising out of a controversy regarding logging on federal land in old 
growth forests in the Pacific Northwest that are habitat for an 
endangered species of owl.120  The controversy over timber cutting 
reached the courts after the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Land 
Management of the Department of the Interior approved sales of timber 
in the old growth forests.121  Environmental groups and logging interests 
challenged the logging plans, with environmental groups claiming too 
much logging was allowed and loggers claiming too little was 
allowed.122  After a variety of judicial proceedings in two federal district 
courts, Congress intervened into the controversy by passing a 
comprehensive plan for timber sales in the area for fiscal year 1990 as 
section 318 of the Department of Interior annual appropriations bill.123  
The statute mandated a certain level of timber sales, but, to protect the 
 119. See id. at 1702. 
 120. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
 121. Id. at 431. 
 122. Id. at 432-37. 
 123. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745 (1989). 




spotted owl, placed new restrictions and requirements on the sales.124  It 
stated that no sales of timber could occur in areas identified in the Forest 
Service’s 1988 environmental impact statement, with some congressional 
adjustments,125 and prohibited sales in 110 areas that had been identified 
in an agreement between the Bureau of Land Management and the 
Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife.126  In effect, the statute 
constituted congressional approval of a great deal of what the agencies 
had previously done.  Subsection (b)(6)(a) dealt specifically with the 
ongoing litigation concerning spotted owl protection: 
Without passing on the legal and factual adequacy of the Final Supplement to the 
Environmental Impact Statement for an Amendment to the Pacific Northwest 
Regional Guide—Spotted Owl Guidelines and the accompanying Record of 
Decision issued by the Forest Service on December 8, 1988 or the December 22, 
1987 agreement between the Bureau of Land Management and the Oregon 
Department of Fish and Wildlife for management of the Spotted Owl, the 
Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas according to 
subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section on the thirteen national forests in 
Oregon and Washington and Bureau of Land Management lands in western 
Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls is adequate consideration for the 
purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the 
consolidated cases captioned Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, 
Civil No. 89-160 and Washington Contract Loggers Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale 
Robertson, Civil No. 89-99 (order granting preliminary injunction) and the case 
Portland Audubon Society et al., v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 87-1160-FR.  The 
guidelines adopted by subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section shall not be 
subject to judicial review by any court of the United States.127
The environmentalist plaintiffs in the ongoing spotted owl litigation 
challenged section 318 on the ground that it interfered with the judicial 
function by directing the outcome of a case pending in the federal 
courts.128  Under the plaintiffs’ (and the court of appeals’) interpretation 
of the statute, Congress had directed the federal courts to hold that 
section 318’s provisions satisfied the statutes under which the plaintiffs 
were challenging the sales, namely NEPA, the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act (MBTA), the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 
(FLPMA), the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and the 
Oregon-California Land Grant Act (OCLA).129  Under the plaintiffs’ 
argument, section 318 did not amend any of the statutes under which 
they were challenging the sales but rather mandated a particular 
 124. See id. § 318(a). 
 125. See id. § 318(b)(3). 
 126. See id. § 318(b)(5). 
 127. Id. § 318 (b)(6)(A). 
 128. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1992). 
 129. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d, 
503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
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interpretation of those statutes in pending litigation, violating Article III 
principles.130
For their challenge, the plaintiffs relied on United States v. Klein,131 a 
Civil War era decision that invalidated a statute on the ground that it, 
inter alia, “prescribe[d] a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular 
way.”132  Before Klein, the Supreme Court had decided that a presidential 
pardon would make a claimant entitled to the return of property seized 
during the Civil War because, according to the Court, a pardon was 
sufficient evidence of loyalty to warrant return of captured property 
under relevant statutes.133  Klein received a presidential pardon and then 
brought a claim for the value of his captured property to the Court of 
Claims.134  After the Court of Claims ruled in Klein’s favor, the United 
States appealed.135  In the meantime, Congress passed a statute providing 
that when a pardon stated that the person pardoned had aided the 
rebellion, and the pardon was accepted without a disclaimer, the pardon 
should be considered “as conclusive evidence in the Court of Claims, 
and on appeal, that the claimant did give aid to the rebellion; and on 
proof of such pardon . . . the jurisdiction of the court shall cease, and the 
suit shall be forthwith dismissed.”136  Under the statute, then, the Supreme 
Court would have been required to hold that the pardon was evidence of 
disloyalty and Klein’s case should have been dismissed. 
The argument in favor of upholding the statute in Klein (and in the 
spotted owl litigation) was provided by the Court’s earlier decision in 
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.137  In Wheeling Bridge, 
after the Supreme Court declared that a bridge constructed under state 
authority was a nuisance138 because it interfered with navigation on a 
navigable river and thus interfered with Congress’s commerce power, 
Congress passed a statute declaring the bridge a “lawful structure” and 
making the bridge a post road.139  The Supreme Court, on a motion to 
 130. Id. at 1313, 1316; Robertson, 503 U.S. at 439-40. 
 131. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). 
 132. See Klein, 80 U.S. at 146.  It is also possible to read Klein much differently, as 
holding that Congress was interfering unconstitutionally with the pardon power. 
 133. Id. at 131-32. 
 134. Id. at 132. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 143-44 (emphasis added). 
 137. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856). 
 138. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 
(1852). 
 139. Id. 




enforce the injunction granted pursuant to the earlier nuisance ruling, 
held that the new legislation superseded its prior ruling and that the 
bridge was therefore no longer a nuisance.140  The Klein Court 
distinguished Wheeling Bridge on the ground that, in Wheeling Bridge, 
the law had been changed, while in Klein, Congress had merely 
instructed the Court on how to treat a particular piece of evidence 
without changing the underlying legal norms.141
The Robertson Court carried forward this distinction between 
Wheeling Bridge and Klein and presented the key issue in the case as 
whether Congress had changed the law (which would be constitutional) 
or directed court action in a particular case in a particular direction 
(which would be unconstitutional).142  The Court concluded that section 
318 changed the law rather than merely directed the outcome of the 
Robertson litigation, and therefore did not violate the principles underlying 
Klein.143  In rejecting the argument that the statutory reference to the 
district court case names and numbers established that Congress had 
intervened into ongoing litigation, the Court adopted the government’s 
position that Congress mentioned the pending litigation only to identify 
the statutes that section 318 was deemed to satisfy.144
The Court’s decision recognizes broad authority in Congress to make 
very particular changes to the law in its supervisory role over federal 
 140. Id. 
 141. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146-47. 
 142. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
 143. The Court acknowledged that section 318 did not partially repeal the statutes 
that were the basis of the challenges to the sales, but the Court held that Congress had 
deemed that the new requirements of section 318 met the requirements of the other 
statutes.  See id. at 439-41.  This does not literally mean that Congress was of the opinion 
that in this particular instance the provisions of section 318 satisfied the requirements of 
the other statutes, hence the proviso that Congress was not passing on:  
[T]he legal and factual adequacy of the Final Supplement to the Environmental 
Impact Statement for an Amendment to the Pacific Northwest Regional 
Guide−Spotted Owl Guidelines and the accompanying Record of Decision 
issued by the Forest Service on December 8, 1988 or the December 22, 1987 
agreement between the Bureau of Land Management and the Oregon 
Department of Fish and Wildlife for management of the Spotted Owl. 
Id. at 435 n.2.  Rather, Congress was legislating that section 318’s standards should 
govern the particular situation.  This practice of “deeming” one statute to comply with 
another, for example deeming that the plan for the spotted owl satisfied NEPA, tempers 
the effect of generally applicable statutes like NEPA when adherence would be 
politically unacceptable.   
 144. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 440.  For an argument that Robertson and Klein are 
inconsistent, see Amy D. Ronner, Judicial Self-Demise: The Test of When Congress 
Impermissibly Intrudes on Judicial Power After Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society 
and the Federal Appellate Courts’ Rejection of the Separation of Powers Challenges to 
the New Section of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1037, 1054-55 
(1993). 
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agencies.145  The Court does not require Congress to adopt general rules 
to govern future agency action.  As applied to other agency action, the 
requirements of the five statutes at issue in Robertson are no different 
after section 318 than they were before it.  What Congress actually did 
was exempt timber sales pursuant to section 318 from the requirements 
of the five statutes and make that exemption apply retroactively in 
pending litigation. 
There are additional examples of particularized congressional intervention 
into the administration of the laws during the pendency of judicial 
review, in which Congress directs an executive official to grant an 
approval that would otherwise be discretionary with an agency official 
or Cabinet secretary.146  In one statute, Congress directed the Secretary 
 145. More recently, Congress passed a statute regulating logging in part of the 
Black Hills National Forest.  The statute required the Forest Service to violate the terms 
of a federal court-approved settlement agreement.  This statute was challenged on the 
grounds that it usurped the authority of both the executive branch and the federal courts.  
The Tenth Circuit rejected the challenge, stating that its conclusion followed a fortiori 
from Robertson.  See Biodiversity Assoc. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1163 (10th Cir. 
2004). 
 146. Congress has also, on occasion, attempted to influence the outcome of 
particular civil litigation not involving the government.  The most recent and certainly 
most notorious example is Public Law 109-3 (2005), in which Congress granted federal 
jurisdiction over any claims brought by the parents of Terry Schiavo “for the alleged 
violation of any right of Theresa Marie Schiavo under the Constitution or laws of the 
United States relating to the withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical 
treatment necessary to sustain her life.”  Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 1, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).  
This statute was passed after Florida state courts had ruled in favor of Ms. Shiavo’s 
husband’s desire to remove all life support including a feeding tube over the objections 
of Ms. Schiavo’s parents.  Although it seemed clear that the proponents of this statute 
hoped to reverse this outcome, the statute explicitly disclaimed making any change in the 
substantive law.  Rather, the statute purported only to grant jurisdiction to a Florida 
federal court, grant standing to Ms. Schiavo’s parents to pursue the claims, establish a de 
novo standard for evaluating claims that may have already been considered by Florida 
state courts and specify that the federal court should disregard any impediments to 
federal jurisdiction based on previous or pending state proceedings.  In the short period 
between the passage of this statute and Ms. Schiavo’s death, federal courts repeatedly 
denied relief, finding insufficient likelihood of success on the merits to grant a temporary 
restraining order that would have ordered the reinsertion of Ms. Schiavo’s feeding tube 
during the pendency of the federal litigation.  See, e.g., Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. 
Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005), aff’d 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005).  
(The federal statute apparently did not alter the prerequisites for preliminary relief, which 
include a requirement that the party seeking preliminary relief establish a substantial 
likelihood of success on the merits.)  The courts did not reach the constitutionality of this 
statute since they found no basis to grant relief under it.  Because this statute and others like 
it do not implicate administrative action, it presents issues different from those involved 
when statutes attempt to direct the outcome of litigation involving judicial review of 
administrative action.  Judge Birch, in an opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing 




of Transportation to approve a highway design and construction 
proposal “[n]othwithstanding any other provision of law.”147  In 
response to a challenge to the Secretary’s approval of the highway 
project, a federal district court held that the application of the other 
statutes to the particular project was foreclosed by the more specific 
statute.148  With regard to another highway project, Congress simply 
directed the Secretary of Transportation to “approve the construction of 
[the highway] notwithstanding section 138 of title 23 and section 303 of 
title 49, United States Code”149 and a reviewing court held that this 
provision made the statutes under which the plaintiffs had challenged the 
highway location inapplicable to the particular highway.150  The court 
stated that the new statute provided an exemption from preexisting law 
and thus did not impinge on the executive’s prerogative over execution 
of the law.151  All of these decisions demonstrate that Congress has a 
great deal of power to supervise the executive branch through the 
enactment of particularized statutes.152  As long as Congress is careful 
not to style its enactments as directing the outcome of particular 
en banc in one of the petitions brought by Ms. Schiavo’s parents, argued that the 
provisions of the statute that direct the federal courts to hear the case de novo and 
disregard potential abstention arguments were unconstitutional because, in dictating the 
way in which federal courts must exercise their jurisdiction, “the Act invades the 
province of the judiciary and violates the separation of powers principle.”  See Schiavo 
ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2005) (Birch, J., specially 
concurring).  The Florida Supreme Court found that a law passed by the Florida 
legislature to allow the state governor to stay a court ruling removing Ms. Schiavo’s 
feeding tube violated separation of powers because it gave the governor the power to 
override a judicial order in a case.  See Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2004). 
 147. Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 
1212(u), 112 Stat. 107, 198 (1998), as amended, TEA 21 Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 
105-206, § 1226(e), 112 Stat. 834, 840 (1998). 
 148. See Bald Eagle Ridge Prot. Ass’n v. Mallory, 119 F. Supp. 2d 473, 480 (M.D. 
Pa. 2000), aff’d mem., 275 F.3d 33 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]here can be no question that the 
statutory provisions on which plaintiffs rely have been made inapplicable, regardless of 
whether the action of Congress is termed repeal by implication, exemption, suspension, 
or any other word or phrase which may be used to characterize this action.”). 
 149. See Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 
114, 100 Stat. 1783, 1783-349  (later reenacted as Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341, 
3341-349). 
 150. Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 151. Id. at 1434. 
 152. There is also an ongoing debate over whether Congress should have the power 
to make constitutional decisions free from Supreme Court interference.  While at one 
time the debate appeared to be about the principle of judicial review, it often appears 
now to involve the pragmatic question of whether particular views are more likely to 
prevail in Congress or in the courts.  See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION 
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000); Larry D. Kramer, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004). 
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litigation, it is free to direct executive discretion even during the 
pendency of judicial review litigation.153
Thus, the legislative process, including the budget process, provides 
Congress with potent means of supervising the particularities of the 
execution of the laws.  While the sheer number of administrative actions 
and level of technical detail often involved make it impossible for 
Congress to monitor the vast majority of administrative actions, 
Congress is able, when the right incentives exist, to target favored or 
disfavored administrative action for codification or rejection, and it is 
free to direct the administrative hand with strong legislative commands. 
5.  General Statutes and the Administrative Process 
In addition to very specific, targeted actions, Congress formally 
controls the execution of the laws through more general statutory 
provisions.  What I have in mind here are procedural and substantive 
provisions other than the substantive elements of an agency’s enabling 
act that influence agency action.  Examples include the APA, the NEPA, 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Government in the 
Sunshine Act, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), and other 
similar statutes.  Included in this category are also numerous reporting 
requirements which provide Congress with some of the information it 
needs to supervise the execution of the laws both formally and 
informally.  With these and other statutes, Congress controls agency 
decisionmaking through the specification of procedures, standards of 
judicial review, substantive limits that agencies may not transgress and 
substantive considerations that agencies are required to take into 
account. 
 153. In another case not involving a highway, Congress overrode objections to 
decisions by the Forest Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service to allow placement of a 
telescope in a particular location.  Congress had legislatively provided that the University 
of Arizona could place a telescope within a designated area and that this placement 
would satisfy applicable environmental statutes.  After a court held that the approved 
placement was not within the area designated by Congress, Congress acted again stating 
that placement in the approved location would be deemed to comply with the 
environmental statutes.  In Robertson terms, the court held that the particular provisions 
validly amended otherwise applicable statutes.  See Mount Graham Coal. v. Thomas, 89 
F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 1996).  The court held that the statute was valid even though a final 
judgment had already been entered holding that the placement was not within the area 
that Congress had designated because Congress has the power to amend the law 
prospectively in a way that would override the prospective effects of an injunction. 




The most important general statute that regulates agency administration 
of the law is the APA, which was passed in 1946.154  The APA contains 
two sets of provisions, one establishing the procedures that agencies 
must follow155 and another establishing a system of judicial review of 
agency action.156  After years of political wrangling over the power of 
agencies, the APA emerged as a compromise between those who wanted 
strict controls on agencies to limit New Deal programs and those who 
preferred a weak act that would make it easier for agencies to engage in 
aggressive regulation.157
The APA acts as a backup statute when Congress has not addressed an 
issue in a statute particular to an agency.  Many statutes creating 
agencies and prescribing their authority include procedural requirements 
and standards of review.  The APA includes provisions that fill any gaps 
in the agency’s particular statute, including the procedures for rulemaking 
and adjudication and the standards of judicial review.158  If an agency 
does not follow the procedures Congress specifies, its action is invalid, 
unenforceable and subject to being set aside on judicial review.159
McNollgast explains the APA as establishing a set of mechanisms for 
Congress to maintain control over agencies.160  According to McNollgast, 
the APA is intended to deal with two problems, agency drift and 
legislative drift.161  Agency drift is the tendency of agencies to pursue 
their own goals, which may be different from the goals Congress 
intended.162  Legislative drift is the tendency of a small, influential group 
of legislators to use their influence to divert the agency toward their 
goals and away from the goals of the legislature as a whole.163  The 
relatively loose procedural requirements for all agency activities other 
than formal adjudication and the relatively deferential standards of 
judicial review mean that the APA may be far from perfect as a tool of 
 154. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 700-706 (2000). 
 155. Administrative Procedure Act §§ 551-559. 
 156. Administrative Procedure Act §§ 700-706. 
 157. See McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180, 182 (1999); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The 
Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 
(1996). 
 158. Administrative Procedure Act §§ 553-554, 706. 
 159. It is important to note both that the agency action is unenforceable and that it is 
subject to being set aside on judicial review because even if the time for judicial review 
has passed, an agency may find itself unable to enforce an invalid rule.  See United 
States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 160. See McNollgast, supra note 157, at 184-85; McCubbins et al., Structure and 
Process, supra note 18, at 440-42, 472-73. 
 161. McNollgast, supra note 157, at 184. 
 162. Id.  
 163. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 107, at 1496 n.177.   
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congressional supervision, but imperfection is not inconsistent with the 
overall aim. 
The subjection of administrative action to judicial review and the 
specification of standards of review are mechanisms employed by 
Congress to control the execution of the law.164  A desire to conform 
agency action to congressional intent may not be the only reason that 
Congress subjects agency action to judicial review.  Congress may also 
be concerned with the protection of individual rights, and may want to 
make certain that agencies observe open and democratic decisionmaking 
procedures to preserve democratic values.  However, Congress is at least 
somewhat concerned with ensuring that agencies follow statutory 
instructions, hence the APA’s specification that a “reviewing court 
shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . not 
in accordance with law . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority 
or limitations, or short of statutory right.”165
Judicial review is an indirect method of supervision of agencies 
because it depends on a third party, the judiciary.  This raises the 
question of whether the federal judiciary is a faithful agent.166  Given the 
constitutional protections judges enjoy against overreaching by either of 
the other branches of government, one might expect that courts would 
feel free to ignore the preferences of the other branches, including 
 164. Gary Lawson has expressed reservations about the constitutionality of those 
provisions of the APA that regulate the standard of review that courts are required to 
apply when reviewing agency action.  In fact, he thinks that any statute that “regulate[s] 
the standard of proof that courts must apply” is unconstitutional on the ground that it 
interferes with the judicial function.  See Lawson, supra note 50, at 219-26. 
 165. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706(2)(A) (2000). 
 166. Landes and Posner, in an influential article, portrayed judicial review by an 
independent judiciary as an ideal enforcement mechanism for the interest group bargains 
within the legislature that produce contracts in the form of legislation.  See William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group 
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).  Jonathan Macey questioned this conclusion on 
the basis that Landes and Posner did not explain why independent judges have an 
incentive to do the legislature’s bidding.  See Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic 
Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 69 (1987).  Macey argues that judges 
advance the publicly stated public-regarding intentions that legislators attach to legislation 
even if the legislators mislead the public and pass the legislation only for self-regarding 
reasons, such as to please narrow interest groups that will help them get reelected.  In my 
view, Macey is correct that courts tend to rely on the publicly stated bases for congressional 
action and that these bases are normally public-regarding expressions of legislative intent 
and not the interest group oriented reasons that might more accurately explain why the 
legislature chose to act.  However, the question remains as to why courts rely on 
congressional expressions at all, as opposed to some judicially articulated set of norms that 
are completely independent of congressional intent. 




Congress.  In many situations it appears that federal courts do just that, 
pursuing their own preferences and pushing against the language and 
congressional understanding behind federal statutes.  In the civil rights 
area, for example, Congress has repeatedly found it necessary to amend 
statutes in reaction to narrow judicial constructions to accomplish goals 
that were arguably embodied in the pre-amendment versions of the 
statutes.167
Assessing the faithfulness of federal judges as agents of Congress in 
the area of judicial review is difficult because in so many cases it is 
difficult to discern the intent of Congress.  Some technical matters have 
been left to agencies with little more than a goal articulated by 
Congress—healthy air, clean water, safe and healthy places of 
employment.  Yet in cases in which the statutes provide guidance, courts 
often at least appear to be making significant efforts to keep agencies in 
line with congressional intent.  Two cases in which agencies were 
prevented from taking major policy initiatives provide good examples of 
this.  In one, the Supreme Court prevented the FCC from exempting all 
long distance carriers other than AT&T from the requirement that they 
file tariffs with the agency.168  In another, the Supreme Court prevented 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from regulating tobacco as a 
drug.169  In both cases, the Court’s analysis centered on discerning 
Congress’s intent from the language and structure of the statutes 
governing the agencies’ exercise of their authority.  In addition to these 
substantive examples, the foundation of the Supreme Court’s procedural 
jurisprudence regarding agencies, discussed below, is that absent 
unconstitutionality, courts may not impose on agencies procedural 
requirements different from or in addition to those specified by Congress 
in governing statutes, including the APA.170  While one can argue over 
whether the Court’s expressions of fidelity to congressional intent are 
genuine or whether courts generally are better or worse than agencies at 
discerning congressional intent, there is no question that courts, 
including the Supreme Court, express themselves in judicial review 
cases in terms of congressional intent.171
 167. See Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Litigation, Fifty 
Years Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 981 (2002). 
 168. MCI Telecomm’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
 169. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 170. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519 (1978); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990). 
 171. The Court’s recent application of the Chevron doctrine is a good example of 
the use of congressional intent to overrule (or in some cases approve) agency action.  
When it was decided, it appeared that Chevron would result in greatly increased 
deference to agencies.  As application of the doctrine developed, however, the Supreme 
Court has decided many cases under the prong of Chevron that require agencies (and 
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There are several possible explanations for this reality of judicial 
behavior.  Judges may be following well-developed norms of judicial 
conduct either because those norms have been internalized172 or because 
judges do not want to suffer the social and professional sanctions that 
may be brought down on them if they violate established norms,173 for 
example the norm that statutes should not be interpreted in a manner 
contrary to the apparent intent of Congress.  This is not to say that 
judges are perfect agents in administrative law.  In fact they are far from 
perfect, whether because their independence allows them, at least to 
some extent, to pursue their own preferences or because Congress’s 
instructions are often not clear enough for even the most faithful agent to 
act upon without making errors.  The point for present purposes is that it 
is rational for Congress to view judicial review of agency action as part 
of an effort to control the execution of the law in terms of limiting the 
administration’s ability to substitute its preferences for those of 
Congress. 
In addition to judicial review provisions in the APA and agency-specific 
statutes, Congress has employed its legislative power to enact numerous 
general statutes that control the substance of agency discretion and the 
manner in which the agencies exercise their discretion.  These statutes can 
be divided into three categories: (1) non-APA procedural requirements; 
(2) impact statement requirements; and (3) reporting requirements.  The 
category of non-APA procedural requirements includes statutes such as 
the FOIA,174 the Government in the Sunshine Act,175 the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACA),176 the Negotiated Rulemaking Act177 and the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Government Act.178  Impact requirement 
courts) to follow the clearly expressed intent of Congress, even when, for example, 
explaining that clearly expressed intent requires the Court to engage in several pages of 
analysis that includes references to the language, structure and history of a statute, and 
even application of canons of statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., Dole v. United 
Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26 (1990). 
 172. Presidents tend to choose judicial nominees who at least appear to have 
internalized the norms of judicial conduct, if only because judges perceived to be outside 
the “mainstream” are likely to have trouble in the confirmation process. 
 173. See Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics and Judicial Behavior: 
Macey’s Public Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 220-23 (1991). 
 174. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
 175. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2000). 
 176. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972). 
 177. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (2000). 
 178. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 
2993 (1998). 




statutes include the NEPA,179 the Endangered Species Act (ESA),180 the 
Small Business Act181 and the Migratory Bird Conservation Act.182  
Reporting requirements include scores of provisions that require agencies 
and other executive branch officials to make regular reports to Congress 
or congressional committees.  Congress has also established a statutory 
procedure for congressional review of major rules, the Congressional 
Review Act.183  This procedure is sui generis and is discussed above. 
The non-APA procedural requirements and the impact statement 
requirements have in common that Congress, with some exceptions, 
relies on courts to enforce their provisions.184  Statutes such as FOIA and 
the Government in the Sunshine Act can have significant effects on 
agency action because they open agency records and meetings to greater 
public scrutiny than might otherwise exist.185  FOIA opens all agency 
records to public inspection and copying except for those records that 
fall into a FOIA exception,186 and FOIA is enforceable by an action in 
federal court to force an agency to turn over covered records.187  The 
Government in the Sunshine Act requires that all meetings of an agency 
be open to the public unless the agency invokes a statutory exception, 
and even then the agency must follow specified procedures to legally 
meet in private.188  If an agency improperly meets in private, any action 
taken at the private meeting may be void.  FACA similarly requires any 
advisory committee with nongovernmental members “established or 
utilized” by the President or an agency to conform to open meetings 
requirements.189  This statute has been particularly controversial because, on 
its face, it means that the President may not meet with a group of private 
individuals to ask their advice without giving advance notice of the 
meeting, opening the meeting to the public and keeping minutes on what 
was discussed at the meeting.  This is a significant set of restrictions on 
 179. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (2000). 
 180. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). 
 181. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-657f (2000). 
 182. 16 U.S.C. §§ 715-715r (2000). 
 183. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2000). 
 184. Negotiated rulemaking procedures are not subject to judicial review, although 
rules produced through a negotiated rulemaking are subject to judicial review if the rule 
would have been subject to judicial review had negotiated rulemaking not been used.  
See 5 U.S.C. § 570 (2000).  The Negotiated Rulemaking Act provides that “agency 
action relating to establishing, assisting, or terminating a negotiated rulemaking 
committee . . . shall not be subject to judicial review.  Nothing in this section shall bar 
judicial review of a rule if such judicial review is otherwise provided by law.” 
 185. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 552b (2000). 
 186. 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
 187. Id. 
 188. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(b)-(c). 
 189. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972). 
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the President’s ability to confer with nongovernmental constituencies.  
Courts have tended to interpret FACA to avoid the serious separation of 
powers questions that might arise out of the potential interference with 
the operation of the executive branch that a more expansive interpretation 
would entail.190  With regard to all of these statutes, the degree to which 
they are effective in controlling executive action depends on how 
aggressively the courts interpret and enforce them. 
In addition to these general procedural requirements, a number of 
federal statutes pursue particular substantive goals by requiring agencies 
to take account of particular substantive concerns.  Statutes like NEPA 
and the Regulatory Flexibility Act require agencies to prepare impact 
statements describing the effects agency action would have on the 
subject of the particular statute such as the environment or small 
businesses.191  These statutes are substantive and procedural at the same 
time—substantive in that they require agencies to focus on and consider 
particular substantive issues but procedural in that they do not require 
any particular substantive outcome.  For example, NEPA requires that 
agencies prepare an environmental impact statement whenever a “major” 
federal agency action “significantly” affects the environment.192  NEPA 
specifies the contents of the statement and requires that the statement 
“accompany” proposed agency action through the approval process, but 
NEPA does not require that an agency forego actions that meet some 
standard of negative environmental impact.193  Thus, in operation, NEPA 
is largely procedural.  However, the public process for creating 
environmental impact statements, the publicity that environmental impact 
statements create concerning the environmental effects of proposed 
agency action, and the likelihood that courts will strike down agency 
action on judicial review when the statement is inadequate have forced 
federal agencies to consider and perhaps reduce the negative 
environmental effects of their actions.194
 190. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989); Ass’n of Am. 
Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 191. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (2000); 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 
(2000). 
 192. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347. 
 193. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.  
 194. See McCubbins, Abdication or Delegation, supra note 22, at 35.  The actual 
effects of NEPA on the environment are unclear.  One study indicates that agencies try 
very had to avoid having to produce an environmental impact statement by using 
mitigation and other strategies to keep environmental effects below statutory thresholds.  




Another device Congress uses to keep tabs on agency action is the 
sunset provision.  Under a sunset provision, a statute automatically expires 
after a certain period of time.  Often, a sunset provision is included for 
reasons unrelated to agency action, such as a perception that a problem 
is temporary, uncertainty over whether the legislation is necessary or 
will work, or simply as a matter of political compromise between those 
inclined in favor and those inclined against a proposal.  Where 
administrative action is relevant, a sunset provision gives an agency a 
strong incentive to administer a law in a manner favorable to Congress, 
because otherwise Congress will not re-authorize the program after it 
expires. 
6.  Reporting Requirements and Certifications 
Reporting requirements are also an effective tool that Congress uses to 
exert control over the executive branch.  In recent decades, the number 
and range of reporting requirements have increased exponentially, 
provoking complaints from executive branch officials that the sheer 
volume of reporting requirements harms their ability to function 
effectively.195  From the other side, there are consistent complaints from 
Congress that the executive branch is too reticent about sharing 
information with the legislative branch and thus reporting requirements 
are justified as a means for Congress to maintain control over the 
bureaucracy.196  It is impossible to overstate the volume of reporting 
requirements Congress includes in legislation directed at agencies and 
the President.197  In part, reporting requirements enable the informal 
supervision of agencies that is discussed below.  Reporting requirements 
are also a constant reminder that Congress is interested in agency 
activity and that all such activity takes place under Congress’s watchful 
eye.  Pervasive scrutiny is designed to keep agencies from straying too 
far from congressional intent. 
See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002). 
 195. See Jonathan G. Pray, Comment, Congressional Reporting Requirements: 
Testing the Limits of the Oversight Power, 76 U. COL. L. REV. 297, 298-317 (2005) 
(discussing volume and burden of reporting requirements).   
 196. See LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (2004); Raoul 
Berger, Executive Privilege: A Presidential Pillar Without Constitutional Support, 26 
VILL. L. REV. 405 (1980).   
 197. A Wall Street Journal report estimated the number of reports required in 1991 
at approximately 3000, at an annual cost of $350 million.  See Jim Payne, Congress’s 
Uncontrollable ‘In’ Basket, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1991, at A14, cited in Pray, supra note 
195, at 300 n.10.   
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Related to reporting requirements are certification requirements, under 
which the President or another official is required to certify to Congress 
that a particular state of affairs does or does not exist.198  Certification is 
often used in programs involving contingent discretion, that is, 
discretion that may be exercised only upon the existence or nonexistence 
of the specified state of affairs.  Certification, much like a reporting 
requirement, allows Congress to keep track of the execution of laws that 
involve contingent discretion because the act of certification brings the 
matter directly to Congress’s attention.  These certifications have legal 
consequences, such as making a foreign country eligible for monetary 
aid, military assistance, favored trade status and the like.  For example, 
under one statute, the President may authorize the release of funds for 
economic or military assistance to countries that are not in compliance 
with certain international nuclear nonproliferation programs, but only 
after the President certifies to Congress that the termination of funding 
“would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests; 
and . . . he has received reliable assurances that the country in question 
will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in 
doing so.”199  The statute also provides that Congress has the right, by 
joint resolution enacted within thirty days of the certification, to reject 
the certification, at which point the assistance would cease.200
7.  Executive Branch Organization and Agency Structure 
Another way in which Congress exercises authority over the execution 
of the laws is its power over the organization of the executive branch.  
One can imagine a system under which all executive power flowed 
directly to the President, who would then manage the execution as he 
saw fit, including organizing the executive branch into departments and 
agencies.  In our system, however, while the President may sometimes 
exercise independent organizational power,201 it is largely Congress that 
 198. See Mark A. Chinen, Presidential Certifications in U.S. Foreign Policy 
Legislation, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 217 (1999). 
 199. See 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa (2000). 
 200. The statute provides that the assistance terminates “upon the enactment of that 
resolution.”  § 2799aa(b)(2)(A).  Under Chadha, the President would probably have the 
power to veto the resolution, and the resolution could not have any legal effect until 
either the President signed it or Congress overrode a veto.  See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919 (1983). 
 201. See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 77-136 
(2003) (discussing agencies created by the executive branch and Congress’s responses). 




decides what departments to create, how to organize those departments 
into various authorities and agencies and whether to create agencies 
outside of any department.202  If Congress is unhappy with the way an 
agency is functioning, it can move it into a different department or even 
abolish it.  Dissatisfaction with the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service’s performance, for example, led Congress to abolish that agency 
and reallocate its functions among agencies within the Department of 
Justice, where the INS was located, and the new Department of 
Homeland Security.  Congress even creates departments over the objection 
of the President, as was the case in the recent creation of the Department 
of Homeland Security, which President Bush initially opposed.203  
Congressional control over the organization of the executive branch can 
be a potent tool for supervising the execution of the law. 
Often, it seems that the structure of the agency created to administer a 
program is as important to Congress as the substance of the regulatory 
program.  A good example is the struggle between Congress and 
President Richard Nixon over the structure of the entities that administer 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.204  The proponents of 
federal worker safety legislation pushed for an agency within the 
Department of Labor, while the President and business interests favored 
an independent agency.  The compromise ultimately adopted placed the 
standard setting and enforcement agency within the Department of 
Labor and created an independent agency to adjudicate violations.205  
McCubbins explains that the legislative coalition that passes regulatory 
programs structures the implementing mechanism, including setting the 
administrative procedures that apply, with the hope that the structure 
itself will produce desired outcomes without the necessity of extensive 
monitoring or supervision.206  When this does not work, legislators 
 202. Congress also has granted the President power to reorganize without specific 
statutory approval of the new organizational structure.  See generally Reorganization Act 
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-17, 91 Stat. 29, 32 (1977).  These reorganizations were subject 
to legislative vetoes.  See id. § 906.  Now that the legislative veto is no longer available, 
Congress has provided that no executive reorganization plan can go into effect without 
the approval of both Houses of Congress under a special, expedited procedure.  See Pub. 
L. No. 98-614, § 3(a), 98 Stat. 3192 (1984) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 906 (2000)). 
 203. Brooke Donald, 2002: The Year in Review: GOP Showed National Gains, 
Controlling Congress, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 29, 2002, § J, at 2, available at 2002 
WLNR 3692699 (“Bush scored a post-election victory with the creationof the Homeland 
Security Department, which he initially opposed.  Facing criticism from Democrats, he 
embraced the concept in June and used it as a political issue in the midterm election 
campaign.”). 
 204. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-675, 677-678 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 3141-1 (2000). 
 205. See RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
11-16 (4th ed. 2002). 
 206. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 18; see also Kathleen 
Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices About Administrative 
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monitor and supervise the administration of the program and may make 
adjustments to the administrative structure, although this ex post 
monitoring may reflect the desires of the supervising legislators rather 
than the desires of the original coalition that passed the legislation.207
The power over the organization of the executive branch includes the 
controversial power to establish agencies that are independent of direct 
presidential control.208  Theoretically, these agencies are supposed to be 
insulated from politics, but the truth is that while the independent 
agencies may be insulated from the President, they are often much more 
responsive to direct (albeit informal) congressional supervision than 
agencies within the executive branch.209  There are several common 
features in legislation creating independent agencies.  First, Congress 
includes in the legislation language indicating that the agency is 
independent.  Second, Congress specifies that the agency is headed by a 
group of commissioners appointed by the President for a fixed term, 
often with a requirement of bipartisan membership.210  (The bipartisanship 
requirement, and other qualifications that Congress has specified for 
various positions in government, can be viewed as additional formal 
methods of control.  These requirements are constitutionally suspect 
because they restrict the President’s authority to appoint Officers of the 
United States.211)  Third, Congress includes restrictions on the President’s 
power to remove commissioners during their terms, usually in the form 
of a requirement that they not be removed without good cause.212  
Fourth, Congress may include provisions concerning the chairmanship 
Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62 (1995) (discussing delegation in light of the 
possibility of agency drift); Macey, supra note 18 (discussing efforts in Congress to 
“hard wire” agencies to produce favored results). 
 207. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, supra note 18. 
 208. For a general description of the independent agency phenomenon, see FISHER, 
supra note 29, at 146-76. 
 209. Thus, in the usual case, Congress favors an independent agency as a way to 
diminish presidential control.  In the case of occupational safety discussed above, the 
President pushed for an independent agency because the Department of Labor at the time 
was viewed as under the influence of organized labor.  The President and business 
interests must have felt that they might do better in an entity separate from the 
Department of Labor even though an independent agency theoretically should be 
somewhat less amenable to presidential influence. 
 210. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 661(b) (2000) (specifying six-year terms for members of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission). 
 211. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 212. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 661(b) (“A member of the [Occupational Safety and 
Health Review] Commission may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect 
of duty, or malfeasance in office.”). 




and vice-chairmanship of the agency that greatly restrict the President’s 
choices.213  Finally, Congress may include provisions exempting or 
restricting the President’s ability to subject the agency’s budget to the 
normal review within the White House’s Office of Management and 
Budget.214  All of these features are designed to reduce presidential 
influence which enables Congress to maintain control over the independent 
agencies through informal devices discussed in the next section of this 
Article. 
8.  Advice and Consent on Appointments 
Another formal means of supervision that Congress has over the 
executive branch, not involving the legislative power, is the Senate’s 
power to reject appointments to agencies.  Under the Appointments 
Clause, appointments of Officers of the United States, which include any 
federal official with authority to execute the law, are made by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.215  Advice and 
consent is understood as majority approval in the Senate, although under 
Senate rules and practices, a committee can prevent a nomination from 
coming up for a vote, and less than a majority of the full Senate can 
filibuster, which also prevents the full Senate from taking a vote.216  
There are two ways in which the advice and consent power becomes a 
tool of supervision.  The first is the very direct fact that the Senate has a 
say in personnel and can refuse to approve appointments if it expects 
that the nominee will not execute the law in the manner favored by the 
 213. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1330(c) (2000) (imposing severe restrictions on 
President’s choices of chairman of International Trade Commission). 
 214. See FISHER, supra note 29, at 162-64. 
 215. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 216. “Advice and consent” is understood as a majority vote in the Senate except 
when the Constitution specifies otherwise, as in the requirement in Article II, Section 2, 
Clause 2 of the Constitution that treaties be ratified by a two-thirds majority of the 
Senate.  See Lawrence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections of 
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221, 1272 
(1995) (“The Appointments Clause requires Senate majority approval of principal and 
inferior officers[.]”).  Advice and consent for judicial appointments similarly requires a 
majority vote in the Senate.  Recently, a controversy has arisen over whether it is 
constitutional for the Senators to use procedural devices such as the filibuster, under 
which a minority of Senators can vote to continue debate indefinitely, to prevent the full 
Senate from voting on a nomination.  See Orrin Hatch, Judicial Nomination Filibuster 
Cause and Cure, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 803, 822 (tradition is that advice and consent 
means majority vote of Senators present and voting; use of filibuster against judicial 
nominees is “unprecedented”); Adam J. White, Toward the Framers’ Understanding of 
“Advice and Consent”: A Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
103, 104-06 (2005) (describing methods of defeating judicial nominees including failure 
to hold committee hearings and filibustering).   
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Senate.217  This power is often used to “convince” the President to 
nominate an individual favored by an influential Senator, providing that 
Senator with a loyal friend at an agency who is likely to execute the law 
in line with that Senator’s wishes.218  The second, less direct consequence of 
the Senate’s power is that approval of appointments can be used as 
leverage over related and even completely unrelated areas in which the 
Senate has an interest in the execution of the laws. 
The choice of which officials to subject to the advice and consent 
process is also reflective of Congress’s interest in the execution of the 
laws.  Congress has been aggressive in legislatively subjecting appointments 
to the Senate’s advice and consent power.  Congress has insisted that the 
appointment of important presidential advisors and other executive 
branch officials are subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, on 
the ground that these officials are Officers of the United States.  For 
example, in the 1970s, Congress legislatively subjected the appointment 
of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget219 and the 
United States Trade Representative220 to senatorial advice and consent.  
This is also thought to allow the legislature to assert the power to 
summon these officials to oversight hearings.221
9.  Impeachment and Removal 
Another nonlegislative supervisory power vested in Congress is the 
power to impeach and remove executive (and judicial) officials.  The 
Constitution specifies that the House alone has the power to impeach 
federal officials and the Senate alone has the power to conduct trials 
after the House votes for Articles of Impeachment.222  If the Senate 
convicts the official of the violations alleged in the articles of 
 217. See generally David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology, 
20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 438 (2004) (concluding that the Senate’s power over appointments 
influences the ideology of nominees chosen by the President).  In the next section, I 
discuss how informal pressure also influences presidential appointments. 
 218. Cf. Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 278 
n.104 (asserting that, while the “Senate has an ameliorating influence on presidential 
appointments . . . the exact extent of that influence has been difficult to capture with 
certainty . . . .”). 
 219. See Act of Mar. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-250, § 207, 88 Stat. 11 (1974) 
(codified at 31 U.S.C. § 502 (2000)). 
 220. See Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 141(a), (b)(1)-(2), (c)-(h), 88 
Stat. 1999 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (2000)). 
 221. This point was suggested by John F. Cooney. 
 222. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 5; art I, § 3, cl. 6. 




impeachment, the official is removed from office.223  This is not 
commonly used as a method of day to day supervision of executive 
officials, although Justice Scalia noted in his dissent from the Court’s 
approval of the Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in 
Government Act that “the context of this statute is acrid with the smell 
of threatened impeachment.”224  Impeachment has most commonly been 
used in recent years to remove federal judges who refuse to resign after 
they have been convicted of crimes because they have life tenure and 
there is thus no other mechanism to remove them.225  It is used much less 
often against executive officials because they can usually be removed by 
the President or some other supervisory federal official.226  When 
impeachment has been used against the President, it has often appeared 
to be based more on politics than on serious violations of the law.227
10.  Litigation by Congress 
Congress has also gotten involved in the quintessential executive 
activity of litigating the interests of the United States in court, although 
it tends to do so in separation of powers disputes when its own powers 
are at stake. 228  Congress has statutorily granted the Senate the right to 
intervene in litigation when the “powers and responsibilities of Congress 
 223. It is not clear that removal is the only punishment that the Senate may inflict.  
Joseph Isenbergh’s research on this during the impeachment proceedings against 
President Clinton revealed that in the early years under the Constitution, the Senate 
imposed lesser punishments such as fines on persons convicted by the Senate.  See 
Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process, 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS, Nov. 11, 1998, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/ 
39.pdf.  It has been quite a long time since the Senate has considered a lesser 
punishment.   
 224. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 225. See generally Eleanore Bushnell, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE 
FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT TRIALS (1992) (telling the story of the fourteen federal officers 
who, at the time of the writing, had been impeached by the House and tried by the 
Senate; the majority of those impeached have been federal judges). 
 226. See Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 CORN. L. REV. 
215, 219 (2005) (noting that “the President’s most important means of wielding control 
arises from his power to appoint and remove executive officials”). 
 227. Although it is difficult to draw a line between political and nonpolitical uses of 
the impeachment power against the President, the impeachments of Presidents Johnson 
and Clinton seem to be on the political side of the line while the threatened impeachment 
of President Nixon seems to be more directly about criminal conduct. 
 228. See Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 
YALE L.J. 970, 970 n.1 (1983) [hereinafter Executive Discretion] (detailing cases in 
which the predecessor to the Senate Counsel had intervened); Note, By “complicated 
and indirect” Means: Congressional Defense of Statutes and Separation of Powers, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 205, 207 (2004) [hereinafter Complicated and Indirect] (naming 
Chadha, Bowsher, and Buckley as among the cases in which Congress has defended a 
challenged statute in court).  
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under the Constitution of the United States are placed in issue.”229  The 
statute creates the Office of Senate Legal Counsel, and the head of that 
office is appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate from 
candidates recommended by the Senate majority and minority leaders.230  
The House employs counsel and participates in litigation on an ad hoc 
basis.231  There is disagreement among commentators over whether it is 
consistent with separation of powers for the Houses of Congress to 
intervene in litigation.  The argument in favor of the power is based on 
the possibility that without it, the President may exercise an absolute 
veto over legislation simply by declining to defend it in court.232  The 
response to this is that Congress’s legislative, impeachment and oversight 
powers are adequate to ensure that the President defends Congress’s 
constitutional powers in litigation.233
It is perfectly understandable that Congress would be skeptical of a 
system under which only the executive branch could litigate whether 
Congress has encroached too much on the executive power.234  Despite 
all of Congress’s formal and informal tools of supervision, the executive 
branch is not in a position to argue both sides of the case when its own 
powers are at stake.  The Supreme Court recognized this in Chadha, 
stating, “We have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend 
 229. 2 U.S.C. § 288e(a) (2000).  For a general discussion of the practice of the 
Senate intervening in cases challenging statutes on separation of powers grounds, see 
Complicated and Indirect, supra note 228 and Rebecca Mae Salokar, Representing 
Congress: Protecting Institutional and Individual Members’ Rights, in COURT IN 
CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF EMERGING RIGHTS 105 (Colton C. Campbell & John A. 
Stack, Jr., eds. 2002). 
 230. 2 U.S.C. § 288(a)(1) (2000). 
 231. See Executive Discretion, supra note 228, at 971 n.3. 
 232. Id. at 979-80. 
 233. See Complicated and Indirect, supra note 228, at 233. 
 234. On related grounds, the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000), which 
allows private individuals to assert fraud claims on behalf of the U.S. government, has 
been attacked as violating separation of powers by taking away the executive branch’s 
control over litigation on behalf of the United States.  In light of the long existence of 
this type of procedure, the challenges have been unsuccessful.  See Riley v. St. Luke’s 
Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749, 760-69 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).  For the argument that 
the False Claims Act violates the Constitution, see id. at 758-69 (Smith, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the False Claims Act is unconstitutional because it takes away executive 
branch control over litigation on behalf of the United States, violating the Take Care 
Clause and the Appointments Clause).  Whether it violates separation of powers or not, 
the False Claims Act is an effort by Congress to take away some of the executive 
branch’s control over the choice to litigate claims, and thus can be seen as an element of 
congressional administration in which the private parties bringing suit are agents of 
Congress. 




the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant 
charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute 
is inapplicable or unconstitutional.”235  This is why it is not surprising, 
for example, that Congress granted its members standing to litigate the 
constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act236 and also specified that 
when and if the Act were challenged, each House of Congress had the 
right to intervene in the litigation.237
11.  Congressional Excesses and Innovations 
Congress is so aggressive in its supervision of the administration of 
laws that it has employed methods of supervision that courts have later 
found were in excess of Congress’s constitutional powers.  The most 
prominent example of this is the legislative veto that Congress included 
in many statutes granting powers to agencies.  Under legislative veto 
provisions, agency action was submitted to Congress for review, and 
agency action would go into effect unless it was rejected by Congress or, 
as was usually provided, by a subset of Congress such as one House or 
sometimes even a single committee.238  Supporters of the legislative veto 
argued that it was proper because the procedure was contained in bills 
that were signed by the President and further, that it was desirable 
because it enhanced Congress’s control over the exercise of delegated 
legislative power.  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Congress 
may not take action having legal effect without going through the 
procedures specified in the Constitution for legislating, namely that the 
identical bill be passed by both Houses of Congress and be presented to 
the President for signature or veto.239
 235. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983). 
 236. See Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996) 
(formerly codified at 2 U.S.C. § 691). 
 237. See Line Item Veto Act of 1996, § 3(a).  The Supreme Court held, in a 
challenge to the Act brought by members of Congress who voted against it, that 
individual members of Congress lacked constitutional standing because they were not 
personally injured by the existence of the Act.  Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).  
Ultimately, the Act was struck down because it purported to grant the President the 
power to veto items in bills that had already been signed into law.  Once a bill has been 
signed into law, only Congress, subject to the President’s veto, may change the law.  See 
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
 238. See Phillip P. Frickey, The Constitutionality of Legislative Committee 
Suspension, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1237, 1259-60 (1986) (discussing basic nature of the 
legislative veto). 
 239. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 957-58.  Despite the Supreme Court’s clear rejection 
of legal effect for action by a subset of Congress or action by Congress without 
presentment to the President, in a recent, and probably unconstitutional statute, Congress 
required the approval of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations before any 
agency may transfer funds for an E-Government initiative sponsored by the Office of 
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A much earlier attempt by Congress to exercise authority over the 
execution of the law was the requirement, in various statutes, that the 
President seek the advice and consent of the Senate before removing an 
Officer of the United States whose appointment had been subjected to 
senatorial advice and consent.  In 1867, Congress passed a law over 
President Andrew Johnson’s veto requiring the advice and consent of the 
Senate before the President could remove any official who had originally 
been appointed with such advice and consent.240  When President Johnson 
refused to comply with this law, he was impeached by the House of 
Representatives and avoided removal by one vote in the Senate.241  In 
1876, such a provision was included in the law under which a local 
postmaster was appointed,242 and when the President removed the 
postmaster without consulting the Senate, the postmaster brought suit for 
backpay in the Court of Claims.243  The Supreme Court rejected his 
claim on the ground that there is no basis in the Constitution for the 
Senate to participate in the removal of executive officials.244  Congress 
might, through legislation, eliminate an office entirely or prescribe an 
expiration date for an appointment, but the Senate has no power on its 
own to prevent the removal of an officer within the executive branch.245
Management and Budget.  See Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, 
The Judiciary, The District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 841, 119 Stat. 2396, 2505 (2005).  This is another 
“innovative” attempt by Congress to influence the administration of the law.   
 240. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430. 
 241. Biography of Andrew Johnson, www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/ 
aj17.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2006). 
 242. Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, 19 Stat. 78, 80. 
 243. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926). 
 244. Id. at 163-64, 176-77.  Saikrishna Prakash has recently argued that Congress 
does have the power to remove executive branch officials through legislation in four 
distinct ways.  First, Congress can abolish an office, thereby leaving the incumbent out 
of a job.  Second, Congress can establish term limits for executive officials, resulting in 
eventual removal from office.  Third, Congress can mandate removal from office of any 
official convicted of a crime.  Fourth, and most controversially, Congress can pass what 
Prakash calls a simple removal statute, singling out a particular official for removal from 
office.  See Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming Dec. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=889378.  
 245. In his dissent in Myers, Justice McReynolds relied on the 1820 Tenure of 
Office Act as precedent for congressional involvement in removal.  See Myers, 272 U.S. 
at 186-88 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).  The Tenure of Office Act specified a four year 
tenure for certain officials, provided that all such officials could be discharged during 
their terms at the President’s pleasure and also imposed, one might say retroactively, an 
expiration date for the appointments of officials who were already in office at the time 
the Act was passed. Tenure of Office Act, ch. 102, 3 Stat. 582 (1820).  What Justice 




Congress is restrained in its efforts to supervise the executive branch 
by the elements of separation of powers that regulate who may 
participate in the execution of the laws.  Only Officers of the United 
States may execute the laws, and Congress may not participate in the 
appointment of such officers except via the Senate’s power of advice 
and consent.246  The Constitution provides that Officers of the United 
States are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, except that Congress may legislatively entrust the appointment 
of inferior officers to the President alone, department heads and courts of 
law.247  The Constitution specifically prohibits members of Congress 
from serving as officers of the United States,248 and Congress has not 
been able to avoid this prohibition by designating its members as serving 
in a capacity other than as members of Congress.249  Officials appointed 
or removable in ways inconsistent with status as Officers of the United 
States may not execute the laws.250
Congress has run afoul of these appointment and removal requirements 
more than once.  In the politically sensitive area of the regulation of 
federal elections, Congress attempted to keep a hand in the administrative 
process by statutorily granting the power to appoint members of the 
Federal Election Commission to the Speaker of the House and President 
pro tempore of the Senate, and also by subjecting all members of the 
Commission to confirmation by both the House and the Senate.251  The 
Supreme Court rejected these innovations: the power of appointment is 
granted to the President, not members of Congress, and the power of 
confirmation is granted to the Senate alone, not both the House and the 
Senate.252
McReynolds failed to appreciate is that even if Congress as a whole has the power to 
legislatively provide a termination date for an appointment, that does not mean that 
Congress may arrogate to itself the power to reject presidential exercises of the power to 
remove. 
 246. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 247. Id. 
 248. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
 249. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991).  The Court held that members of Congress may not serve on 
an authority that reviews the operation of the airports in the Washington, D.C. area. The 
Court did not reach the Incompatibility Clause challenge to this arrangement, resting its 
decision on more general separation of powers principles.  See id. at 277 n.23. 
 250. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 597 (1994) (arguing that the President must have the 
constitutional power to appoint and remove all officers who execute the law).   
 251. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1975). 
 252. See id.  In a later case, the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the presence of 
the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House as nonvoting ex officio members 
of the Federal Election Commission whose voting members were all presidential 
appointees.  Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 
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In the equally sensitive area of balancing the federal budget, in a 1985 
statute, Congress granted the Comptroller General253 the power to 
prescribe federal spending limits that under certain circumstances would 
become mandatory.254  This provision was held unconstitutional because 
the Comptroller General, who is thought of as an officer of Congress in 
charge of monitoring the performance of the executive branch,255 is 
subject to removal by a joint resolution256 of Congress and is not 
removable by the President.257  The Supreme Court held that while 
Congress is free to retain power to remove its own officers, it may not 
entrust the execution of the law to such officials.258  Thus, while the 
Court did not find it unconstitutional for Congress to retain the power to 
remove the Comptroller General, it did hold that the Comptroller 
General, as an officer of Congress, may not participate in the execution 
of the law.259
This is not to say that all apparent structural innovations that Congress 
employs to give itself a greater say in the administration of the laws are 
likely to be held unconstitutional or that they should be viewed as 
unconstitutional.  Martin Flaherty finds, in the enormous shift of power 
in the direction of the President, good reason to allow devices such as 
1993).  The court reasoned that although these congressional employees were not voting 
members, Congress must have intended them to have influence over the commission, 
and any such formal influence by members not appointed pursuant to the Appointments 
Clause violates the Constitution. 
 253. The Comptroller General is the head of an agency of Congress previously known 
as the General Accounting Office (GAO), now known as the Government Accountability 
Office.  The principal functions of the GAO involve research and reporting on the 
administration of the laws. 
 254. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 717-19 (1986). 
 255. See What is GAO?, http://www.gao.gov/about/what.html (last visited Mar. 16, 
2006): 
GAO, commonly called the investigative arm of Congress or the congressional 
watchdog, is independent and nonpartisan. It studies how the federal 
government spends taxpayer dollars. GAO advises Congress and the heads of 
executive agencies (such as Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, 
Department of Defense, DOD, and Health and Human Services, HHS) about 
ways to make government more effective and responsive. GAO evaluates 
federal programs, audits federal expenditures, and issues legal opinions. When 
GAO reports its findings to Congress, it recommends actions. Its work leads to 
laws and acts that improve government operations, and save billions of dollars. 
 256. A joint resolution is passed by both Houses of Congress and presented to the 
President. 
 257. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714. 
 258. Id. at 732. 
 259. Id. at 758-59. 




the legislative veto and congressional involvement in the removal of 
executive officials to rebalance the powers of the federal government.260  
The Supreme Court itself has approved two of the pillars of the 
administrative state, the lenient nondelegation doctrine and Congress’s 
power to establish independent agencies and insulate them, at least to an 
extent, from presidential control.261  The landmark 1935 decision allowing 
Congress to require cause for the President to remove agency officials262 
is central to the jurisprudence of the administrative state.  The more 
recent decisions discussed above concerning the legislative veto, the 
structure of the Federal Election Commission and the Comptroller 
General’s involvement in the budget process, together with a decision 
invalidating the structure of the bankruptcy courts,263 created the 
appearance that the Court was likely to strike down all independent 
agencies as inconsistent with the separation of powers.  This belief was 
proven wrong when the Court upheld the independent counsel provisions of 
the Ethics in Government Act.264  Another interesting innovation, under 
which the Comptroller General was granted the statutory authority to 
hear and issue recommendations on bid protests in government contracting, 
was upheld by two courts of appeals, largely on the grounds that the 
Comptroller’s recommendations were not binding and therefore the 
process was not executive but rather facilitated Congress’s investigative 
powers.265
 260. See Flaherty, supra note 19, at 1828-39. 
 261. See Abner S. Greene, Discounting Accountability, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1489, 
1501 (observing this development). 
 262. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 263. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 264. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 265. See Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986); 
see also Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988).  The most 
constitutionally difficult part of the scheme was its stay provision.  Filing a protest with 
the Comptroller automatically stayed the award of the contract.  That is not problematic 
because the Comptroller does not issue the stay; it is statutorily automatic.  Further, the 
procuring agency has the power to override the stay.  However, the Comptroller, for 
good cause, does have the authority to extend the time for making a decision on a 
protest, and the extension automatically extends the stay of the award of the contract.  
This seems to violate the requirement that only Officers of the United States can take 
actions that have legal effects.  The Reagan Administration apparently believed that the 
stay provision was unconstitutional.  President Reagan, when he signed the legislation 
involved, stated that he believed the stay provision was unconstitutional, and apparently 
his Administration had vowed not to obey it, even if it was upheld by lower federal 
courts.  Id. at 1105.  Nonetheless, both courts of appeals that have considered it have 
upheld the statute for similar reasons: the Comptroller’s review is nonbinding and the 
power over the length of the stay is not sufficient to convert the Comptroller’s review 
into impermissible execution of the laws.  See id. at 1110-11; Ameron, 809 F.2d at 995; 
City of Alexandria v. United States, 737 F.2d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (upholding a 
procedure under which the disposal of surplus government property was, in effect, 
subject to disapproval by a congressional committee). 
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12.  International Trade Oversight 
Congress’s involvement in the negotiation of international trade 
agreements may involve the most intrusive oversight practice of all.  
International trade agreements are negotiated by the United States Trade 
Representative, an official in the Executive Office of the President who 
is appointed by the President subject to the advice and consent of the 
Senate.266  Congress has required, by two statutes, that groups of members 
of Congress be designated as accredited members of delegations to trade 
meetings and negotiating sessions.267  The first statute, passed in 1975 
and amended in 1988, requires the Speaker of the House (upon the 
recommendation of the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and 
Means) and President pro tempore of the Senate (on the recommendation 
of the Chairman of the Committee on Finance) to name five members of 
their respective House of Congress to be “designated congressional 
advisers on trade policy and negotiations.”268  This statute also requires 
the United States Trade Representative to consult “on a continuing 
basis” with the Senate Finance Committee and the House Committee on 
Ways and Means.269  The second statute, passed in 2002, creates another 
group of members of Congress, the Congressional Oversight Group, and 
also designates them as accredited members of trade negotiating 
groups.270  Both statutes require that these members of Congress be kept 
informed of the activities of the United States Trade Representative, that 
they should have access to information concerning ongoing and 
proposed trade negotiations and that they should be consulted on trade 
policy.271
Another interesting innovation in the trade area that has not been 
tested in court involves the role of the House of Representatives in 
ratifying international trade agreements.  The President negotiates treaties 
subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, which in the case of 
 266. 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (2000). 
 267. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2211(a), 3807 (1994). 
 268. See Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 161, 88 Stat. 1982, 2008 and 
Act of Aug. 23, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1632, 102 Stat. 1119, 1269 (codified at 19 
U.S.C. § 2211(a) (2001)).  The named committee chairmen can also designate additional 
members of Congress to be advisers on particular trade agreements. 
 269. Id. 
 270. See Act of Aug. 6, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2107, 116 Stat. 993, 1017 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3807 (Supp. II 2004)). 
 271. 19 U.S.C. § 2211(a); 19 U.S.C. § 3807. 




treaties requires a two-thirds vote.272  Not all international agreements are 
treaties, although the line between treaties and nontreaty international 
agreements is not very clear or well understood.273  Some agreements, 
known as Executive Agreements, are made by the President alone.274  
Other agreements, mainly in the trade area, such as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), are made under legislative authority 
granted to the President and are, pursuant to the legislation, presented to 
both the House and the Senate for ratification.275
The House’s role in ratifying international trade agreements, such as 
NAFTA, is controversial because the Constitution grants only the Senate 
the advice and consent power over treaties.276  There is a split among 
commentators over whether these arrangements are constitutional.277  
There are several possible justifications for allowing the House to 
participate in the ratification of trade agreements such as NAFTA.  First, 
the House shares in the legislative power over tariffs and trade and thus 
traditionally participates through legislation in matters such as imposing, 
adjusting and removing tariffs.278  Second, the House’s participation is 
based on a quid pro quo under which Congress agrees to an up or down 
vote on the trade agreement without amendments.279  Finally, assuming 
that nontreaty international agreements exist, the line between what may 
be done only in treaty form and agreements that may be concluded in 
other forms is so uncertain that the government may be free to choose in 
any case between the treaty form and some other form, such as an 
agreement sent to both Houses under fast track legislation.280  By 
 272. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 273. See generally John C. Yoo, Law as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of 
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001) (exploring the treaty 
versus nontreaty distinction and its constitutional basis). 
 274. Id. at 765. 
 275. See id. at 758-59. 
 276. One court found that the issue of whether NAFTA was a treaty requiring 
Senate ratification under the Treaty Clause was a nonjusticiable political question.  See 
Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001); see also 
Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 
810-12 (1995).  For a discussion of these and other issues concerning international 
agreements and U.S. law, see James Thuo Gathii, Insulating Domestic Policy Through 
International Legal Minimalism: A Re-characterization of the Foreign Affairs Trade 
Doctrine, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1 (2004). 
 277. See Gathii, supra note 276, at 20-22 (citing sources on both sides of 
controversy). 
 278. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 279. This is known as “fast track.” 
 280. See Gathii, supra note 276, at 20 n.43.  The Third Restatement of Foreign 
Relations Law notes that: 
[S]ince any agreement concluded as a Congressional-Executive Agreement 
could also be concluded by treaty . . . either method may be used in many 
cases.  The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive Agreement can 
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insisting on participation in the ratification of international trade 
agreements, the House maintains some control over the President’s 
conduct in the international arena. 
In sum, the legislative and other formal powers provide Congress with 
potent tools to exert substantial influence over the execution of the laws 
and the carrying out of other executive branch activities.  Whether 
Congress exercises its powers too often, not often enough or instead with 
the proper frequency is debatable.  From general legislation like the 
APA to targeted appropriations riders, Congress has, on numerous 
occasions, become involved in the day to day administration of the laws.  
The Senate’s power to reject executive appointments is another formal 
tool that keeps Congress involved.  Undoubtedly then, Congress uses 
many formal tools to conduct extensive oversight of the executive 
branch. 
B.  Informal Congressional Involvement in the Execution of the Laws 
In addition to the formal methods that Congress employs to supervise 
the agencies, Congress, usually acting in smaller groups or even through 
individual members of Congress, engages in a great deal of informal 
monitoring and supervision of agencies.  Informal methods are those 
methods that do not require formal action by Congress, that is, no 
legislation or impeachment or advice and consent is required because the 
method of supervision does not purport to have any legal effect.  This 
includes informal contact between members of Congress and 
administrators, committee hearings, information requests, and other 
similar devices.  Informal oversight and supervision often take place 
with a threat in the background that if an agency does not align its 
actions with the desires of legislators, it will find itself subject to 
legislation including changes to the substance of its program, changes to 
its structure, reductions or reallocations of its budget or targeted 
appropriations riders.  The informal methods are pervasive and persistent, 
and the executive branch knows that almost all of its activities are 
be used as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance.  Which 
procedure should be used is a political judgment, made in the first instance by 
the President, subject to the possibility that the Senate might refuse to consider 
a joint resolution of Congress to approve an agreement, insisting that the 
President submit the agreement as a treaty. 
RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 cmt. E (1987). 




carried out under the watchful eye of Congress or representatives of 
Congress. 
To a great extent, the informal methods of supervision are employed 
in conjunction with formal methods.  For example, Congress has 
legislatively required agencies to file periodic reports with Congress.281  
These reports are often used as the basis for committee hearings, the 
paradigmatic informal method of supervision.282  As we shall see, informal 
supervision of agencies is extensive and provides Congress with some 
fairly effective supervisory tools to complement its formal powers over 
the substance of laws and the procedures and structures of agencies.  At 
the end of the day, the multifaceted framework of informal contacts, 
together with the formal methods discussed above, means that Congress 
plays an important superintending role over the execution of the laws it 
passes. 
1.  Oversight 
Oversight is the general term applied to a broad range of congressional 
monitoring and supervision of administrative agencies, most of which 
fall into the category of “informal” supervision.  Oversight is the public 
face of a vast network of contacts between members of Congress (and 
their staffs) and agency officials, including agency heads (and their 
staffs).  The most common set of oversight activities involves the receipt 
of information and the holding of hearings on the activities of agencies.  
Although oversight has always been part of the relationship between 
Congress and the executive branch, the current structure of oversight 
was initiated in 1946 with the passage of the Legislative Reorganization 
Act.283  This Act facilitated oversight through two devices, the organization 
of the House and the Senate into similar committee structures and the 
creation of a professional oversight staff for committees.284  Since then, 
oversight has mushroomed, although some may say it has mutated into a 
many-headed monster with some agencies scrutinized by dozens of 
committees and subcommittees.285  It is apparently very easy for 
members of Congress with an interest in a particular agency to assume 
 281. See Pray, supra note 195. 
 282. Id. at 301.   
 283. See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (codified at 
2 U.S.C. § 31). 
 284. For a theoretical examination of legislative committee structure, see generally 
KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991). 
 285. For example, a recent editorial in the Boston Globe states that seventy-nine 
committees and subcommittees engage in oversight regarding the Department of 
Homeland Security.  See Editorial, Security at Risk, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 7, 2005, at 
A18. 
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an oversight function within the structure of a committee or 
subcommittee.  The pervasive nature of oversight and its effect on the 
administration of the law has led Steve Calabresi to conclude that “the 
congressional committee chairs are in many ways rival executives to the 
cabinet secretaries whose departments and personal offices they 
oversee.”286
From the perspective of someone concerned that Congress delegates 
too much power to the executive branch, informal oversight is an 
important ameliorative, picking up some of the slack in legislative 
guidance that is lacking in broad delegations.287  Interestingly, over time 
there have been widely divergent views on whether oversight is 
appropriate and whether Congress engages in too much or too little 
oversight.  In 1885, Woodrow Wilson complained that Congress wielded 
far too much power, was unrestrained and prone to caprice.288  He wrote 
that Congress “has entered more and more into the details of the 
administration, until it has virtually taken into its own hands all the 
substantial powers of government.”289  By 1908, after witnessing a 
transformation in the role of the United States in world politics and 
strong presidents such as Theodore Roosevelt and Grover Cleveland, he 
wrote that the President is now at the “front of affairs.”290  With the 
broad delegations to regulatory agencies that blossomed in the twentieth 
century, complaints surfaced again that Congress had abdicated its 
lawmaking role, although at the same time there were complaints that 
Congress was too aggressive.291  The fact that there are complaints from 
 286. See Calabresi, supra note 102, at 51.  Calabresi spells out three ways in which 
congressional committees insinuate themselves into the execution of the law: the 
scrutiny of oversight hearings, appropriations riders, and promises extracted by the 
relevant Senate committee during the confirmation process.  See id. at 50-55.  Given that 
at least the second and third methods are clearly within Congress’s constitutional 
powers, I find it puzzling that an originalist would be so critical of them. 
 287. For an examination of congressional oversight, see, for example, WHO MAKES 
PUBLIC POLICY? THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE 
(Robert S. Gilmour & Alexis A. Halley eds., 1994). 
 288. See WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS, 46-49, 315-19 (15th ed. 1913) (1885); Thomas W. Wilson, Cabinet 
Government in the United States, 7 INT’L REV. 146, 147-49 (1879). 
 289. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 288, at 45. 
 290. Id. at xi-xiii; see also WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 57-60 
(1908). 
 291. Compare Lowi, supra note 21 (arguing that Congress has abdicated its 
responsibility to oversee the executive branch) with Calabresi, supra note 102 (arguing 
that congressional oversight is too intrusive).   




opposite perspectives indicates that the truth may lie somewhere in the 
middle.  Perhaps the level of oversight is close to what is appropriate.292
The machinery of congressional oversight is enormous.293  Each House 
of Congress has numerous committees and subcommittees, almost all of 
which engage in oversight activities.294  The website of the House of 
Representatives lists twenty-one House committees and three joint 
committees,295 while the Senate’s website lists fifteen Senate committees 
and four joint committees.296  The committees in each House are further 
divided into several subcommittees.297  At the high end, the Appropriations 
Committee in each House has more than a dozen subcommittees.298  
More typically, committees such as Agriculture and International Relations 
have four to seven subcommittees.299  Each of these committees and 
subcommittees has professional staff to perform oversight. 
Oversight often involves hearings before a committee or subcommittee at 
which agency officials and even department heads are asked to apprise 
the committee or subcommittee of agency activities and answer 
 292. From the perspective of someone who believes in the unitary executive both as 
a matter of constitutional design and normative desirability, the oversight process, as 
carried out by congressional committees, is a disaster.  See Calabresi, supra note 102, at 
50-55. 
 293. The variety of interactions between Congress and agencies is spelled out quite 
clearly in RANDALL B. RIPLEY & GRACE A. FRANKLIN, CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 68-84 (4th ed. 1987). 
 294. See Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: 
Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 
103-05 (1997). 
 295. United States House of Representatives, http://www.house.gov/house/ 
CommitteeWWW.shtml. 
 296. U.S. Senate: Committees Home, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/ 
committees/d_three_sections_with_teasers/committees_home.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 
2005).  The Senate lists a Joint Committee on the Library which the House does not list. 
 297. See United States House of Representatives, supra note 295 (providing links to 
subcommittees); U.S. Senate: Committees Home, supra note 296 (noting presence of 
subcommittees). 
 298. See Committee on Appropriations, http://appropriations.house.gov (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2006) (listing 10); U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, 
http://appropriations.senate.gov/subcommittees/subcommittees.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 
2006) (listing 12). 
 299. See House Committee on Agriculture: Subcommittees, http://agriculture. 
house.gov/inside/subcomms.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (House Committee on 
Agriculture lists five subcommittees); United States House of Representatives Committee 
on International Relations: Subcommittees, http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/ 
subcommittees.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (House Committee on International 
Relations lists seven subcommittees); United States Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry Committee, http://agriculture.senate.gov/sub.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) 
(Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry lists four subcommittees); 
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, http://foreign.senate.gov/ 
subcommittee.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
lists seven subcommittees). 
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questions concerning the agency’s policies or performance.300  One 
might think that the purpose of oversight hearings is to provide an 
opportunity for members of Congress to receive information about 
agency activities so they can consider whether legislation is desirable.  
While this is part of the reason for hearings, more important is the fact 
that hearings provide an opportunity for members of Congress to express 
their views, often consisting of displeasure with the agency’s performance, 
to agency personnel and the voting public.  Commonly, hearings involve 
long speeches by committee members criticizing agency actions and 
demanding change.301  Hearings may include testimony from members 
of the public about how agency action has affected them and also from 
nongovernmental experts on the consequences of government policy.302  
Very often, oversight hearings are carefully choreographed by committee 
chairs to help achieve political ends.  The sheer volume of hearings 
communicates the message that Congress considers itself the boss. 
The hearing process also facilitates tacit agreements between 
committees and agencies requiring agencies to handle matters in an 
agreed-upon way in the future.  Committee directives cannot be binding 
on agencies after the Chadha decision, which requires bicameralism and 
presentment before any action in Congress may create binding law or 
have any legal effect.303  However, nothing prevents agencies from 
accepting “suggestions” made by committee members at hearings, and 
committee members often insist on assurances to that effect in exchange 
for foregoing legislative action or further investigation.304  For example, 
in the immigration context, the filing of a private bill coupled with a 
subcommittee request for a report from the deporting agency results in a 
stay of deportation, apparently pursuant to an informal agreement 
between Congress and the agency.  Given the power of Congress over 
agency budgets and substantive law, agencies have a strong incentive to 
listen when members of Congress make suggestions at public hearings. 
 300. See Pray, supra note 195, at 307 (describing usual oversight practices). 
 301. See, e.g., Brian D. Shannon, Debarment and Suspension Revisited, 44 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 363, 366 n.10 (1995) (observing committee criticism of agency action). 
 302. See, e.g., Alan N. Resnick, The Bankruptcy Rulemaking Process, 70 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 245, 256-57 (discussing role of public comments before Advisory 
Committee). 
 303. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983). 
 304. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the 
Clipper Ship, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 780 n.290 (1995) (observing 
that “[a]gencies are allowed to defer to other opinions, so long as they make the final 
decision” and listing supporting cases). 




Hearings are often part of the many extensive congressional 
investigations conducted regarding the conduct of the executive branch.  
These investigations and confrontations may be legitimate attempts by 
Congress to exercise its legislative power responsibly, but they profoundly 
affect the balance of power in the United States government.305  To 
support its investigations, Congress has the power to subpoena witnesses 
and require them to bring records and other documents.306  These tools 
are quite broad,307 and many confrontations between Congress and the 
President involve actual or threatened claims of executive privilege 
against congressional attempts to procure information from the executive 
branch.308  Congressional investigations run the gamut, from looking 
into the administration of regulatory programs to investigations of 
whether the Department of Justice is acting properly in ongoing criminal 
investigations and prosecutions, where disclosure of information can 
harm law enforcement and prejudice the rights of subjects.309  Congress 
 305. See William Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the 
President, 4 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 781-84 (2004); Randall K. Miller, Congressional 
Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional Prerogative of Executive Privilege, 81 MINN. L. 
REV. 631, 635-37, 683-87 (1996). 
 306. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503-07 (1975) 
(committee subpoena is legitimate part of legislative process and therefore Speech or 
Debate Clause protects committee members from civil suit based on alleged 
constitutional violations arising out of issuance of subpoena).  There has been some 
critical commentary regarding Congress’s subpoena power and the related power to 
prosecute contempt of Congress.  Gary Lawson has recently argued that the Orders, 
Resolutions, and Votes Clause of the Constitution, Article I, Section 7, Clause 3, requires 
that a congressional vote for a subpoena be presented to the President for signing or veto.  
See Gary Lawson, Burning Down the House (and Senate): A Presentment Requirement 
for Legislative Subpoenas Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1373, 1385 (2005).  He bases his conclusion on the analysis of the Orders, 
Resolutions, and Votes Clause in Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, 
Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided and Why INS 
v. Chadha was Wrongly Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2005).  Additionally, Todd 
Peterson concludes that Congress cannot, consistent with separation of powers, compel 
the executive branch to prosecute someone for criminal contempt of Congress.  Rather, 
any prosecution must be subject to normal prosecutorial discretion in the executive 
branch.  See Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Contempt of 
Congress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 612 (1991); see also Watkins v. United States, 354 
U.S. 178 (1957) (voiding conviction for contempt of Congress for failing to reveal 
whether associates were communists because defendant was not given an opportunity by 
congressional committee to assert and have evaluated the basis for his refusal to answer). 
 307. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 453 (1977); Eastland, 421 
U.S. at 504-05. 
 308. E.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (matter under investigation by 
Congress involved alleged false and misleading testimony in a congressional committee 
by an executive branch official on the operation of a government program). 
 309. See Todd David Peterson, Congressional Oversight of Open Criminal 
Investigations, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1373 (2002).  Peterson concludes that the 
Department of Justice should not be required to provide Congress with information 
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frequently seeks to require administration officials to appear for hearings 
with documents and other information.310
Public demands by members of Congress for information can place 
the President in the uncomfortable position of feeling the need to 
maintain secrecy while members of Congress claim that the only reason 
for secrecy is to prevent political embarrassment.  Committees often 
conduct intensive investigations into the conduct of the administration 
with an eye toward criminal prosecution and law reform.  Executive 
branch officials trying to remain loyal to the President often find 
themselves under sharp attack from members of Congress seeking 
information to use against the President or his policies.  For example, 
President Clinton’s actions were subjected to intensive scrutiny in large 
part by investigations emanating from Congress.311  Investigations can 
result in the production of multivolume reports with hundreds and even 
thousands of pages.312  Congress’s message to the executive branch is 
clear—“we are watching you.” 
2.  Oversight Institutions 
Congress has also established and funded institutions that provide 
extensive oversight of the executive branch.  In addition to investigations 
conducted by Congress itself, the primary entity that conducts 
investigations for Congress is the Government Accountability Office 
concerning ongoing criminal investigations and that this should be a per se rule without 
the necessity of the President asserting executive privilege.  Id. at 1378. 
 310. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Separation of Powers, the Presidency, and the 
Environment, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL L. 25, 36-37 (describing congressional 
response to protests that the Office of Management and Budget was unduly interfering 
with the EPA: “Congress responded by holding numerous oversight hearings at which 
administration officials were asked to appear as witnesses to defend their actions.”). 
 311. Congress’s power to investigate the President is not unlimited.  See Marshall, 
supra note 305.  Marshall explains that Congress has strong political incentives to 
investigate the President and little in the way of political disincentives.  Id. at 820.  He 
recommends reforms that would make members of Congress and Congress as a whole 
more accountable for investigations of the President as a way of reducing the tendency 
toward destructive investigations.  Id. 
 312. For example, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation produced a 2700 
page, three volume report on the federal taxation issues related to the Enron scandal.  See 
Christopher H. Hanna, From Gregory to Enron: The Too Perfect Theory and Tax Law, 
24 VA. TAX. REV. 737, 788 n.238 (2005) (discussing Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 
108th Cong., Report of Investigation of Enron Corp. and Related Entities Regarding 
Federal Tax and Compensation Issues, and Policy Recommendations (Joint Comm. Print 
2003)). 




(GAO) (formerly the General Accounting Office).  The GAO, with 
approximately 3,300 employees,313 was created by Congress with the 
express purpose of engaging in oversight of the executive branch: 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an agency that works for 
Congress and the American people. Congress asks GAO to study the programs 
and expenditures of the federal government. GAO, commonly called the 
investigative arm of Congress or the congressional watchdog, is independent 
and nonpartisan. It studies how the federal government spends taxpayer 
dollars.314
The research and investigations performed by the GAO, combined with 
all of the reporting to Congress that agencies are legally required to do, 
enables Congress to keep close tabs on activity within the executive 
branch. 
The GAO is headed by the Comptroller General, an official appointed 
for a fifteen-year term by the President, with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, from a list provided by the Speaker of the House and 
President pro tempore of the Senate.315  The Comptroller is removable 
for cause and inability to perform the duties of the office by a joint 
resolution of Congress.316  The length of the Comptroller’s term in office 
insulates the Comptroller from presidential influence, and the method of 
removal underscores that the Comptroller works for Congress, not the 
executive branch.317
The primary focus of the GAO is the performance of the executive 
branch, and its reports often focus attention on inadequacies in executive 
branch administration.318  The GAO’s nearly 3,300 employees and budget 
 313. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO: THE HUMAN 
CAPITAL STRATEGIC PLAN, FISCAL YEARS 2004-2006 5, available at http://www. 
gao.gov/new.items/d041063.pdf.   
 314. What is GAO?, supra note 255. 
 315. 31 U.S.C. § 703 (2000).  The requirement that the President appoint someone 
from a list provided by the congressional leadership is controversial, but may be 
constitutionally allowable in the case of the Comptroller General because he is 
considered an officer of Congress and not the executive branch.  Whether it would be 
allowed in the case of executive branch officials is doubtful.  See Hechinger v. Metro. 
Wash. Airports Auth., 36 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 316. 31 U.S.C. § 703. 
 317. This provision also means that the Comptroller may not exercise authority 
pursuant to the laws because, as the Supreme Court has held, only Officers of the United 
States may exercise such authority and Officers of the United States may not be removed 
by Congress, except via impeachment.  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 318. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE LOGISTICS: MORE EFFICIENT USE 
OF ACTIVE RFID TAGS COULD POTENTIALLY AVOID MILLIONS IN UNNECESSARY 
PURCHASES, GAO-06-366R, (Mar. 8, 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/ docsearch/ 
abstract.php?rptno=GAO-06-366R (last visited Mar. 16, 2006) (indicating that the 
Department of Defense, an executive branch agency, has failed to maintain visibility 
over inventory and that “[t]he lack of visibility over inventory and equipment shipments 
increases vulnerability to undetected loss or theft and substantially heightens the risk that 
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of over $460 million constitute an enormous bureaucracy focused on the 
performance of the government.319  The GAO is very active in investigating 
waste, fraud and other sorts of abuses by government agencies.320  It has 
issued a series of reports under the rubric of its Government Performance 
and Accountability series that focuses on the challenges within each 
department and non-departmental federal agency.321  The GAO reports 
that it has made 2,700 recommendations for governmental reform and that 
eighty-three percent of its recommendations have been accepted.322  GAO 
reports provide fodder for congressional oversight of federal agencies 
and are often used by congressional committees and Congress as a 
whole as evidence of problems within the executive branch. 
Another entity that provides research for Congress is the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), “a $91,726,000 per year (FY 2004, $101 
million proposed for FY 2005) agency staffed by 729 members, [which] 
responds to over 800,000 congressional requests each year.”323  The 
CRS, an arm of the Library of Congress, produces 1000 reports per year 
and updates an additional 4000.324  The subject matter of CRS reports 
spans the entire spectrum of federal governmental activity, including 
law, social policy, foreign affairs, international trade, national defense, 
the administration of justice, retirement, children and families, health 
care, and education.325
The CRS is considered an agency of Congress, not the executive 
branch.  Its director is appointed by the Librarian of Congress, subject to 
confirmation by the Joint Committee of the Library, a congressional 
millions of dollars will be spent unnecessarily. Additionally, needed supplies may not 
reach the warfighter when needed, which may impair readiness”). 
 319. GAO at a Glance, http://www.gao.gov/about/gglance.html (last visited Mar. 
16, 2006) (indicating a staffing level of 3,200 employees and a budget of $463.6 
million). 
 320. See, e.g., Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing 
Drug Price Controls?, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631, 678-79 (2001) (discussing GAO 
investigation of medical patent fraud). 
 321. See Key Related GAO Products Issued Since 2003 Performance and 
Accountability Series, http://www.gao.gov/pas/2005/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2006). 
 322. GAO at a Glance, supra note 319.   
 323. Stephen Young, CRS Reports (July 26, 2004), http://www.llrx.com/ 
features/crsreports.htm (guide to the Congressional Research Service).  CRS’s 2004 
annual report states that in fiscal year 2004 it “delivered 889,284 research responses.”  
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2004, available at 
http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/CRS04_AnnRpt.pdf.   
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 




committee composed of Senators and Representatives.326  This appointment 
process is permissible because the director does not exercise authority 
under United States law and thus is not an Officer of the United States 
under the test articulated by the Supreme Court.327
3.  Informal Contacts 
The public face of oversight and hearings exists against the 
background of a network of informal, often private contacts through 
which members of Congress attempt to influence the execution of the 
law by communicating directly with agency personnel.  When no 
proceedings are pending, members of Congress may communicate freely 
with agency personnel and urge the agency to take or forego action.328  
Once proceedings begin, the law is less clear.  With regard to formal 
adjudicatory proceedings, off the record communications are normally 
contrary to both the APA and due process.329  In rulemakings, while 
there is no question that members of Congress may participate in the 
public rulemaking proceedings, the case law is somewhat murky on 
whether members of Congress are allowed to communicate outside the 
public record with the agency once rulemaking proceedings have 
begun.330  The dominant understanding appears to be that in most 
rulemaking proceedings, members of Congress may communicate with 
agency officials, but the substance of any important communication 
must be placed on the public record.331  Further, there is support in the 
case law for a rule that members of Congress should keep their 
comments to the merits of the issues before the agencies and should not 
 326. See What is the Congressional Research Service, http://www.loc.gov/ 
crsinfo/whatscrs.html#about (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).  Interestingly, the Librarian 
himself is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.  
Librarians tend to serve through multiple presidencies—there have been only thirteen 
Librarians of Congress since the founding of the library in 1800.  The current Librarian, 
James H. Billington, has been serving since 1987. 
 327. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 328. See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 
12 (2000) (“Congress can and does monitor agencies through . . . informal staff 
contacts . . . .”). 
 329. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(a), (d)(1)(a) (2000): 
[W]hen a hearing is required to be conducted in accordance with section  
556 of [the APA] . . . no interested person outside the agency shall make or 
knowingly cause to be made to any member of the body comprising the 
agency, administrative law judge, or other employee who is or may reasonably 
be expected to be involved in the decisional process of the proceeding, an ex 
parte communication relevant to the merits of the proceeding . . . .
 330. Compare Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) with HBO v. 
FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 331. See infra text accompanying note 341.   
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threaten retaliation if the agency acts contrary to the member’s expressed 
preferences.332
There are strong arguments that off the record contacts are legally 
allowable in all proceedings other than formal adjudication and formal 
rulemaking.  The existence of the APA prohibition against ex parte 
contacts in formal adjudication and formal rulemaking,333 and the 
absence of a similar provision with regard to other proceedings, such as 
informal rulemaking, implies that there is no legal bar to nonrecord 
contacts except in formal adjudication.  This implication may actually be 
required by the Vermont Yankee rule that, absent constitutional problems, 
courts should not impose procedural requirements in addition to those 
specified in the APA and other applicable statutes.334
The Supreme Court has not provided specific guidance on whether ex 
parte contacts are allowed in proceedings other than formal adjudication, 
and the lower courts have disagreed on the extent to which such contacts 
are improper.  In the leading cases on ex parte contacts in rulemaking, 
two panels of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals took different 
approaches to the problem.335  The first of the leading cases, the HBO 
case, involved a challenge by a public interest participant in a FCC 
rulemaking regarding the division of programming between cable and 
over-the-air television.336  It was an uncontested fact that many 
interested parties communicated off the record with agency members 
and staff.337  The D.C. Circuit panel cited pervasive ex parte contacts as 
evidence “of undue industry influence over Commission proceedings.”338  
The court decried ex parte contacts as constituting a secret record, 
raising the possibility that the public record would not reveal the true 
 332. See D.C. Fed’n Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972).  For a 
discussion of this and other cases in which members of Congress have exerted political 
pressure on agencies, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible 
Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 481 (1990). 
 333. 5 U.S.C. §§ 557(a), (d)(1)(A). 
 334. For a discussion of the Vermont Yankee rule, see infra notes 428-439 and 
accompanying text.  In District No. 1, Marine Eng’rs’ Beneficial Ass’n v. Maritime 
Admin., 215 F.3d 37, 42-43 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the court held that courts lack power to 
prohibit ex parte contacts in administrative proceedings when no statute or rule bans 
them.   
 335. See Sierra Club, 657 F.2d 298; HBO, 567 F.2d 9. 
 336. HBO, 567 F.2d at 13. 
 337. Id. at 51. 
 338. Id. at 53. 




basis for the agency’s decision.339  The court went on to observe, 
however, that “informal contacts between agencies and the public are the 
‘bread and butter’ of the process of administration and are completely 
appropriate so long as they do not frustrate judicial review.”340  Out of 
this muddled analysis, the court constructed two rules.  First, once 
rulemaking proceedings have begun, agencies should refuse to accept ex 
parte communications and second, if ex parte contacts nonetheless 
occur, the agency should place them, including summaries of any oral 
communications, on the public record.341
The second leading case on ex parte communications, the Sierra Club 
case,342 concerned agency contacts initiated by members of Congress, 
the President, other executive branch officials and private interests 
during the pendency of an EPA rulemaking on pollution standards for 
coal fired power plants.343  This case involved allegations of an “‘ex 
parte blitz’ by coal industry advocates conducted after the close of the 
comment period” and numerous post-comment period meetings with 
personnel of other agencies, members of Congress (and their staffs), the 
President (and his staff) and representatives of private interests.344  These 
meetings included two with Senator Robert Byrd, a powerful Senator 
who was very interested in the outcome of the rulemaking because he 
represented West Virginia, a state that produces a great deal of relatively 
“dirty” coal.345  In this case, a different D.C. Circuit panel began its 
analysis by noting that no statute prohibits ex parte communications in 
rulemaking proceedings, and then declined to construct a rule barring ex 
parte contacts in the absence of a statute forbidding them.346  The court 
also observed that the legitimacy of policymaking by administrators 
depends on them remaining accessible to members of the public and that 
the quality and acceptability of rules may be enhanced by ex parte 
communications.347  The court did find some statutory authority to regulate 
ex parte contacts in procedural sections of the Clean Air Act that add to 
the requirements of the APA.348  In particular, one provision of the Clean 
Air Act prohibits the EPA from basing its rule on any material not 
placed in the rulemaking docket while another requires that documents 
the Administrator of the EPA believes are of central relevance be placed 
 339. See id. at 58-59. 
 340. See id. at 53-57. 
 341. See id. at 57. 
 342. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 343. Id. at 387-89. 
 344. Id. at 386. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 396. 
 347. Id. at 400-01. 
 348. Id. at 401. 
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in the docket as soon as possible.349  From these two provisions, the 
court derived a requirement that the agency summarize important oral 
comments and place them on the record.350  This court’s decision exhibits 
some of the HBO court’s displeasure with ex parte communications 
since it expands the domain of the statute from “documents” to oral 
communications, but the court’s decision is more lenient than the HBO 
court’s admonition that agencies should refuse to accept ex parte 
contacts.351  However, the end result is similar in that both courts require 
agencies to place documents and summaries of oral ex parte 
communications on the public record. 
With regard to the meetings with Senator Byrd, the court found it 
perfectly fine for the agency to meet with him, as long as the Senator’s 
comments focused on the merits of the rule:352
We believe it entirely proper for Congressional representatives vigorously to 
represent the interests of their constituents before administrative agencies 
engaged in informal, general policy rulemaking, so long as individual 
Congressmen do not frustrate the intent of Congress as a whole as expressed in 
statute, nor undermine applicable rules of procedure.  Where Congressmen keep 
their comments focused on the substance of the proposed rule . . . administrative 
agencies are expected to balance Congressional pressure with the pressures 
emanating from all other sources.  To hold otherwise would deprive the 
agencies of legitimate sources of information and call into question the validity 
of nearly every controversial rulemaking.353
 349. Id. at 402. 
 350. Id. at 402-03. 
 351. One aspect of the controversy involves the distinction between rulemaking and 
adjudication.  The HBO court relied on a prior D.C. Circuit decision that ex parte 
contacts are not appropriate in rulemaking proceedings that decide “conflicting private 
claims to a valuable privilege” since such proceedings are analogous to adjudication.  
Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1959), 
cited in HBO v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  Sangamon Valley was a 
proceeding to allocate television frequencies among a small number of licensees. 269 
F.2d at 223.  HBO involved a larger group of broadcast, cable, and subscription 
television interests fighting over the right to show various types of programming. 567 
F.2d at 19.  The Sierra Club court held that the HBO rule does not apply to “informal 
rulemaking of the general policymaking sort involved here.”  Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 
402. 
 352. Pressure by a member of Congress was found to be improper when a powerful 
member of the House of Representatives threatened to prevent funding of the 
Washington, D.C. subway system if the Department of Transportation failed to build a 
bridge between the Georgetown area of Washington, D.C. and Sprout Run, Virginia.  See 
D.C. Fed’n Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 353. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 409-10. 




The court’s reasoning recognizes that congressional pressure on agencies 
is ubiquitous, but its expectation that agencies will be able to balance 
congressional pressure against pressure from other sources may be 
somewhat unrealistic.  Allowing members of Congress the freedom to 
“vigorously” press the interests of their constituents in private meetings 
with agency personnel provides those members with a powerful tool for 
shaping agency action to their preferences. 
The most notorious, relatively recent example of congressional 
pressure on an agency on behalf of constituents354 is probably the case of 
the Keating Five, in which five Senators repeatedly pressed officials of 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, including its Chairman, on behalf 
of Charles Keating, not to adopt stricter rules regarding the investments 
of savings and loans and then not to apply the new rules to Keating’s 
institutions.355  Keating had made substantial campaign contributions to 
the group of Senators.356  With regard to a meeting between four of the 
Senators and the Board Chairman, at which the Senators were seeking to 
end the Board’s investigation of one of Keating’s savings and loans, the 
Chairman of the Board reported that because of the Senators’ influence 
over legislation, he felt pressure to comply with their wishes.357  Despite 
all of the pressure the Senators brought to bear on the agency, and a 
pattern in which campaign contributions and pressure on Keating’s 
behalf appeared to have been linked, the Senate Select Committee on 
Ethics found no violation of law or Senate rule.358
In rulemakings and other legislative-type agency proceedings, off the 
record contacts can be supplemented by on the record participation.  
Members of Congress can participate in agency processes by offering 
comments and analyses of proposed agency action.  Their comments are 
likely to be influential for all the reasons that agencies fear acting 
contrary to the wishes of those in Congress with power over their 
budgets and authorizing statutes.  Making on the record comments has 
the disadvantage of taking a public position that may be contrary to the 
views of some constituents, but it also has advantages such as avoiding 
the legal uncertainty inherent in off the record contacts.  Agencies can 
 354. “Constituents” should be understood broadly to include anyone whose support 
may be important to a member of Congress.  For example, Charles Keating’s interests 
were advocated by five or six Senators, obviously more than represent the state in which 
he lived.  For a general discussion of congressional ethics and constituent advocacy, 
including the case of the Keating Five, see Ronald M. Levin, Congressional Ethics and 
Constituent Advocacy in an Age of Mistrust, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
 355. See RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
70-74 (3d ed. 1998). 
 356. Id. at 73. 
 357. Id. at 74. 
 358. Id. 
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base their decisions on the comments in the public record without 
worrying about the rules that bar reliance on nonrecord material.  
Another advantage of participating in a rulemaking or other proceeding 
in a public manner is that when constituents are united in favor of one 
position, it allows the member to appear to be fighting for the 
constituents.  Even in a losing battle, fighting the fight may be politically 
advantageous. 
4.  Legislative History 
Congress also influences the execution of the law by producing 
legislative history that includes instructions to the executive branch in 
addition to those contained in the legislation itself.359  The problem with 
legislative history is that it is not voted on by Congress as a whole, and 
therefore it does not have the force of law.  This is particularly 
problematic when the legislative history contradicts or supplements 
statutory language.  Without getting into the longstanding debate over 
whether courts should rely on legislative history in interpreting statutes, 
insofar as legislative history does influence the construction of statutes 
administered by the President or an agency, legislative history can be a 
device of congressional administration.360  Legislative history is used by 
committees to illuminate the meaning of statutory language and to 
provide other background information on the legislation.  What is most 
relevant here is that Congress sometimes produces legislative history 
containing explicit instructions to the executive branch.  Consider the 
following excerpt from a conference committee report on an immigration 
provision that provides relief from deportation to victims of human 
trafficking who can show “extreme hardship involving unusual and 
severe harm upon removal”: 
 359. I have included legislative history in the category of informal congressional 
action because when it produces legislative history in the form of committee reports and 
the like, Congress has not taken the formal steps necessary to exercise one of its 
constitutional powers such as legislation or impeachment.  It is somewhat more formal 
than many of the informal powers discussed here when it is embodied in reports that 
have been adopted by a congressional committee.  Nonetheless, in my view it fits better 
in the informal category than the formal one. 
 360. Even within the highly deferential Chevron model, the Supreme Court has 
viewed reference to legislative history as a legitimate element of statutory interpretation.  
See Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 38-40 (1990). 
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The conferees expect that the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review will interpret the “extreme hardship 
involving unusual and severe harm” to be a higher standard than just “extreme 
hardship.” The standard shall cover those cases where a victim likely would 
face genuine and serious hardship if removed from the United States, whether 
or not the severe harm is physical harm or on account of having been trafficked.  
The extreme hardship shall involve more than the normal economic and social 
disruptions involved in deportation.361
Here, in addition to the language contained in the statute itself, the 
conference committee has produced a report telling the executive branch 
how to interpret statutory provisions that might otherwise leave more 
room for executive discretion.  The executive branch has the same 
incentive to follow the language of legislative history as it does to 
comply when members of Congress employ other forms of informal 
pressure—the implicit threat of increased oversight, legislative sanctions 
and decreased cooperation from Congress in the future. 
5.  Informal Supervision of the Appointments Process 
Another way in which Congress informally influences the execution 
of the law is through the appointments process.  Although Congress may 
play no formal role in the appointment of executive branch officials 
other than the Senate’s power of confirmation, members of Congress 
have a great deal of influence over who the President chooses for 
appointments.  The Senate normally recognizes the President’s prerogative 
to appoint high level officials such as Cabinet secretaries and confirms 
nominations to those positions unless the nomination presents very 
serious problems.  With regard to less senior positions, however, 
powerful members of Congress go so far as to “recommend” particular 
persons for positions at the head of or within federal agencies.362  These 
recommendations are accompanied by thinly-veiled or implicit threats of 
withholding the cooperation that the executive branch needs from 
Congress in confirming other choices for this or different appointments, 
 
 361. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, H.R. REP. NO. 
106-939, at 95 (2000) (Conf. Rep.), discussed in Joyce Koo Dalrymple, Human 
Trafficking: Protecting Human Rights in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 25 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L.J. 451 (2005). 
 362. This is not a new practice.  In Laurin Henry’s book on presidential transitions, 
the process for appointment of local postmasters during President Woodrow Wilson’s 
term is recounted.  The normal practice was to consult with the local member of 
Congress.  President Wilson balked at appointing unqualified candidates.  Ultimately, 
Wilson agreed to allow members of Congress to make the choices, subject to the 
President’s right to reject a particular candidate and demand that the member of 
Congress suggest someone else.  LAURIN HENRY, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS 80-82 
(1961). 
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in the annual budget process or when substantive legislation is necessary 
for the administration to pursue its policies.  It is common to see former 
legislative aides and other persons loyal to members of Congress in 
important agency posts.  In bipartisan agencies, when a vacancy belonging 
to the party other than the President’s is open, legislative leaders from 
the other party have a great deal of influence over who the President 
nominates.363  The placement of officers more loyal to members of 
Congress than to the President throughout the federal bureaucracy 
creates an informal pipeline of congressional influence over the 
execution of the law. 
6.  Informal Supervision and Appropriations 
The appropriations process provides another good window for 
observing the way that the legislature employs informal tools to supervise 
the execution of the laws.  Many agencies receive lump-sum appropriations 
that contain only general headings but not specific designations for 
particular programs.364  Lump-sum appropriations are made in response to 
fairly detailed agency budget requests, and the understanding is that an 
agency will spend the money in accord with its budget request even 
though the particulars of the request are not included in the appropriations 
bill365 and even though agency decisions to reallocate funds from a lump-
sum appropriation are not subject to judicial review.366  In effect, the 
agency’s detailed budget request serves as a promise that it will spend the 
money in line with the budget request unless the agency receives 
permission to spend the money in a different manner.367  Permission from 
 363. There is an interesting recent example of disagreement among Democrats over 
a Democratic appointment to the National Transportation Safety Board, with Democratic 
leaders favoring one candidate with strong political credentials and other Democrats 
favoring a different candidate with stronger professional qualifications.  See Rich Klein, 
NTSB Slot Has Kennedy, Kerry at Odds, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 2005, at A4.  It 
apparently goes without saying that Democrats in Congress have the power to make the 
choice. 
 364. See John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional: Radical 
Textualism, Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
489, 564 (2001). 
 365. The intended amounts for each program are often included in a committee 
report, with the expectation that the agency will treat the committee report as if it were a 
statute.  See id. 
 366. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993). 
 367. See also FISHER, supra note 29, at 100 (explaining how an agreement between 
an agency and a congressional committee on the use of appropriated funds replaced the 




Congress to reallocate funds from a lump-sum appropriation does not 
come formally via an amendment to the appropriations legislation, but 
rather informally via a committee’s explicit or tacit consent.368  Under 
longstanding informal arrangements, it is understood that the committee 
will be informed of any significant changes to the agency’s spending plans 
within the lump-sum appropriation and that if the committee disapproves, 
the changes will not be made.369  If the agency violates the terms of the 
understanding between it and the committee, it faces statutory restrictions 
on the use of its funds in the future.370
There are several reasons why Congress does not include all the 
details of the budget in the appropriations bills even though Congress 
cares about how agencies spend their funds.  First, it is expensive to 
specify in writing all of the line items in a spending bill.  It would take a 
large number of staff hours and mistakes would inevitably be made, 
which would require new bills to correct the errors in the original bills.  
Second, there would be political costs to including every item in a line in 
a bill.  Some items would likely be controversial and might provoke 
opposition from the public and from within Congress.  This would slow 
down the appropriations process.  While including every item in the 
appropriations bill might be a victory for openness in government, it 
would come at a great cost to members of Congress who may prefer a 
less-open system that works better and gets their favorite programs 
funded every year with little or no controversy.  Third, both Congress 
and agencies may prefer the flexibility to make adjustments as the 
material and political realities of the fiscal year reveal themselves.  It 
would be much more difficult to adapt if each adjustment required 
legislation. 
7.  Casework 
Another common method of informal congressional involvement in 
the administration of the law is casework.  In recent decades, the size of 
the staffs of members of Congress has increased substantially, and a 
large portion of that increase has been used to provide casework for 
constituents.  With casework, members of Congress provide an avenue 
for relief from problems with the bureaucracy, ranging from simple 
replacement of lost benefits checks to help navigating complex 
legislative veto after Chadha).  See generally MICHAEL W. KIRST, GOVERNMENT 
WITHOUT PASSING LAWS: CONGRESS’ NONSTATUTORY TECHNIQUES FOR APPROPRIATIONS 
CONTROL (2d ed. Univ. of N.C. Press 1969). 
 368. See Roberts, supra note 364. 
 369. See id. 
 370. See id. 
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government approval processes.  Casework by congressional offices 
runs parallel to the agencies’ own methods for resolving problems. 
The distinction between casework and the intervention into agency 
proceedings discussed above is that casework is mundane, dealing 
mainly with simple bureaucratic errors and procedures.  Most of this 
activity does not implicate issues of policy, but casework can morph into 
pressure on agency policy since it is not always clear whether a 
constituent has been the victim of an error or rather a discretionary 
denial of a benefit or permit.  In any case, the fact is that members of 
Congress devote substantial staff resources to helping constituents 
ensure that agencies properly administer the law. 
The primary function of casework is to win loyal voters, sort of pork 
barrel writ small.371  This is one way in which the power of Congress 
over federal spending creates a significant advantage for incumbents 
seeking reelection.  A member of Congress with an effective casework 
operation can win thousands of votes from people who have been helped 
and from the friends and relatives of those who have been helped.  
Agency errors are a good thing for members of Congress because they 
provide them with a way to win voter loyalty.  Rather than appropriate 
sufficient funds for agencies to deal with their own problems or avoid 
them in the first place, Congress redirects funding to their own offices 
and then helps the squeaky wheel get the grease by acting when a 
constituent complains.372  Members of Congress would rather supply the 
grease themselves (and take the credit for doing so) than provide 
agencies with the resources to do so. 
8.  The Normative Critique of Oversight 
What should we make of congressional oversight?  Does oversight 
ameliorate the problem of too much delegation to an undemocratic 
bureaucracy, or does it upset the separation of powers balance in the 
federal government?  In my view, congressional involvement in the 
 371. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON 
ESTABLISHMENT (2d ed. 1989). 
 372. This is a form of “fire alarm” oversight when members of Congress act on 
complaints by constituents rather than “patrolling” the administrative agencies for 
problems.  In many situations, it makes economic sense for members to wait for 
complaints in this fashion, just as fire departments wait at the station for alarms rather 
than patrol the streets for fires.  The classic article on this is McCubbins & Schwartz, 
Congressional Oversight Overlooked, supra note 22. 




administration of the laws is a healthy counterweight to two somewhat 
contradictory problems with the administrative system: the relative 
insulation of agencies from democratic control and the increased 
presidential supervision of agencies in recent years.  The personal power 
of the President appears to have increased substantially in recent years as 
occupants of the office have gone even further than Ronald Reagan in 
their efforts to manage the administration of the law.  When viewed in 
isolation, it may appear that Congress’s involvement is excessive.  
However, when viewed in light of the increases in presidential 
supervision over the last twenty-five years, it is difficult to say whether 
Congress’s influence has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same.  
Congressional administration may be important to maintaining any hope 
for balance. 
This may be heresy to those who read the Constitution as placing all 
power over the execution of the laws in the hands of the President.  
However, as long as Congress does not purport to act with legal effect 
without properly exercising its legislative powers, there is no separation 
of powers problem and the overall effects are probably positive.  
Presidential involvement is more likely to move agency decisions away 
from the preferences of the political community than congressional 
involvement because it is very difficult to know whether the President’s 
views on any single issue are shared by the electorate.  By contrast, the 
535 members of Congress are more likely to represent the spectrum of 
views across the community.  On this understanding, oversight increases 
the transparency and accountability of administrative law. 
There are those who disagree with this assessment, largely on the 
ground that oversight is not a particularly democratic process and may 
skew the outcomes of the administrative process in the direction of 
powerful legislators in leadership positions or on key committees.373  
Oversight occurs largely through the actions of committees, subcommittees 
and individual members of Congress, and there is reason to fear that 
these subgroups do not represent the views of Congress as a whole.374  
 373. See Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability, supra note 18. 
 374. See Seidenfeld, Civic Republican Justification, supra note 18, at 1525.  
Seidenfeld notes two related problems, first that oversight may not represent the views of 
Congress as a whole and second that oversight represents current views and not the views 
of the original coalition that passed the legislation involved.  In my view, the first problem 
is more serious because it entails a charge that oversight is undemocratic.  On the second 
issue, in my view there is nothing theoretically wrong with current views influencing the 
execution of the law.  In fact, we expect that when a new President is elected, the execution 
of the law will be in line with the new President’s policies.  The first problem is explored in 
greater detail, and characterized as one of agency cost between Congress as principal and 
committee as agent in DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 107.  See also Lupia & McCubbins, 
supra note 18; McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 18. 
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Committee chairs in particular have a great deal of power and can use 
that power to push agencies around without much of an indication that a 
majority in Congress would endorse the particular manifestation of 
legislative oversight.375  For example, if an agency acts in response to a 
threat by a single subcommittee chair, the agency’s action may not 
reflect the overall will of Congress or even the committee or subcommittee 
as a whole.  This problem has been described as an example of principal-
agent slack between the majority in Congress (or the legislative coalition 
that passed the legislation being administered) as principal, and the 
committee, subcommittee or individual members of Congress, as 
agents.376  Slack exists in a principal-agent relationship when the agent 
(in our example, the subcommittee chair) fails to carry out the will of the 
principal (in our example, Congress or the enacting coalition). 
A partial answer to this challenge to oversight is that it all takes place 
within a structure created by Congress and that Congress as a whole has, 
in effect, delegated oversight powers to the individuals and groups that 
exercise them, with tacit agreements that make individual members and 
committees free to act without interference from others as long as they 
do not stray too far from overall congressional preferences.  This occurs 
even in the formal legislative process itself, in which committee chairs 
can prevent legislation favored by a majority from reaching the floor and 
in which a few influential legislators can insert language into bills that 
others will vote for out of party discipline or as part of a trade-off for 
their own favored legislation.  Even though power is not distributed 
evenly throughout Congress and members with leadership positions will 
have much more power than others to push agencies toward their 
 375. There is some evidence that campaign contributions may have their greatest 
effect in matters of low visibility before committees.  See Jean R. Schroedel, Campaign 
Contributions and Legislative Outcomes, 39 W. POL. Q. 371 (1986).  Further, lobbying 
groups may allocate contributions, and other means of procuring support, between 
legislators and administrators depending on which entity has the authority to make 
pivotal decisions.  See Guy L. F. Holburn & Richard G. Vanden Bergh, Influencing 
Agencies through Pivotal Political Institutions, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 458 (2004).  The 
authors note that sometimes the pivotal decisionmaker will be on the extreme end of the 
spectrum of views on the relevant subject.  Id. at 461. 
 376. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 107; see also Jonathan Bender & Terry 
M. Moe, Agenda Control, Committee Capture and the Dynamics of Institutional Politics, 
80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1187 (1986); Sean Gailmard, Expertise, Subversion, and 
Bureaucratic Discretion, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 536 (2002) (discussing incentives for 
individual legislators to subvert overall legislative intent). 




preferences, Congress as a whole is responsible for the structure of 
oversight and its substantive outcomes. 
Another positive element of oversight is that it may make an entrenched 
bureaucracy more responsive to the popular will when even the President 
cannot secure control over agency policy.  Oversight can be viewed as a way 
to combat the general insulation of agencies from political accountability.  
Under some circumstances, the views of members of Congress engaged in 
oversight may be closer to those of the President than the views of agency 
officials whose service began before the most recent presidential election.  
For example, after eight years of the Clinton Administration, oversight by 
members of the Republican-dominated Congress might have helped bring 
agency action taken by career officials who were hired or served during 
the Clinton Administration closer to the views of Republican President 
George W. Bush.  While the President’s primary instruments of control 
include the ability to appoint and remove agency heads and other important 
personnel, oversight by powerful members of Congress under these 
circumstances could result in agency policies that are closer to the 
President’s preferences than he might otherwise be able to achieve.377
These are not complete answers to the critique of oversight because 
they may allow for too much deviation from the terms of the legislative 
program and from the preferences of Congress as a whole given that 
oversight does not include the discipline of public majority votes in 
Congress.378  Further, ignoring the principal-agent slack between Congress 
as a whole and those conducting oversight is a bit like saying that, 
because employers do not find it worthwhile to engage in enough 
monitoring to catch every act of stealing by employees, the employees 
have been given permission to steal.  More to the point, although we 
understand that all actors within the administrative process, including the 
President, agency officials, judges conducting judicial review and 
members of Congress, pursue their own aims within the process, this 
does not disable us from criticizing their actions for straying too far from 
congressional intent as embodied in legislation.  There are reasons to be 
wary of a system of oversight that allows individual members of 
Congress, or small groups within Congress, to shape administrative 
 377. Thanks to Michael Harper for suggesting this point. 
 378. As noted, because I find oversight that reflects the views of the current Congress 
perfectly acceptable, I find the second problem more serious than the first.  See 
Seindenfeld, Civic Republican Justification, supra note 18, at 1525, and text accompanying 
note 374.  Mark Seidenfeld’s criticism of oversight rests on the view that agencies, because 
of their expertise and relative isolation from the political process, are more deliberative than 
congressional committees and thus more likely to pursue the public interest as understood 
from the “civic republicanism” perspective.  See Seidenfeld, Civic Republican Justification, 
supra note 18, at 1515. 
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action.  The mechanisms within Congress for disciplining members for 
abusing their authority by thwarting the will of Congress may not be 
strong enough to ensure that oversight reflects the priorities of Congress 
as a whole.  Action taken in response to oversight by a congressional 
committee may be less problematic than action in response to pressure 
from a single member, because the hearings are public and the 
membership of the committee is somewhat reflective of the membership 
of Congress as a whole, but this is far from perfect.  Even a relatively 
large and bipartisan committee membership may reflect a special interest 
in an issue from a perspective not shared throughout Congress under 
conditions in which no one has sufficient incentive to challenge the 
committee’s actions.379
Does this mean that we should take steps to limit oversight?  In my 
view, the question here becomes a matter of the second best.  If 
oversight activities were reduced or reshaped so as to avoid the 
principal-agent problem, the system would probably worsen because 
agencies would then be freer to act in line with their own preferences 
with much less regard for congressional intent.  At present, agencies act 
within the universe of the preferences of the President, the federal 
courts, Congress as a whole and those conducting oversight, whose 
views may or may not reflect the preferences of Congress as a whole.  
Judicial review and presidential supervision are, in my view, inferior 
methods of ensuring that agencies are responsive to the will of their 
ultimate principals.  Presidential supervision without effective congressional 
oversight is more of a threat to democratic values than congressional 
oversight because it can occur privately, and the President may have 
been elected for reasons completely unrelated to the particular regulatory 
issues involved.  Judicial review is episodic, limited to those controversies 
that present justiciable cases, and is subject to the will of judges who are 
even less connected to the popular will than members of Congress.380  
 379. Because most oversight is informal, that is, no subgroup in Congress takes 
action that purports to have legal effect, oversight does not violate the rule against 
legislative vetoes.  Arguably, however, oversight by narrow groups within Congress is in 
tension with the values underlying the bicameralism and presentment requirements 
which counsel against allowing a subgroup within Congress to affect legal rights and 
duties. 
 380. See Beermann, supra note 173; Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory 
Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 66-86 (1991).  For a more 
optimistic view on the possibility of judicial action to advance the public interest see 
Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). 




Unless someone provides a convincing argument that judges pursue the 
public good, as embodied in congressional legislation, as opposed to 
their own private interests, including seeing their own political ideals 
enacted into law, there is good reason to doubt that judicial review 
presents the greatest promise for enforcing and enacting Congress’s 
will.381  Perhaps reforms to oversight would be desirable, but it appears 
that this is a case in which care must be exercised to avoid creating a 
cure that is worse than the disease. 
In summary, Congress has many methods, both formal and informal, 
to supervise the day to day execution of the laws.  Formally, Congress’s 
legislative power and the Senate’s power of advice and consent over 
presidential appointments are potent tools for influencing the administration’s 
execution of the laws.  Congress’s power over the budget, and its power 
to prescribe the substance and procedures governing the execution of the 
laws, force the executive branch to remain attentive to Congress’s 
wishes as it executes the laws passed by Congress.  Congress also 
engages in constant informal monitoring of, and input into, the execution 
of the laws.  Hearings, investigations, ex parte contacts, tacit agreements 
and “recommendations” for appointments provide Congress with the 
ability to, if not control, at least strongly influence the execution of the 
law.  From Congress’s perspective, the executive branch is its agent, and 
Congress does whatever it can within, and sometimes without, the 
Constitution to make it so. 
II.  CONGRESSIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
In this section, I look at what I consider the “big three” of administrative 
law doctrines—the nondelegation doctrine, which regulates the degree 
of discretion Congress may delegate to agencies, the Chevron doctrine, 
which specifies the standard of review of agency decisions of statutory 
construction,382 and the Vermont Yankee doctrine, which holds that 
courts may not impose on agencies procedural requirements beyond 
those required by the Constitution and applicable statues and rules.383  
The goal of this section is to examine whether our understanding of 
these doctrines should be altered based on a better understanding of 
congressional administration. 
 381. But see Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability, supra note 18, at 1095 
(concluding that judicial review is superior to political review for ensuring the “legality 
and wisdom of agency decisions”). 
 382. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984). 
 383. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 
519, 524 (1978). 
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A.  The Nondelegation Doctrine 
The nondelegation doctrine is a black letter rule that prohibits 
Congress from delegating its legislative power.384  This rule is rarely 
applied, and the term “nondelegation doctrine” as used in most 
circumstances is really a misnomer for a doctrine that allows Congress 
to delegate a great deal of discretionary authority to the executive 
branch.385  As Tom Merrill recently put it, our understanding of delegation 
comprises two competing postulates: “The first says only Congress may 
exercise legislative power.  The second says only Congress may delegate 
legislative power.”386  So understood, the nondelegation doctrine, which 
allows Congress to delegate to administrative agencies the power to 
make legislative rules, is one of the pillars of the administrative state.  
Without the authority to delegate, the administrative state would only 
slightly resemble the current governmental structure.  In matters involving 
only the execution of the laws,387 while there is always some discretion 
inherent in enforcing the law, the President would be more of a 
ministerial employee of Congress, and Congress would be required to 
write statutes containing nearly all of the details that are now included in 
administrative rules.388  This means that in those areas in which the 
President depends on Congress for discretionary authority, the powers of 
the two branches are symbiotic rather than competitive.  In other words, 
 384. See Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935). 
 385. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I: From Nondelegation to 
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097 (2004).  I do not mean to take sides in 
the debate over whether there is or should be a nondelegation doctrine in the Constitution.  
Compare Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (2005) (arguing that limits on 
delegation of discretion to the executive branch are required by the word “proper” in the 
Necessary and Proper Clause) with Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002) (arguing that there should be no 
nondelegation doctrine beyond the bare prohibition on the delegation of power to make 
actual laws).  As a positive matter, I do not think it is controversial that the conventional 
nondelegation doctrine does not significantly rein in Congress’s proclivity to delegate 
discretion. 
 386. See Merrill, supra note 385, at 2099. 
 387. In areas in which the President’s authority does not depend on delegations 
from Congress, the President would retain discretion even in the absence of the current 
permissive nondelegation doctrine. 
 388. Adjudicatory agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and National 
Labor Relations Board might survive a more restrictive nondelegation doctrine although 
they would not be able to make legislative rules to supplement or supplant the case by 
case adjudicatory decisionmaking process. 




reducing Congress’s power to delegate would not increase the executive 
branch’s power.  Instead, it would decrease it since the President and the 
agencies would no longer be able to receive delegated discretionary 
authority. 
The conventional nondelegation doctrine is not confined to a 
prohibition of Congress granting to someone else the actual legal power 
to make public or private laws.  Rather, the doctrine also limits 
Congress’s power to delegate discretionary authority to make rules or 
other pronouncements with the force of law.  This limit is expressed by 
the Supreme Court as the “intelligible principle” doctrine, which allows 
Congress to delegate as long as it legislates an intelligible principle 
under which the agency must act.389  The intelligible principle doctrine is 
very lenient, requiring only that Congress identify an agency’s jurisdiction 
and point it in the desired direction.390  The best examples of the breadth 
of allowable agency discretion are goals-type statutes, such as the Clean 
Air Act, under which Congress legislated the goal of clean air and 
allowed the EPA to fill in details such as the definition of clean air and 
what specific limits should be placed on sources of pollution.391
Should the fact of congressional administration alter our understanding of 
the nondelegation doctrine?  In my view, it should.  Because Congress 
exercises a great deal of control over the discretionary activity of the 
executive branch, then insofar as the basis for the nondelegation doctrine 
is to ensure that Congress maintains control over important government 
decisions,392 we should embrace the lenient nondelegation doctrine 
because Congress is able to keep tabs on the exercise of the delegated 
discretion.  This approach to nondelegation is not new.  It was advocated 
as long ago as 1969 by Kenneth Culp Davis393 and may help explain at 
least one lower court decision that in 1971 upheld the delegation to the 
President to take action to stabilize wages and prices.394
Further, informing the lenient nondelegation doctrine with the realities 
of congressional administration is consistent with longstanding separation 
of powers principles.  Because nondelegation challenges cannot be 
decided with resort to a simple procedural provision of the Constitution 
(unless Congress delegates the actual legal authority to legislate, which 
 389. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). 
 390. See Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
 391. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 462, 471. 
 392. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-88 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 393. See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 
715 (1969).  Davis advocated looking at all the safeguards that prevent agencies from 
exercising uncontrolled power. 
 394. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). 
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would violate the procedures in the Constitution for passing bills), a 
standard for nondelegation challenges must be constructed in light of 
general separation of powers concerns.  General separation of powers 
standards are concerned with whether Congress is engaged in self-
aggrandizement or whether another branch has been unduly restricted in 
its ability to function.395  These are institutional realities rather than 
legalistic considerations.  For example, when the Supreme Court upheld 
the provision for independent prosecutors in the Ethics in Government 
Act, Justice Scalia’s strongest argument in dissent was that the majority 
did not appreciate just how difficult the law made it for the President to 
exercise his power to execute the law.396  Another good example of this 
style of separation of powers reasoning is the Court’s opinion upholding 
legislation that allowed the government to take control of President 
Richard Nixon’s papers.397  The Supreme Court, in its opinion rejecting 
Nixon’s challenge to the law requiring him to turn his papers over to the 
government, seemed much more concerned with institutional realities, 
such as the fact that the papers would remain in the custody of executive 
branch officials and that President Ford signed the legislation, than with 
doctrinal niceties.398  In delegating, Congress is not hindering any other 
branch from performing its constitutional functions and there is no 
danger that Congress’s own power will be overly limited, since 
Congress can always repeal or narrow the delegation.  Thus, taking 
into account the realities of congressional administration, the 
nondelegation doctrine should remain lenient and delegation should not 
be feared by those concerned with separation of powers. 
Although the current intelligible principle doctrine for determining 
whether Congress has delegated too much discretion may set a proper, 
lenient level of nondelegation scrutiny, it does not explicitly take 
account of congressional involvement and thus is not subject to 
adjustment in cases in which such involvement is absent.  However, the 
nondelegation doctrine could be made explicitly sensitive to the reality 
of congressional supervision of the administration of the laws.  For 
example, the nondelegation doctrine might be more lenient with regard 
 395. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694-96 (1988); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. 
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (“[T]he proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it 
prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned 
functions.”). 
 396. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 397. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 425. 
 398. Id. 




to agencies required to make their rules pursuant to public rulemaking 
procedures because these, and the requirements of the Congressional 
Review Act,399 facilitate congressional involvement in the rulemaking 
process.  A court might require a somewhat more detailed intelligible 
principle in a statute that delegates rulemaking power that is not subject 
to the APA’s rulemaking procedures or the requirements of the 
Congressional Review Act, although even then, ex post oversight might 
be enough to justify lenient nondelegation norms.400  In sum, the fact of 
congressional administration supports the leniency of the nondelegation 
doctrine, at least in those situations in which the agency action is public 
enough to provide an adequate opportunity for oversight. 
B.  The Chevron Doctrine 
The second pillar of contemporary administrative law examined here 
is the Chevron doctrine.401  The Chevron doctrine comprises a set of 
rules governing the degree to which courts should defer to agency 
statutory interpretation,402 but it has achieved iconic status, perhaps 
because of what it has to say about the relationship among the three 
branches of the federal government in the administrative state.  The 
problem with analyzing Chevron in light of congressional administration 
is that the doctrine is somewhat difficult to describe accurately because 
the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, are not consistent about it. 
The Chevron decision, itself, signaled that significantly greater 
deference would be given to agency interpretations of the statute that the 
agency administers.403  That is certainly how lower courts and commentators 
 399. 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2000). 
 400. This analysis assumes that congressional administration restrains executive 
discretion in a positive way by making the executive more responsive to the will of 
Congress.  As discussed above, the unrepresentative nature of a great deal of oversight 
may mean that the administration becomes particularly responsive to a few powerful 
members of Congress but not to the preferences of Congress as a whole.  If this critique 
is accurate, then congressional administration becomes at worst neutral on the 
nondelegation issue.  That is, congressional administration would not detract from the 
reasoning that has led to a lenient nondelegation doctrine, but it would not add to it 
either. 
 401. Named for Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). 
 402. Id. at 842-43. 
 403. One recent study concludes that after Chevron, the level of deference the 
Supreme Court shows toward agencies has increased with regard to both formal and 
informal agency action.  See RUTH ANN WATRY, ADMINISTRATIVE STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: THE AFTERMATH OF CHEVRON V. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL 
(2002). 
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understood it at the time.404  The Chevron Court outlined a two step 
process for judicial review of agency interpretations.405  In step one, the 
Court stated that agencies and courts are bound to follow Congress’s 
clearly expressed intent.406  The Court indicated that Congress’s intent 
would be viewed as clear only when “Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue.”407  The phrases “directly spoken” and 
“precise question” point toward a narrow scope for step one.  However, 
in later cases, the Court has broadened the reach of step one by relying 
on “traditional tools of statutory construction” and other factors to 
discern clear congressional intent.  Post-Chevron cases have employed, 
among other tools, the plain meaning rule,408 canons of statutory 
construction,409 the structure and history of regulation in an area,410 and 
the relationship between the provision under construction and other 
provisions411 to discern and apply Chevron step one and reject agency 
interpretations.412  At the Supreme Court, Chevron is invoked both 
against and in favor of deference to agency statutory interpretation. 
Deciding whether a case should be resolved under Chevron step one is 
another way of deciding whether the agency decision under review 
should receive any deference at all.  If a case is resolved under step one, 
this means that the reviewing court finds that the statute is clear, and the 
court then measures the agency action against that clear meaning.  No 
deference is shown to agency interpretations in cases resolved under 
Chevron step one.  It is the steady expansion of the universe of cases that 
is resolved at step one that has transformed the Chevron doctrine, at least 
at the Supreme Court level, from a doctrine of deference to a doctrine of 
de novo review of agency statutory interpretation.  The devices courts 
have used in step one cases, including the plain meaning rule, the other 
 404. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An 
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984; Richard Pierce, Jr., 
Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1110, 1122-27 
(1995). 
 405. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. 
 408. MCI Telecomm’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
 409. Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26 (1990). 
 410. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 411. Id. 
 412. See Board of County Comm’rs v. EEOC, 405 F.3d 840 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(“Applying Chevron’s two-step test, we first conduct a de novo review to determine 
whether the plain language of the applicable statutory provisions clearly demonstrates 
congressional intent.”). 




canons of statutory interpretation, and relating the issue under review to 
other statutes to determine which statutory meaning would best comport 
with the structure and history of regulation, are all helpful devices that 
courts can use to discern statutory meaning.  However, in most cases 
they help fill gaps in the specific coverage of the statute rather than 
reveal an actual intent on the part of members of Congress regarding the 
particular question.413  For example, although the Court resolved the Brown 
& Williamson case under Chevron step one,414 no one really knows 
whether Congress intended for the FDA to be able to regulate tobacco 
products.  The Court’s reasoning against agency power may be persuasive, 
but the expertise and political accountability of the head of the FDA may 
have made him a more reliable decisionmaker on that matter.   
In cases in which Chevron applies but cannot be resolved under step 
one, review becomes very deferential.415  The Court specified in step two 
of Chevron that when Congress leaves a gap in a statute or when a 
statute is unclear, courts should defer to permissible (in the case of gaps) 
or reasonable (in the case of lack of clarity) agency interpretations.416  The 
theory justifying deference in these cases is that Congress intends, 
explicitly when it leaves a gap and implicitly when it is unclear, for the 
agency to be the primary interpretive body.  Although the Court has not 
had much to say on the matter, it appears that step two simply asks 
whether an agency’s interpretation is reasonable or permissible.417
Understanding how congressional administration should affect Chevron 
requires some consideration of the basis or bases of the Chevron 
doctrine.  This inquiry is complicated by the two-faced nature of Chevron.  
A doctrine of antideference will have a much different normative basis 
than a doctrine of deference.  There are at least three bases that have 
been relied upon by the authors and supporters of the original, 
deferential, version of Chevron.  First, Congress intends for agencies to 
be the primary interpreters of statutes they administer.  Second, agencies 
may be better than courts at discerning and applying congressional 
intent.  The agencies are closer to the political process that created the 
statutes they administer, and their expertise makes them better able to 
sensibly apply those statutes to new, and perhaps unforeseen, 
circumstances.  Third, agencies are politically accountable through the 
President.  While this accountability may be attenuated, it is superior to 
 413. Cf. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).  
 414. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120. 
 415. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1256 (1997). 
 416. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
 417. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 534-35 (2002); Levin, 
supra note 415, at 1260-62. 
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the virtual insulation of federal judges from politics.  If agencies are 
relatively better at statutory interpretation than courts and are more 
politically accountable, then a deferential Chevron doctrine is preferable 
to a nondeferential attitude toward agency interpretations. 
What are the bases for a nondeferential version of Chevron, in which 
agency statutory interpretation decisions are essentially reviewed de 
novo using traditional tools of statutory interpretation?  Fundamentally, 
a combination of factors explains why the Court has turned away from 
the deferential version of Chevron.  First, the Court is an activist 
institution with final say, and it appears that the Court finds it difficult to 
step aside and allow an agency to interpret a statute contrary to what the 
Court believes is the most accurate (in terms of legislative intent) or best 
(in terms of policy) meaning of the statute.  This tendency is supported 
by the traditional norm that questions of law are for the courts and also 
by the separation of powers doubts that were raised about Chevron.418  It 
should thus not be surprising that a doctrine of extreme deference to 
agency statutory interpretations would not survive for long.  Further, 
Chevron seemed inconsistent with the notion that the relative insulation 
of the courts from politics and federal judges’ superior legal skills make 
them better at statutory interpretation than agencies. 
How congressional administration should affect Chevron depends on 
which Chevron is being analyzed.  Sustained congressional involvement 
in the administration of the law bolsters the bases for original, very 
deferential, Chevron.419  Congressional administration reinforces the notion 
that agencies have more information about the political process from 
which the interpreted statute emerged and should thus be in a better 
position than the courts to discern the meaning of the statute.  Further, 
 418. See Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretations of Statutes: 
An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 261 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, 
Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989). 
 419. The analysis is quite different if one takes a negative view of congressional 
administration.  On the negative view of congressional administration, a few members of 
Congress are able to advance their views without regard to whether they reflect the will 
of the majority in Congress.  There would be no reason for confidence that agencies are 
doing a better job of interpreting congressional intent than courts.  Under prevailing 
norms, the federal courts are supposed to be searching for the meaning of statutes, and 
they are less likely to be influenced by the politics of the moment than agency officials 
under intense pressure from powerful members of Congress.  A deferential version of 
Chevron increases the likelihood that agencies will be able to stray from the original 
meaning of statutes. 




agencies are even more politically accountable than originally understood 
because they answer to the President and to Congress as well as to the 
courts on judicial review.420  On this view, the movement away from a 
deferential Chevron to an enlarged, nondeferential step one, has been 
misguided because it is insensitive to the superior position occupied by 
agencies vis-à-vis discerning and applying Congress’s intent.  The more 
that Congress is involved in the administration of the law, the larger the 
relative advantage enjoyed by agencies over courts in interpreting 
statutes administered by agencies.  In general, congressional administration 
counsels against an expansive view of what materials are relevant to the 
step one inquiry, because agencies are in a better position than courts to 
discern clear congressional intent.   
The Chevron decision has spawned an enormous body of case law and 
academic commentary on a wide spectrum of issues, including whether 
the doctrine itself is consistent with separation of powers, the effect of 
the Chevron doctrine on affirmance rates,421 when the doctrine should 
apply,422 and what sort of analysis courts should use to determine 
whether Congress’s intent is sufficiently clear to allow the case to be 
resolved under step one.  These last two issues have become very important 
to determining the degree of deference courts will show to the agency’s 
decision. 
In terms of when Chevron should apply, on the one hand, 
congressional administration counsels in favor of applying Chevron 
when there are likely to be good channels of communication between 
Congress and the agency and, on the other hand, against applying 
Chevron when there are not.  This understanding may actually be 
somewhat consistent with the Supreme Court’s current doctrine.  In 
recent cases, the Court appears to have settled on a domain for Chevron 
that takes into account the formality of the procedures Congress 
empowers the agency to use.423  For example, in United States v. 
 420. Here, I find myself in disagreement with Dean Kagan’s apparent suggestion 
that Chevron deference be accorded to interpretations by executive branch agencies but 
not to those of independent agencies because independent agencies are not accountable 
to the President.  Independent agencies are politically accountable to Congress, and 
being that it is Congress’s intent that is involved in statutory interpretation cases, that 
accountability may be superior for Chevron purposes to accountability through the 
President.  See Kagan, supra note 19, at 2376-77; see also Morrison, supra note 20, at 
1701. 
 421. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994). 
 422. On the application of Chevron in customs decisions, see Michael Cornell 
Dypski, Standard of Judicial Review for Administrative Decisions of the United States 
Customs Service: Past, Present, and Future, 28 N.C. J. INTL. L. & COM. REG. 103 (2002). 
 423. The Court has held that only agency decisions with the “force of law” are 
entitled to Chevron deference, and that whether an agency decision has the force of law 
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Mead,424 the Court held that an agency statutory interpretation that 
formed the basis of a “ruling letter” that was issued without notice and 
comment, but rather as part of an internal enforcement process, was not 
entitled to Chevron deference.425  Rather, less formal decisions such as 
this one are entitled to what is known as Skidmore deference, after 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.:426
“[T]he well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a statute ‘constitute a 
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance,’” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) 
(quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S., at 139-140), and “[w]e have long recognized that 
considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s 
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . .” Chevron, 
supra, at 844, (footnote omitted); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 
444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 
450 (1978).  The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own 
statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked 
to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative 
expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position, see Skidmore, 
supra, at 139-140.427
There are two aspects of decisions made without advance public 
proceedings that should caution against Chevron deference, and one that 
may point the other way.  First, the lack of public proceedings makes it 
less likely that substantial communication between members of 
Congress and agency officials took place before the decision was made, 
because no one, including members of Congress, may have notice that 
an agency decision is imminent.  Second, the private nature of the 
proceedings means that any communication between members of 
Congress and agency officials that did take place was likely also to be 
private, perhaps provoked by a complaint from a constituent, and 
congressional pressure is more unlikely than usual to reflect widely-held 
views on the subject matter.  In other words, this is a situation in which 
the negative aspects of congressional administration may counsel against 
is determined by whether Congress prescribed a relatively formal procedure such as 
adjudication or notice and comment rulemaking.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218 (2001).  Historically, the rule may have been that agency decisions were 
considered to have the force of law (and thus receive deference) only when Congress 
specified that the violation of the agency decision carried a sanction.  See Thomas 
Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules With the Force of Law: The Original 
Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002). 
 424. Mead, 533 U.S. at 218. 
 425. Id. at 227-28. 
 426. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 427. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227-28 (parallel citations omitted).   




deference.  On the other side of the coin, less formal, day to day decisions 
are likely to involve substantial agency expertise and, in the absence of 
congressional pressure, may be apolitical enough to allow us to assume 
that the agency is acting in pursuit of the public interest, which is when 
deference is most warranted. 
In sum, insofar as congressional administration counsels in favor of 
greater deference to agency decisions, it supports the Chevron decision 
generally, and more specifically the original version of Chevron under 
which agency decisions would receive deference unless Congress had 
spoken to the very issue under review.  Congressional administration 
does not, however, support the extension of Chevron’s domain beyond 
those decisions in which congressional input and influence is likely, a 
universe of decisions that may correspond roughly with the boundaries 
drawn in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
C.  The Vermont Yankee Doctrine 
The final pillar of administrative law discussed here is the Vermont 
Yankee doctrine.428  This doctrine holds that unless additional procedures 
are constitutionally required, courts may not impose procedural 
requirements on agencies in addition to those specified in applicable 
statutes and rules.429  This doctrine was imposed by the Supreme Court 
in reaction to a tendency of some lower courts, principally the D.C. 
Circuit, to adjust the level of procedure required in agency proceedings 
in reaction to the importance or complexity of the particular proceeding.  
This phenomenon occurred most often on judicial review of agency 
rulemaking proceedings.430  The most common manifestations of this 
tendency were for lower courts to require additional rounds of notice and 
comment in complex rulemakings and for lower courts to require oral 
presentation of evidence with the opportunity for opposing parties to 
cross-examine witnesses to determine the basis for the rules made.431  
 428. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 
519 (1978). 
 429. Id. at 543-44. 
 430. See, e.g., Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967). 
 431. These lower court decisions were often characterized as imposing “hybrid” 
procedures on agencies because they imported elements of judicial procedure into the 
legislative model created by the APA for agency rulemaking.  This practice, and the 
general practice of strict application of procedural requirements on judicial review of 
agency rulemaking, led to claims that the rulemaking process had become so difficult 
and risky that agencies were doing everything they could to avoid it.  The critics 
characterized the entire package as “ossification” of the rulemaking process.  For a 
useful exchange on this issue, see Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Ossification: 
Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment 
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The lower courts supported their actions by arguing that without 
additional procedures, the record on judicial review would be 
insufficient to support the agency’s ultimate decisions.432  These courts 
may also have been concerned with the perception that agencies were 
not very responsive to the public will and that agency deliberations were 
somewhat hidden from public view and thus subject to all of the abuses 
inherent in political systems that lack transparency. 
The Vermont Yankee doctrine is based on powerful arguments of 
policy and principle.  As a policy matter, judicial fine tuning of the level 
of procedure required in each agency proceeding put agencies in the 
very difficult position of having to predict in advance both the level of 
complexity of each proceeding and the judicial reaction to their choice 
of procedures for each proceeding.  This made the whole process 
very unpredictable and created a strong incentive for agencies to 
overproceduralize to avoid being reversed for procedural reasons on 
judicial review.  This undercut Congress’s apparent intent to allow 
relatively informal procedures for most rulemakings and adjudications. 
These policy reasons are reinforced by more fundamental problems 
with pre-Vermont Yankee practice.  Courts were, in effect, imposing a 
quasi-judicial model on informal agency procedures such as rulemaking 
and informal adjudication.  This usurped Congress’s power to prescribe 
agency procedures and was a fundamental misconception of the nature 
of informal agency proceedings.  When Congress specified informal 
procedures, it intended that agency decisions would be supported by the 
type of record that would be produced using those informal procedures.  
For example, rulemakings were intended by Congress to be legislative in 
nature, and thus a record supported by the informal, legislative 
rulemaking process should normally be adequate to support a rule.  By 
demanding a more developed record, courts were imposing a standard 
that could not be met by an agency employing the procedures specified 
by Congress. 
Even after the Supreme Court came down very hard against judicially 
prescribed procedures in addition to those in applicable statutes and 
rules, the lower federal courts have not lost their appetite for procedural 
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the 
Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525 
(1997); Mark Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review in a World of Techno-Bureaucratic 
Decisionmaking: A Reply to Professor McGarity, 75 TEX. L. REV. 559 (1997). 
 432. See, e.g., Braniff, 379 F.2d 453. 




fine tuning with minimal statutory support.  Courts continue to interpret 
some statutory requirements in ways that create the same problems of 
predictability and legitimacy that the Court acted against in Vermont 
Yankee.  For example, consider the way lower courts have applied the 
notice requirement of the APA’s informal rulemaking provision.433  The 
statute imposes only the minimal requirements of notice of “the terms or 
substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues 
involved.”434  Courts have invalidated agency rules that meet those 
requirements when the comments convince agencies to issue final rules 
that deviate substantially from the proposal. 435  It is very difficult for an 
agency to know in advance whether comments will lead to changes in 
the proposal, and under the reasoning of Vermont Yankee, as long as the 
agency complied with all statutory requirements, it should not be 
required to employ additional procedures, such as an additional round of 
notice and comment when comments lead it to make substantial changes 
between the proposal and the final rule.  And consider the decisions 
discussed above regarding ex parte communications in rulemaking—the 
APA does not prohibit ex parte contacts in rulemaking, yet courts have 
stated that ex parte communications are prohibited in rulemaking and 
have constructed rules requiring that summaries of such communications 
be placed on the public rulemaking record.436  These, and additional 
examples,437 establish that the lower federal courts continue to impose 
nonstatutory procedural requirements even after the Supreme Court has 
twice stated that the practice is forbidden.438
 433. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). 
 434. Id. 
 435. See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985); Sprint 
Corp. v. FCC, 315 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  The lower courts have created a set of 
doctrines under which agencies may not adopt final rules that result in “material 
alterations” of the proposed rules or that are not the “logical outgrowth” of the proposed 
rules, without subjecting the new rules to another round of notice and comment.  While 
these decisions may seem necessary to ensure the transparency of agency proceedings 
(otherwise an agency could hide its true proposal) and the fairness of agency proceedings 
(otherwise an affected party may not realize her interests are at stake), they go 
substantially beyond the language of the notice requirement. See Am. Water Works 
Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 436. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 437. See, e.g., Ober v. EPA, 84 F.3d 304 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that agency must 
reopen notice and comment period if it wishes to rely on comments received after the 
close of the initial comment period). 
 438. Richard Pierce believes that if the Supreme Court took cases on these issues, it 
would overrule the lower courts because the Supreme Court sees a greater role for 
politics in the administrative system than do the lower courts.  See Pierce, supra note 
332, at 515-19.  My only quibble with Pierce’s prediction is that he predicates the failure 
of the Court to overrule the decisions until now on an inability to “fit the issues on its 
crowded docket.”  Id. at 515.  With the Court deciding fewer than a hundred cases per 
year, there is plenty of room for any issue the Court sees fit to decide.  This makes me 
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What does congressional administration have to do with all of this?  In 
my view, the Vermont Yankee doctrine is a natural corollary to 
congressional administration.  The fundamental basis of the Vermont 
Yankee doctrine is that Congress has, through the APA and other 
statutes, struck a balance concerning agency procedure that the courts 
have no authority to disregard, absent unconstitutionality.  The ongoing 
relationship between Congress and the agencies reinforces Congress’s 
authority.  The more influence that Congress has over the formulation of 
policy within agencies, the less need there is for judicial intervention to 
increase agency procedures.  The lack of formality within an agency is 
less a cause for concern when agency action is situated within the 
political process.  Between Congress and the executive branch, there is 
plenty of political accountability to support most agency actions, and 
oversight can take care of those situations in which, although all statutes 
have been obeyed, there is reason to believe that greater procedural 
protections should be afforded to those with an interest in administrative 
action.  There is no reason for judicial interference in the procedures 
established legislatively.439
wonder whether the Court’s failure to resolve these issues lies in the Court’s happiness 
with results that may not fit easily into the Court’s overall jurisprudence of 
administrative procedure. 
 439. On the negative view of oversight, congressional administration exacerbates 
the problems inherent in the relative lack of transparency of agency proceedings, and 
perhaps courts should act to make sure that agencies are fair to those affected by their 
actions.  On this view, the Vermont Yankee doctrine is misguided insofar as it prevents 
courts from increasing the transparency of agency proceedings to ensure that agencies 
are not overly influenced by power interests represented by members of Congress.  
Cross-examination of witnesses or some other method for deeper examination of the 
evidence supporting agencies’ decisions might reveal instances in which agencies were 
overly influenced by political factors when expertise should have dominated.  However, 
even if one takes the negative view of congressional administration, no alteration of 
current law might be necessary.  The Vermont Yankee doctrine has not been applied in a 
very strict manner, and courts have plenty of tools to deal with procedural problems at 
the agencies.  The Vermont Yankee rule prohibits courts from creating new procedural 
requirements by going outside applicable statutes and rules, but does not prevent courts 
from interpreting existing procedural requirements broadly to increase fairness and 
openness.  The rules discussed above discouraging ex parte contacts with agencies 
during the pendency of rulemaking proceedings and requiring that the contents of any 
such contacts be placed on the record are one example of expansive interpretations of the 
APA and other statutes.  The lower courts’ application of the notice requirement in 
rulemaking is another example of a broad reading of an APA requirement that increases the 
fairness and transparency of agency proceedings.  Under currently prevailing understandings, 
as long as a court reversing an agency on procedural grounds relies only on preexisting 
statutes or rules, there is no Vermont Yankee violation even if the application of the statutes or 
rules is expansive.  The Supreme Court may, in the interests of certainty and predictability, 




III.  CONCLUSION 
Congress is intimately involved in the execution of the law, both 
formally through legislative and other controls on the executive branch 
and informally through oversight, investigations, direct contacts, and 
other political methods.  The extensive network of formal and informal 
oversight gives Congress a great deal of influence over the execution of 
the law without exceeding constitutional limits on congressional action.  
The law should recognize that Congress remains keenly interested in the 
execution of the law even when it has delegated substantial discretion to 
administrative agencies.  The reality of congressional administration is 
consistent with the lenient nondelegation doctrine, the deferential 
version of the Chevron doctrine and the Vermont Yankee doctrine, with 
the caveat that the results might be different if oversight gives power 
only to a narrow group within Congress which is particularly interested 
in the administration of the particular law and whose preferences deviate 
substantially from those of Congress as a whole. 
 
rein in this practice, but the lower courts have been doing this for a long time without 
interference from the Supreme Court. 
